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on Collective Decision-Making |
| By: | James Alm (Department of Economics, Tulane University) |
| Abstract: | Taxpayers face well-known and well-identified individual motivations in their compliance decisions, motivations that originate with the standard economic model of tax evasion in which financial incentives are shaped by audit, penalty, and tax rates. However, there is growing evidence that these individual incentives, while important, are not always decisive. Individuals do not always behave as the selfish, rational, self-interested individuals portrayed in the standard neoclassical paradigm, but rather are often motivated by many other factors that have as their main foundation some aspects of social norms, morality, altruism, fairness, or the like, factors that I broadly and no doubt imprecisely lump together as group motivations. I argue that the compliance puzzle can be explained, at least in part, by expanding the standard analysis of individual compliance behavior to incorporate the important ways in which individual decisions are shaped by group motivations. I also provide empirical and experimental evidence to support these arguments, and, I suggest – and predict – some promising lines of future research. |
| Keywords: | tax evasion, behavioral economics, experimental economics |
| JEL: | H2 H26 D03 C9 |
| Date: | 2013–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tul:wpaper:1309&r=cdm |
| By: | Jeroen Hinloopen (University of Amsterdam); Grega Smrkolj (University of Amsterdam); Florian Wagener (University of Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We examine the trade-off between the benefits of allowing firms to cooperate in R&D and the corresponding increased potential for product market collusion. For that we utilize a dynamic model of R&D whereby we consider all possible initial marginal cost levels (technologies), including those that exceed the choke price. This global analysis yields four possibilities: initial marginal costs are above the choke price and this technology is, or is not, developed further, and initial marginal costs are below the choke price and the technology is, or is not, (eventually) taken off the market. We show that an extension of the cooperative agreement towards collusion in the product market is not necessarily welfare reducing: if firms collude, they (i) develop further a wider range of initial technologies, (ii) invest more in R&D such that process innovations are pursued more quickly, and (iii) abandon the technology for a smaller set of initial marginal costs. We also dis cuss the implications of our analysis for antitrust policy. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust policy; Bifurcations; Collusion; R&D cooperatives; Spillovers |
| JEL: | D43 D92 L13 L41 O31 O38 |
| Date: | 2013–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20130045&r=cdm |
| By: | Heimeshoff, Ulrich; Klein, Gordon J. |
| Abstract: | Bargaining Power of retailers is an important aspect of discourse in many industrialized countries, including Germany, Portugal, the UK, and the USA. In Germany the Federal Cartel Office argues that strong bargaining power of retailers presents danger for workable competition in the market. Furthermore, significant bargaining power on the retailer side is often assumed a priori without further investigation. Based on a treatment effect study using difference-in-differences techniques we show, that even small suppliers can have superior bargaining power against retailers depending on their shares on local markets. We do not argue that retailers have no bargaining power at all, but we want to show, that the division of bargaining power between the two sides of the markets varies from product to product and is also a dynamic phenomenon which changes over time. As a result, the a priori assumption of bargaining power of retailers can be very misleading. -- |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:dicedp:87&r=cdm |
| By: | Berardi, N. |
| Abstract: | We develop a theoretical framework that considers the role played by moral hazard and the diversity of networks and cultures in the choice of hiring channel. In favoritism contexts social networks, and particularly strong ties, are adopted as hiring channels for unskilled jobs and result in wage penalties, while otherwise the opposite happens. We estimate an endogenous switching model for the case of Senegal's manufacturing formal sector and find, consistently with our theoretical predictions in case of favoritism, that informal hiring channels are preferred to fill unskilled vacancies and are associated with a wage penalty, especially when ties are stronger. |
| Keywords: | Social networks, Hiring channel, Wage differential. |
| JEL: | O12 J31 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:429&r=cdm |
| By: | Huanxiu GUO; Mary-Françoise RENARD |
| Abstract: | Since 2003, a grass-roots movement of New Rural Reconstruction (NRR) has emerged in China to experience alternative model of rural development. The movement adopts a particular approach for rural development on basis of rural social and cultural reconstruction. In order to understand this social approach, we investigate an original NRR experiment in a poor village of south China, where organic farming is promoted by means of basketball game. An in-depth household survey is conducted to qualitatively analyze this social approach and derive intuitive hypothesis of extended social network for empirical test. With a panel structure dataset collected by the survey, we quantitatively identify the causal effect of social network by exploiting the endogeneity of social network formation. Our identification result provides micro evidence for a large social multiplier effect in the diffusion of organic farming, whereas it is negative for organic experts. Also, our results highlight the role of women, education and labor force for the development of organic farming. On basis of these results, we conclude that organic farming is suitable but challenging for small villages in China, while social activity is a good lever to achieve farmers' collective action for its large diffusion. |
| Keywords: | New rural reconstruction; Social network; Organic farming; China. D71, O33, Q55 |
| JEL: | Q55 O33 D71 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdi:wpaper:1423&r=cdm |
| By: | Arthur Schram (schram@uva.nl); Aljaz Ule (a.ule@uva.nl) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates infrastructure investment in markets where regulation is subject to varying degrees of manipulation by elected politicians. Based on a model of price regulation in a market with increasing demand and long-term returns on investment we construct a multi-period game between a service provider, consumers with voting rights and elected decision makers. In each period the consumers elect a decision maker who may then regulate the price for service provision. Before an election the service provider chooses whether to increase its capacity. Investment is irreversible and profitable only with a sufficiently high price. We derive the subgame perfect equilibrium for this game and investigate the price and investment dynamics through an experiment with human subjects. The experimental results show that service providers invest when decision-makers' interests align with their own, though prices may rise inefficiently high when the regulatory framework is made independent of future political manipulation. Independency of regulation thus decreases efficiency and consumer surplus. In contrast, when decision-makers' interests do not align with service providers' we find efficiency only when regulation can be made independent from electoral dynamics. |
| Keywords: | Infrastructural investment; regulation; electoral competition; laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | L5 L43 D92 C9 |
| Date: | 2013–03–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20130046&r=cdm |
| By: | Marco Bettiol; Eleonora Di Maria; Roberto Grandinetti |
| Abstract: | Studies on service management have broadly discussed the relationship between customization and standardization in services. Studies on modularity have enriched the debate by identifying an additional form of service provision able to couple the advantages of these two alternative approaches. However, at the theoretical and empirical level little attention has been given to explore how service firms adopt standardization and modularity on the one hand, and whether they are able to combine different types of services in their offering, on the other hand. This question is particularly interesting in the domain of Knowledge-Intensive Business Services (KIBS). Literature on KIBS has stressed the high level of service customization KIBS can offer to their business customers, within a collaborative and interactive framework for innovation. However, scholars dedicated little attention on how KIBS develop their service offering and whether the customization is the only strategy they adopt. The aim of the paper is to explore the business service portfolio of KIBS to identify business service management strategies KIBS develop between bespoke services and standardization. Empirical analysis on about 500 Italian KIBS specializing in design and communication, ICT services and professional services show that there are KIBS providing fully standardized services and also the rise of combinatory KIBS able to mix bespoke and standard services with business characteristics similar to the other KIBS profiles. |
| Keywords: | KIBS; service standardization; customization; modularity; combinatory resources |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aal:abbswp:13-08&r=cdm |
| By: | Raouf Boucekkine (Aix-Marseille University (Aix-Marseille School of Economics, CNRS & EHESS, IRES and CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain.); Fabien Prieur (LAMETA, Université Montpellier I and INRA); Klarizze Puzon (LAMETA, Universite Montpellier I.) |
| Abstract: | We consider a framework à la Wirl (1994) where political liberalization is the outcome of a lobbying differential game between a conservative elite and a reformist group, the former player pushing against political liberalization in opposition to the latter. In contrast to the benchmark model, we introduce uncertainty. We consider the typical case of an Arab oil exporter country where oil rents are fiercely controlled by the conservative elite. We assume that the higher the oil rents, the more reluctant to political liberalization the elite is. Two states of nature are considered (high vs low resource rents). We then compute the Market-perfect equilibria of the corresponding piecewise deterministic differential game. It is shown that introducing uncertainty in this manner increases the set of strategies compared to Wirl's original setting. In particular, it is shown that the cost of lobbying might be significantly increased under uncertainty with respect to the benchmark. This ultimately highlights some specificities of the political liberalization at stake in Arab countries and the associated risks. |
| Keywords: | Rent-seeking, lobbying, natural resources, Arab countries, piecewise deterministic differential games |
| JEL: | D72 C61 C73 |
| Date: | 2013–03–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1317&r=cdm |
| By: | Morrow, John; Carter, Michael |
| Abstract: | The political left turn in Latin America, which lagged its transition to liberalized market economies by a decade or more, challenges conventional economic explanations of voting behavior. This paper generalizes the forward-looking voter model to a broad range of dynamic, non-concave income processes. The model implies support for redistributive policies materializes rapidly if few prospects of upward mobility are present. In contrast, under imperfect information, a slow and polarizing shift toward redistributive preferences occurs. Simulation using fitted income dynamics suggests that imperfect information better accounts for the shift back to the left, and offers additional insights about political dynamics. |
| Keywords: | income dynamics, redistributive politics, polarization, Bayesian learning, Latin America |
| JEL: | D3 D7 D8 P1 |
| Date: | 2013–02–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:45020&r=cdm |
| By: | Andreas Assiotis; Kevin Sylwester |
| Abstract: | Recent studies have reported positive associations between democratization and economic growth. They have also explored how these associations could differ across regions or income levels. However, might the effects of democratization upon growth also depend upon other factors such as institutions promoting law and order (or the lack thereof)? Using a panel specification, we employ a democratization-law and order interactive term to examine if the effects of democratization upon economic growth depend upon these other institutions. We find that the coefficient on the interaction term is negative. The positive effects of democratization diminish in countries where other institutions are strong. In fact, we find that democratization could even lower growth where the rule of law already prevails. |
| Keywords: | Democratization, Economic Growth, Institutions |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:05-2013&r=cdm |
| By: | Andreas Assiotis; Kevin Sylwester |
| Abstract: | Many studies examining whether corruption lowers economic growth do not consider if the effects of corruption differ across countries. Whether corruption produces the same effects everywhere or whether its effects are conditional on some country characteristics is an important question. We investigate the association between corruption and growth, where the marginal impact of corruption is allowed to differ across democratic and non democratic regimes. Using cross-country, annual data from 1984 to 2007, we regress growth on corruption, democracy, and their interaction. We find that decreases in corruption raise growth but more so in authoritarian regimes. Possible reasons are in autocracies corruption causes more uncertainty, is of a more pernicious nature, or is less substitutable with other forms of rent seeking. |
| Keywords: | Economic Growth, Democracy, Corruption |
| Date: | 2013–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucy:cypeua:06-2013&r=cdm |
| By: | Michael Peneder (WIFO); Martin Wörter |
| Abstract: | To address the relationship between innovation and competition we jointly estimate the opportunity, production, and impact functions of innovation in a simultaneous system. Based on Swiss micro-data, we apply a 3-SLS system estimation. The findings confirm a robust inverted-U relationship, in which a rise in the number of competitors at low levels of initial competition increases the firm's research effort, but at a diminishing rate, and the research effort ultimately decreases at high levels of competition. When we split the sample by firm types, the inverted-U shape is steeper for creative firms than for adaptive ones. The numerical solution indicates three particular configurations of interest: 1. an uncontested monopoly with low innovation, 2. low competition with high innovation, and 3. a "no innovation trap" at very high levels of competition. The distinction between solution 1. and 2. corresponds to Arrow's positive effect of competition on innovation, whereas the difference between outcomes 2. and 3. captures Schumpeter's positive effect of market power on innovation. Simulating changes of the exogenous variables, technology potential, demand growth, firm size and exports have a positive impact on innovation, while foreign ownership has a negative effect, and higher appropriability has a positive impact on the number of competitors. |
| Date: | 2013–03–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wfo:wpaper:y:2013:i:448&r=cdm |