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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2010‒01‒30
eleven papers chosen by |
| By: | Henry S. Farber (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | It is common observation that many individuals vote despite the fact that in elections with even a moderate number of voters, the probability their vote will be pivotal is quite small. The theoretical solutions of positing that individuals receive utility from the act of voting itself "explains" why individuals vote, but it leaves open the question of whether or not there is a significant margin of individuals who consider the effect of their vote on the outcome in deciding whether or not to vote. I develop a rational choice model of voting in union representation elections (government supervised secret ballot elections, generally held at the workplace, on the question of whether the workers would like to be represented by a union.) These elections provide a particularly good laboratory to study voter behavior because many of the elections have sufficiently few eligible voters that individuals can have a substantial probability of being pivotal. I implement this model empirically using data on over 75,000 of these elections held from 1972-2009. The results suggest that most individuals (over 80 percent) vote in these elections independent of consideration of the likehood that they will be pivotal. Among the reminder, it appears the 1) the likelihood of voting falls with election size, 2) the likelihood of voting increases with the expected closeness of the election outcome, and 3) the marginal effect of closeness on the likehood of voting increases in magnitude with election size. While the first two findings are consistant with the standard rational choice model, the third is not. The results suggest that, while these individuals consider first-order variation in the probability that they will be pivotal, they do not carry out a complete calculation of the probability of being pivotal. |
| Keywords: | Union elections, voting behavior, rational choice |
| JEL: | H39 J08 J29 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cepsud:1200&r=cdm |
| By: | Emmanuel Sigalas, Monika Mokre, Johannes Pollak, Jozef Bátora; Peter Slominski |
| Abstract: | In this paper we elaborate on the analytical framework linking the three RECON democracy models to political representation and claims-making during the European elections campaign. Relying on the models of delegated, federal and regional-cosmopolitan democracy as ideal-types we develop a theoretical and operational framework that guides our empirical research on the prospects of parliamentary mode of representation at the EU level. We argue that parliamentary representation will continue to play a role in the future, but the role of political parties at European level and the claims brought forward to mobilise the electorate will be different in each democracy model. In the case of a delegated EU democracy the national political parties will dominate the European party federations and the EP election campaigns will be predominantly national in their scope. Equally, in a federal EU democracy the influence of the European level parties over their national member will be prominent and political claims will have a distinctively European outlook. In a non-statist, regional-cosmopolitan EU democracy parties and MEP candidates should address also matters of extra-European and of global concern, while the relationship between national and European level parties should be one of consensual agreement rather than of institutionalised hierarchy. The paper ends with the formulation of a series of testable hypotheses that will allow us to assess empirically the prospects for each EU democracy model. |
| Keywords: | democracy; European elections; European Parliament; political parties; political representation |
| Date: | 2009–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:reconx:p0055&r=cdm |
| By: | Massimiliano Landi; Antonio Merlo; Vincenzo Galasso; Andrea Mattozzi (Singapore Management University) |
| Abstract: | Like voters (the represented), politicians (the representees) are the heart and soul of representative democracy. But isn’t being a politician just like any other job? After we get past the rhetoric, is politics any different than other occupations? In the political sector, voters, parties and politicians represent the counterparts of consumers, firms and workers/managers in the market sector. In fact, the analogy is much deeper than it may appear at first sight. In the market sector, consumers determine to a large extent the success of a firm and ultimately the management’s fate. However, managers are chosen by the firms, which typically have an objective that is different from those of consumers and managers. Likewise, while in all democratic systems the voters ultimately determine who is elected, it is typically the case that political parties nominate candidates for public office. Furthermore, the objectives of voters and parties with respect to the selection of candidates may differ, and are constrained by the career ambitions of individuals with political aspirations. But then, what really makes a career in the political sector different from a career in any other economic sector? There are at least three distinctive features that characterize the labor market in the political sector. First, politicians are typically “under the spotlight,� receiving the attention of the media and of a variety of citizens’ organizations. This makes politics a “showcase,� where politicians in office can display their political skills, while it might be more difficult for individuals working in the market sector to reveal their market ability. Second, inter-party competition for potential politicians is likely to be of secondary importance, as ideological preferences are more likely to attract individuals toward specific parties at the beginning of their political careers. Third, it is often the case that political parties “take care of their losers� by reserving party’s positions to defeated incumbents. As a result, while individual careers within the political sector are inevitably linked to the opportunities available within parties, the extent to which individual endowments of “political� and “market� skills are correlated, or experience in the political (market) sector is also valuable in the market (political) sector, links the labor markets of the two sectors. This link affects the selection of politicians, the politicians’ careers, and the relationship between parties and voters. |
| Keywords: | politicians, voters, parties, political sector, |
| JEL: | J21 J00 J49 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:laborw:1548&r=cdm |
| By: | Fernanda Brollo; Tommaso Nannicini |
| Abstract: | We apply a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races to identify the impact of (exogenous) partisan alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. According to our results, municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with the coalition of the President receive larger transfers by about 36%–43% in the last two years of the term. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next (close) electoral race. We also find that politically motivated transfers are larger for second-term mayors—who may have more political connections, weaker reelection incentives, or stronger incentives to run for higher offices—and for small municipalities without a radio station, where the mayor can more easily claim political credit for transfers. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:358&r=cdm |
| By: | De Donder, Philippe (Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ-CNRS and IDEI)); Le Breton, Michel (Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI)); Peluso, Eugenio (Universtiy of Verona) |
| Abstract: | We study majority voting over a bidimensional policy space when the voters’ type space is either uni- or bidimensional. We show that a Condorcet winner fails to generically exist even with a unidimensional type space. We then study two voting procedures widely used in the literature. The Stackelberg (ST) procedure assumes that votes are taken one dimension at a time according to an exogenously specied sequence. The Kramer-Shepsle (KS) procedure also assumes that votes are taken separately on each dimension, but not in a sequential way. A vector of policies is a Kramer-Shepsle equilibrium if each component coincides with the majority choice on this dimension given the other components of the vector. We study the existence and uniqueness of the ST and KS equilibria, and we compare them, looking e.g. at the impact of the ordering of votes for ST and identifying circumstances under which ST and KS equilibria coincide. In the process, we state explicitly the assumptions on the utility function that are needed for these equilibria to be well behaved. We especially stress the importance of single crossing conditions, and we identify two variants of these assumptions: a marginal version that is imposed on all policy dimensions separately, and a joint version whose denition involves both policy dimensions. |
| JEL: | D72 H41 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ide:wpaper:21845&r=cdm |
| By: | Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (U. de Málaga, U. Pablo de Olavide y CORE, Universit´e catholique de Louvain) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. In spite of facing an impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote for any piece-wise linear tax method no equilibrium exists, we show that if we limit the domain of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive, an equilibrium does exist. We also show that, for such a domain, a wide variety of methods can be supported in equilibrium. This last result provides rationale for some activities of special interest groups. |
| Keywords: | voting, taxes, majority, single crossing, special interest politics. |
| JEL: | D72 H24 |
| Date: | 2010–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:10.02&r=cdm |
| By: | Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Department of Economic Theory, Universidad de Málaga) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece- wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide. In spite of facing an impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote for any piece-wise linear tax method no equilibrium exists, we show that if we limit the domain of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive, an equilibrium does exist. We also show that, for such a domain, a wide variety of methods can be supported in equilibrium. This last result provides rationale for some activities of special interest groups. |
| Keywords: | voting, taxes, majority, single crossing, special interest politics |
| JEL: | D72 H24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2010-1&r=cdm |
| By: | Catia Batista (Department of Economics and Institute for International Integration Studies, Trinity College Dublin; IZA); Pedro Vicente (Department of Economics and Institute for International Integration Studies, Trinity College Dublin; CSAE-Oxford; BREAD) |
| Abstract: | This paper tests the hypothesis that international migration experiences may promote better institutions at home by raising the demand for political accountability. In order to examine this question, we use a simple postcard voting experiment designed to capture the population’s desire for better governance. Using data from a tailored household survey, we examine the determinants of voting behavior in our experiment, and isolate the positive effect of international emigration on the demand for political accountability. We find that this effect can be mainly attributed to the presence of return migrants, particularly to those who emigrated to countries with better governance. |
| Keywords: | international migration, governance, political accountability, institutions, effects of emigration in origin countries, household survey, Cape Verde, sub-Saharan Africa |
| JEL: | F22 O12 O15 O43 P16 |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iis:dispap:iiisdp313&r=cdm |
| By: | Gabriel Ahlfeldt (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg); Wolfgang Maennig (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg); Michaela Ölschläger (Chair for Economic Policy, University of Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the 2001 referendum on the Allianz-Arena, a professional soccer stadium in Munich, Germany, with respect to lifestyle-specific voter preferences. Using political party affiliation and milieu probabilities as proxy variables, we find that lifestyle-specific preferences, values and attitudes more significantly contribute to the explanation of voting outcome compared to traditional strata-orientated indicators of economic wealth. Thus, lifestyle, preferences, tastes and attitudes are not proportionally related to income. Results are robust to stadium proximity effects and spatial dependency. |
| Keywords: | Lifestyle, Milieu, Referendum, Stadium, Munich |
| JEL: | D72 H40 P36 R58 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hce:wpaper:030&r=cdm |
| By: | Luigi Marengo; Simona Settepanella |
| Abstract: | We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determine the social outcome. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which a social outcome may be a local or global optimum for a set of objects, and we show that, by appropriately redefining the set of objects, intransitive cycles may be broken and the median voter may be turned into a loser. |
| Keywords: | social choice; object construction power; agenda power; intransitive cycles; median voter |
| JEL: | D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2009–01–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2010/02&r=cdm |
| By: | Viktor J. Vanberg |
| Keywords: | Length 24 pages |
| Date: | 2009–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:esi:evopap:2009-19&r=cdm |