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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2012‒12‒15
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Jürgen Fleiß (Institute of Statistics and Opterations Research, Karl-Franzens-University Graz); Gernot Lechner; Stefan Palan (Institute of Banking and Finance, Karl-Franzens-University Graz) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate whether human subjects are willing to give up individual freedom in return for the benefits of improved coordination. We conduct a modified iterated public goods game in which subjects in each period first decide which of two groups to join. One group employs a voluntary contribution mechanism, the other group an allocator contribution mechanism. The setup of the allocator mechanism differs between two treatments. In the coordinator treatment the randomly selected allocator can set a uniform contribution for all group members including herself. In the dictator treatment the allocator can choose different contributions for herself and all other group members. We find that subjects willingly submit to authority in both treatments, even when competing with a voluntary contribution mechanism. The allocator groups achieve strikingly high contribution levels in both treatments. |
| Date: | 2012–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpsses:2012-03&r=cdm |
| By: | Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor; García Enríquez, Javier; Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos |
| Abstract: | In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers. |
| Keywords: | strategic delegation, bargaining, product substitutability, price |
| JEL: | C72 L13 M54 |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehu:dfaeii:9151&r=cdm |
| By: | Gilles Saint-Paul (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - CNRS : UMR8545 - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - Ecole des Ponts ParisTech - Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris - ENS Paris - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA), EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - Toulouse School of Economics, New York University Abu Dhabi - New York University Abu Dhabi) |
| Abstract: | When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between di¤erent schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and .nally how the attempt to preserve in.uence can lead to degenerative research programs. |
| Keywords: | Ideology ; Macroeconomic Modelling ; Self-con.rming equilibria ; Polarization ; Autocoherent Models ; Intellectual Competition ; Degenerative Research Programs ; Identification |
| Date: | 2012–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00759057&r=cdm |
| By: | Charles J. Thomas (Economic Science Institute & Argyros School of Business and Economics) |
| Abstract: | I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-offers model of multilateral negotiations, a common means of exchange whose strategic complexity has hindered previous modeling efforts. Multilateral negotiations occur in numerous settings in which one party wishes to trade with one of several others, but for concreteness I consider a buyer facing multiple sellers offering potentially different amounts of surplus to be split. The basic model provides surprising insights about introducing competition to an initially bilateral setting, while straightforward extensions provide empirical predictions about how the buyer’s choice of conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations or auctions is affected by factors including the number of sellers, uncertainty when making the choice, and costs of participating in the procurement process. More generally the model provides a tractable foundation for analyzing strategic problems in settings featuring multilateral negotiations. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-31&r=cdm |
| By: | Maria Bigoni (University of Bologna); Gabriele Camera (Economic Science Institute, Chapman University and University of Basel); Marco Casari (University of Bologna) |
| Abstract: | We study the individual behavior of students and workers in an experiment where they repeatedly face the same cooperative task. The data show that clerical workers differ from college students in overall cooperation rates, strategy adoption and use of punishment opportunities. Students cooperate more than workers. Cooperation increases in both subject pools when a personal punishment option is available. Students are less likely than workers to adopt strategies of unconditional defection, and more likely to select strategies of conditional cooperation. Finally, students are more likely than workers to sanction uncooperative behavior by adopting decentralized punishment, and also personal punishment when available. |
| Keywords: | Non-standard subject pools, prisoner’s dilemma, peer punishment, artefactual field experiment, stranger matching |
| JEL: | C90 C70 D80 |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:12-29&r=cdm |
| By: | Di Giannatale, Paolo; Passarelli, Francesco |
| Abstract: | We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents’ political power is disproportionate with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate both the economic and the political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot prevent political distortions from emerging in a huge mass of situations. Distortions are less severe if partners can leave the union at low cost. We propose an alternative voting method based on random assignments of voting rights. Agents are given chances to vote instead of weights. If chances are computed according to a specific formula, no political distortion occurs. As an application, we analyze the rotation voting system recently adopted by the European Central Bank. We find that this system yields an enormous amount of political distortion. Then we compute the voting chances that should be assigned to Eurozone countries in order to eliminate it. |
| Keywords: | Political distortions; Voting rules; Shapley value; Weighted votes; European Central Bank |
| JEL: | D71 C71 D72 |
| Date: | 2012–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:43059&r=cdm |
| By: | Michel Balinski (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X); Rida Laraki (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X, IMJ - Institut de Mathématiques de Jussieu - CNRS : UMR7586 - Université Paris VI - Pierre et Marie Curie - Université Paris VII - Paris Diderot) |
| Abstract: | Cet article met en évidence les lacunes du scrutin majoritaire à un ou à deux tours en théorie et en pratique, se reposant sur l'histoire récente des élections présidentielles françaises et de résultats expérimentaux. Et il propose un remède : plus d'information doit être demandée aux électeurs et le sens de la " majorité " doit être reformulé. |
| Date: | 2012–12–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00760250&r=cdm |