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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2009‒10‒17
five papers chosen by |
| By: | Weber, Tjark |
| Abstract: | The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is a well-known theorem from the field of social choice theory. It states that every voting scheme with at least 3 possible outcomes is dictatorial or manipulable. Later work on the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem frequently does not distinguish between alternatives and outcomes, thereby leading to a less general statement that requires the voting scheme to be onto. We show how the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem can be derived from the seemingly less general formulation. |
| Keywords: | Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem; infeasible alternatives |
| JEL: | D71 |
| Date: | 2009–10–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:17836&r=cdm |
| By: | Berta Esteve-Volart; Manuel F. Bagües |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates the potential existence of a gender bias in political parties-nomination strategies. For this purpose we use data from elections to the Spanish Senate, where candidates are listed in the ballot in alphabetical order, and order in the ballot a¤ects votes. The evidence in this paper suggests that, in the absence of political competition, parties do not nominate the best available female candidates. Instead, parties select female candidates based on their last name, taking into account how their presence in the list a¤ects male candidates-possibilities of success and gender statistics. Finally, to avoid political parties exploiting order in the ballot to favor particular candidates we propose to adopt ballot ordering rotation. |
| Date: | 2009–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fda:fdaddt:2009-30&r=cdm |
| By: | Alberto F. Alesina; Paola Giuliano |
| Abstract: | We establish an inverse relationship between family ties and political participation, such that the more individuals rely on the family as a provider of services, insurance, transfer of resources, the lower is one’s civic engagment and political participation. We also show that strong family ties appear to be a substitute for generalized trust, rather than a complement to it. These three constructs-civic engagement, political participation, and trust- are part of what is known as social capital; therefore, in this paper, we contribute to the investigation of the origin and evolution of social capital. We establish these results using within-country evidence and looking at the behavior of immigrants from various countries in 32 different destination places. |
| JEL: | P16 Z10 Z13 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15415&r=cdm |
| By: | Katsuhiko Masaki |
| Abstract: | Can ‘participatory’ approaches to development constitute a viable strategy for promoting citizenship? This paper addresses this question by scrutinising the equivocal reaction of a peasant community in Nepal to the unfolding of one such project, which supposedly reflected their empowerment as equal citizens. Drawing on the notion of ‘symbolic citizenship’ that values people’s ‘right to narrate’ viewpoints that occur to them naturally, this study proposes a more promising approach that allows people to divulge dilemmas arising from real-world complexities, and then determine the terms of their empowerment, in defiance of the prevailing liberal democratic framework. |
| Keywords: | people, empowerment, liberal, democratic framework, citizens, citizenship, participation, empowerment, democracy, Nepal |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2243&r=cdm |
| By: | Kempf, H.; Rota Graziosi, G. |
| Abstract: | We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first- or second-mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk-dominance to select the leading government. Lastly, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader. |
| Keywords: | Endogenous timing ; First/second-mover advantage ; Public good ; Stackelberg equilibria ; Risk dominance. |
| JEL: | E31 E42 E58 E62 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:240&r=cdm |