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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2012‒11‒11
seven papers chosen by |
| By: | Dutta, Bhaskar (University of Warwick); Gupta, Poonam (National Institute of Public Finance and Policy) |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the response of voters to candidates who have reported that they have criminal charges against them, within the framework of a simple analytical model which assumes that criminal charges give rise to some stigma amongst the electorate, and result in a negative effect on vote shares. Campaigning, the cost of which is borne from candidates' wealth, helps a candidate to increase his or her expected vote share by winning over the "marginal" voter. A criminal candidate gets an additional benefit since he can use the campaigning to convince voters of his innocence, and so reduce the negative effects of the stigma associated with criminal charges. We test the implications of the model using data for the 2009 Lok Sabha elections in India, and find support for all the implications of the model. Our empirical results show that voters do penalise candidates with criminal charges; however, this negative effect is reduced if there are other candidates in the constituency with criminal charges; besides, the vote shares are positively related to candidate wealth, with the marginal effect being higher for the candidates with criminal charges. |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:npf:wpaper:12/109&r=cdm |
| By: | Richard Van Weelden (University of Chicago); Massimo Morelli (Columbia University) |
| Abstract: | We provide a positive analysis of effort allocation by a politician facing reelection when voters are uncertain about the politician's preferences on a divisive issue. We then use this framework to derive normative conclusions on the desirability of transparency, term limits, and independence of executive power. There is a pervasive incentive to ``posture'' by over-providing effort to pursue the divisive policy, even if all voters would strictly prefer to have a consensus policy implemented. As such, the desire of politicians to convince voters that their preferences are aligned with the majority can lead them to choose strictly pareto dominated effort allocations in the first period. Transparency over the politicians' effort choices can either mitigate or re-enforce the distortions depending on the strength of politicians' office motivation and the efficiency of institutions. When re-election concerns are paramount, and executive institutions are strong, transparency about effort choices can be bad for both incentivizing politicians and for sorting. |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed012:111&r=cdm |
| By: | De Donder, Philippe; Leroux, Marie-Louise |
| Abstract: | We build a political economy model where individuals differ in the extent of the behavioral bias they exhibit when voting first over social long-term care (LTC) insurance and then choosing the amount of LTC annuities. LTC annuities provide a larger return if dependent than if healthy. We study the majority voting equilibrium under three types of behavioral biases: myopia, optimism and sophisticated procrastination. Optimists and myopics similarly under-estimate their own dependency risk both when voting and when buying LTC annuities. They differ in that optimists know the correct average dependency risk (that determines the return of both social and private insurance), while myopics also under-estimate this average risk (and thus over-estimate the insurance return). Sophisticated procrastinators act as if they under-estimated their own risk when buying annuities, but anticipate this bias at the time of voting. We obtain that the stylized observation of lack of LTC insurance is compatible with agents being optimistic or myopic, but not sophisticated procrastinators. Increasing the dfference in return across dependency states for the LTC annuity is detrimental to sophisticated voters and to very biased myopic and optimist voters. Finally, less myopic individuals may end up worse off, at the majority-voting equilibrium, than more myopic agents, casting some doubt on the usefulness of information campaigns. |
| Keywords: | Majority Voting, Myopia, Optimism, Sophisticated Procrastinators, Dependency Linked Annuity, Enhanced Life Annuity, Complementary Private Insurance. |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:26383&r=cdm |
| By: | De Donder, Philippe; Leroux, Marie-Louise |
| Abstract: | We build a political economy model where individuals differ in the extent of the behavioral bias they exhibit when voting first over social long-term care (LTC) insurance and then choosing the amount of LTC annuities. LTC annuities provide a larger return if dependent than if healthy. We study the majority voting equilibrium under three types of behavioral biases: myopia, optimism and sophisticated procrastination. Optimists and myopics similarly under-estimate their own dependency risk both when voting and when buying LTC annuities. They differ in that optimists know the correct average dependency risk (that determines the return of both social and private insurance), while myopics also under-estimate this average risk (and thus over-estimate the insurance return). Sophisticated procrastinators act as if they under-estimated their own risk when buying annuities, but anticipate this bias at the time of voting. We obtain that the stylized observation of lack of LTC insurance is compatible with agents being optimistic or myopic, but not sophisticated procrastinators. Increasing the dfference in return across dependency states for the LTC annuity is detrimental to sophisticated voters and to very biased myopic and optimist voters. Finally, less myopic individuals may end up worse off, at the majority-voting equilibrium, than more myopic agents, casting some doubt on the usefulness of information campaigns. |
| Keywords: | Majority Voting, Myopia, Optimism, Sophisticated Procrastinators, Dependency Linked Annuity, Enhanced Life Annuity, Complementary Private Insurance. |
| JEL: | D91 H55 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:26382&r=cdm |
| By: | Carlos Eduardo S. Gonçalves; Mauro Rodrigues Jr., Ricardo A. Madeira |
| Abstract: | There is an open debate in social sciences concerning the impact of different electoral rules and societal heterogeneity on the number of candidates vying for a seat during election times. Using data from Brazil’s municipal mayoral elections, this paper assesses the empirical validity of the so-called nuanced view, which claims the interaction between societal heterogeneity and institutional permissiveness of electoral rules (presence of a runoff, in our case) is key to explain the number of candidates. Our study differs from others in the literature in two major aspects: (i) we have a truly exogenous source of variation in electoral rules due to a change in legislation introduced by the constitutional reform of 1988 and, (ii) we use panel-data techniques that allow for a more reliable identification of the parameters. Our results provide support for the nuanced-view: the coefficient of the interaction between heterogeneity and the presence of a runoff is always positive and statistically significant. |
| Keywords: | runoff, heterogeneity, number of candidates |
| JEL: | D72 D63 E D02 |
| Date: | 2012–10–31 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spa:wpaper:2012wpecon25&r=cdm |
| By: | Débora Rezende de Almeida |
| Abstract: | As conferências de políticas públicas são instâncias participativas institucionalizadas que ofuscam a separação tradicional entre Estado e sociedade e geram dinâmicas de representação política diferentes do modelo eleitoral de democracia. Nestes espaços, a sociedade civil é chamada para representar a pluralidade das demandas sociais e para ampliar a inclusão política a partir da deliberação de políticas que expressem diferentes opiniões, interesses e perspectivas. Partindo desta aposta normativa, o texto aborda o problema da autorização, prestação de contas e responsividade, mostrando como estas experiências se relacionam com estes critérios e quais são as variáveis que contribuem ou impedem para o exercício de uma representação democrática, em termos de efetiva influência da sociedade, na deliberação das políticas públicas no Brasil. Argumenta também que a legitimidade democrática das instituições participativas precisa ser buscada na conexão entre as diversas arenas deliberativas e não somente na ação singular de cada indivíduo ou instituição. Palavras-chave: representação política, democracia, instituições participativas, conferências nacionais Public Policy Conferences are institutionalized participatory bodies that outshine the traditional separation between state and society and generate dynamics of political representation different from the electoral model of democracy. In these areas, civil society is called to represent the plurality of social demands and to expand the political inclusion through the deliberation of policies that express different opinions, interests and perspectives. From this normative commitment, the paper addresses the problem of authorization, accountability and responsiveness, showing how these experiences relate to these criteria and what are the variables that contribute to or impede the exercise of democratic representation in terms of actual influence of society in the deliberation of public policy in Brazil. It argues that the democratic legitimacy of participatory institutions must be sought in the connection between the distinct deliberative arenas and not in the singular action of each individual or institution. Keywords: political representation, democracy, participatory institutions, national conferences |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipe:ipetds:1750&r=cdm |
| By: | Costa Lima, Rafael; Moreira, Humberto; Verdier, Thierry |
| Abstract: | We re-address the tradeoff between centralized and decentralized decision making of local policies when policymakers are subject to capture by special interest groups. In particular, we consider the case where lobbies have private information about their ability to exert influence. We find a new informational effect in the political game under centralized structures that gives the policymaker additional bargaining power against lobbies. Thus, when compared to decentralization, centralization reduces capture, and is more likely to be welfare enhancing in the presence of information asymmetries. Then, we apply the model to the classical problem of local public goods provision and to the incentives towards the creation of customs unions agreements. |
| Keywords: | Asymmetric information; Centralization; custom unions; lobbying; public goods |
| JEL: | D72 D82 F15 H41 |
| Date: | 2012–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9199&r=cdm |