|
on Collective Decision-Making |
|
Issue of 2010‒06‒18
eight papers chosen by |
| By: | Colignatus, Thomas |
| Abstract: | Economic policy depends not only on national elections but also on coalition bargaining strategies. In coalition government, minority parties bargain on policy and form a majority coalition, and select a Prime Minister from their mids. In Holland the latter is done conventionally with Plurality, so that the largest party provides the chair of the cabinet. Alternative methods are Condorcet, Borda or Borda Fixed Point. Since the role of the Prime Minister is to be above all parties and represent the nation and to be there for all citizens, it would enhance democracy and likely be optimal if the potential Prime Minister is selected from all parties and at the start of the bargaining process. The performance of the four selection rules is evaluated using the results of the 2010 Dutch Parliamentary elections. The impossibility theorem by Kenneth Arrow (Nobel memorial prize in economics 1972) finds a crucially different interpretation. |
| Keywords: | Political economy; public choice; political science; optimal representation; electoral systems; elections; coalition; impossibility theorem |
| JEL: | D71 C88 A2 |
| Date: | 2010–06–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23240&r=cdm |
| By: | Daniel Radley; James Rockey |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the behaviour of a Citizen-Candidate Model in a simple framework with many large constituencies, many policy dimensions, and endogenous coalition formation. A model is simulated in which districts elect representatives who themselves interact to form parties. Competition between parties of different sizes and with different platforms is an emergent property of the model which leads to stable equilibria. The paper shows that the widespread usage of the Citizen-Candidate model may be empirically justified. Our results demonstrate how the number of policy dimensions and representatives elected per electoral district influence the number, size, and relative locations of parties and consequently the possible stable equilibria. Comparison with election data shows strong correspondence between the model’s results and observed outcomes, including variation consistent with Duverger’s law. |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lec:leecon:10/17&r=cdm |
| By: | Nicolas Jacquemet (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris); Alexander James (University of Wyoming - Department of Economics and Finance); Stephane Luchini (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - Université de la Méditerranée - Aix-Marseille II - Université Paul Cézanne - Aix-Marseille III - Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) - CNRS : UMR6579); Jason Shogren (Departement Economy and Finance, University of Wyoming - University of Wyoming) |
| Abstract: | Herein we explore whether a solemn oath can eliminate hypothetical bias in a voting referenda, a design commonly promoted in nonmarket valuation exercises for its incentive compatibility properties. First, we reject the null hypothesis that a hypothetical bias does not exist. Second, we cannot reject the hypothesis that people who sign an oath are as likely to vote for the public good (e.g., wind energy R&D) in a hypothetical referenda as in a real one. This result opens interesting avenues for improving the elicitation of preferences in the lab. |
| Keywords: | Dichotomous Choice Mechanism; Hypothetical bias; Oath; Preference revelation |
| Date: | 2010–06–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00490448_v1&r=cdm |
| By: | Chi, Feng; Yang, Nathan |
| Abstract: | Our general objective is to characterize the recent and well publicized diffusion of Twitter among politicians in the United States 111th House of Representatives. Ultimately, Barrack Obama, Facebook and peers matter when it comes to the propensity and speed of Twitter adoption. A basic analysis of the distribution of first Tweets over time reveals clustering around the President's inauguration; which holds regardless whether the adopter is Democratic or Republican, or an incumbent or newcomer. After we characterize which representatives are most likely to adopt Twitter, we confirm the widespread belief that Facebook and Twitter are indeed complementary technology. Given their perceived desire for accessible government, a surprising result is that Republicans are more likely to adopt Twitter than Democrats. Finally, using the exact dates of each adopter's first Tweet, we demonstrate that the diffusion of Twitter is faster for those representatives with a larger number of peers already using the technology, where peers are defined by two social networks: (1) Politicians representing the same state; and (2) politicians belonging to the same committees; especially so for those in committee networks. This observed behavior can be rationalized by social learning, as the instances in which the peer effects are important correspond to the cases in which social learning is relevant. |
| Keywords: | Communication; diffusion of technology; political marketing; social interaction; social media; social learning. |
| JEL: | M3 D83 D85 |
| Date: | 2010–06–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23225&r=cdm |
| By: | Smith, John |
| Abstract: | Measures of preferences are primarily useful in that they are helpful in predicting behavior. We perform an experiment which demonstrates that the timing of the measurement of social preferences can affect such a measure. Researchers often measure social preferences by posing a series of dictator game allocation decisions; we use a particular technique, Social Value Orientation (SVO). We vary the order of the SVO measurement and a lager stakes dictator game. In our first study, we find that subjects with prosocial preferences act even more prosocially when the SVO measurement is administered first, whereas those with selfish preferences are unaffected by the order. In our second study we vary the order of the SVO measurement and a nonstandard dictator game. We do not find the effect found in the first study. This suggests that the effect found in the first study is driven by choices involving the size of surplus. |
| Keywords: | experimental economics; social values; dictator game; social value orientation |
| JEL: | D64 Z13 C91 |
| Date: | 2010–06–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23282&r=cdm |
| By: | Rajeev K. Goel; Michael A. Nelson |
| Abstract: | This research adds to the literature on the nexus between government and corruption by examining further the influence of government decentralization on corruption. Previous research has focused primarily on fiscal decentralization. We bring additional evidence to bear for the United States by addressing whether the structure of local governments – measured both in terms of the scope of services offered and the size of the population served – has a bearing on corruption within the state. Results show that government decentralization does not necessarily reduce corruption – the type of decentralization matters. Specifically, we find that more general-purpose governments consistently contribute to corruption. In contrast, the effect of special-purpose governments on corruption is mixed. The findings uniquely flush out the tension between fiscal decentralization and fragmental local government structures in terms of impacts on corruption. Beyond this, we find that the influences of various government enforcement agencies on corruption, including police, judiciary and corrections, vary. Other corruption determinants generally support the literature. Policy implications are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Corruption; Fiscal decentralization; Local government fragmentation; Special-purpose government; General-purpose government |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sol:wpaper:2013/57625&r=cdm |
| By: | Pierre Dehez |
| Abstract: | A community faces the obligation of providing an indivisible public good. Each member is capable of providing it at a certain cost and the solution is to rely on the player who can do it at the lowest cost. It is then natural that he or she be compensated by the other players. The question is to know how much they should each contribute. We model this compensation problem as a cost sharing game to which standard allocation rules are applied and related to the solution resulting from the auction procedures proposed by Kleindorfer and Sertel (1994). |
| Keywords: | public goods, cost sharing, core, nucleolus, Shapley value. |
| JEL: | C71 H41 M41 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2010-14&r=cdm |
| By: | Simon Gaechter (Centre of Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Benedikt Herrmann (Centre of Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Christian Thoeni (University of St. Gallen) |
| Abstract: | Does the cultural background influence the success with which genetically unrelated individuals cooperate in social dilemma situations? In this paper we provide an answer by analyzing the data of Herrmann et al. (Science 2008, pp. 1362-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by Inglehart & Baker (American Sociological Review 2000, pp. 19-51)). We use analysis of variance to disentangle the importance of cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified by previous research. The significance of this result is that cultural background has a substantial influence on cooperation in otherwise identical environments. This is particularly true in the presence of punishment opportunities. |
| Keywords: | human cooperation; punishment; culture; experimental public good games |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2010-09&r=cdm |