|
on Collective Decision-Making |
|
Issue of 2008‒09‒29
eight papers chosen by |
| By: | Emma Galli; Veronica Grembi; Fabio Padovano (University of Rome 3, (Italy)) |
| Abstract: | This paper evaluates the erosion of electoral accountability of the “Governors” of the Italian Regions in three subsequent political moments: 1) the elections; 2) the inaugural speeches of the Governor; 3) their first important policy decision, the long-term regional budget (DPEFR). We use content analysis (Laver et al., 2003) to assess the position of each Governor on a left to right distribution at the moment of the inaugural speeches and of the DPEFR. We then analyze the correlation between the distributions of 1) the electoral results and the inaugural speeches and 2) the inaugural speeches and the DPEFR, under the hypothesis that greater similarity can be interpreted as greater accountability. The analysis detects some erosion of accountability from the elections to the inaugural speeches, and a more serious one from the inaugural speeches to the DPEFR. A series of ANOVA tests suggests that the Region’s relative economic position/dependency on transfers from the central governments partly explains such loss of accountability. |
| Date: | 2008 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rcr:wpaper:02_08&r=cdm |
| By: | Arianna Degan (Department of Economics, UQAM and CIRPEE); Antonio Merlo (Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we address the following question: To what extent is the hypothesis that voters vote “ideologically” (i.e., they always vote for the candidate who is ideologically “closest” to them) testable or falsifiable? We show that using data only on how individuals vote in a single election, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is irrefutable, regardless of the number of candidates competing in the election. On the other hand, using data on how the same individuals vote in multiple elections, the hypothesis that voters vote ideologically is potentially falsifiable, and we provide general conditions under which the hypothesis can be tested. |
| Keywords: | voting, spatial models, falsifiability, testing |
| JEL: | D72 C12 C63 |
| Date: | 2007–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pen:papers:08-034&r=cdm |
| By: | Borck, Rainald (DIW Berlin); Wrohlich, Katharina (DIW Berlin) |
| Abstract: | We analyse preferences for public, private or mixed provision of childcare theoretically and empirically. We model childcare as a publicly provided private good. Richer households should prefer private provision to either pure public or mixed provision. If public provision redistributes from rich to poor, they should favour mixed over pure public provision, but if public provision redistributes from poor to rich, the rich and poor might favour mixed provision while the middle class favour public provision ('ends against the middle'). Using estimates for household preferences from survey data, we find no support for the ends-against-the-middle result. |
| Keywords: | childcare, redistribution, political preferences, public provision of private goods |
| JEL: | J13 D72 H42 D19 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3694&r=cdm |
| By: | Alexander Dyck; David Moss; Luigi Zingales |
| Abstract: | We argue that profit-maximizing media help overcome the problem of "rational ignorance" highlighted by Downs (1957) and in so doing make elected representatives more sensitive to the interests of general voters. By collecting news and combining it with entertainment, media are able to inform passive voters on politically relevant issues. To show the impact this information has on legislative outcomes, we document the effect "muckraking" magazines had on the voting patterns of U.S. representatives and senators in the early part of the 20th century. We also show under what conditions profit-maximizing media will cater to general (less affluent) voters in their coverage, providing a counterbalance to special interests. |
| JEL: | L51 N41 P16 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14360&r=cdm |
| By: | Klein, Daniel B. (George Mason University) |
| Abstract: | The paper develops the idea of configuration of ownership to distinguish three primary political ideologies: (classical) liberalism, conservatism, and leftism. The liberal configuration is atomistic in its recognition of owners and ownership claims; it conforms closely to Adam Smith’s “commutative justice,” which Smith represented as a sort of social grammar. The conservative configuration also strives for a social grammar, but it counts among the set of owners certain spirit-lords such as God and Patria. The liberal and conservative configurations become isomorphic if and only if the ownership claims of the conservative spirit-lords are reduced to nothing. The left configuration ascribes fundamental ownership of resources to the people, the state, and sees laws as organizational house-rules into which one enters voluntary by choosing to remain within the polity; the type of justice that pertains is parallel to Smith’s “distributive justice,” which Smith associated with aspirational rules for achieving beauty in composition. The scheme illuminates why the left’s conception of liberty consists in civil liberties. The formulation of configurations is used to interpret the semantics of the three primary ideologies. Meanwhile, it is noted that actually existing parties and movements are admixtures of the three primary ideologies. For example, what makes Republicanism “conservative” is that it is relatively conservative; it by no means thoroughly or consistently rejects the precept of collective ownership by the polity. |
| Keywords: | ownership; justice; liberalism; statism; conservatism; leftism; |
| JEL: | A10 A13 |
| Date: | 2008–09–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0126&r=cdm |
| By: | Zimmermann, Klaus W. (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg); Horgos, Daniel (Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg) |
| Abstract: | Mancur Olson's theory of the decline of nations is path-breaking in political economics. It has been tested cross-sectionally in numerous empirical studies. We survey the existing results briefly, with a special focus on studies using the number of lobbies as an exogenous variable. Using data from the period 1973-2006, we then present the field's first time-series analysis of the effects of the number of interest groups on the German lobby list and macroeconomic performance, gauged in terms of economic growth and inflation. The number of interest groups (as a proxy for their influence) is shown to have an important impact on macrovariables: Interest group activity significantly leads to a decline in the growth rate and a rise in the inflation rate. |
| Keywords: | Interest groups; economic performance; growth rate; inflation rate |
| JEL: | D61 D72 D78 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:vhsuwp:2008_084&r=cdm |
| By: | Campos, Nauro F. (Brunel University); Giovannoni, Francesco (University of Bristol) |
| Abstract: | Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these views. Based on whether influence is sought with rule-makers or rule-enforcers, we develop a conceptual framework that highlights how political institutions are instrumental in defining the choice between bribing and lobbying. We test our predictions using survey data for about 6000 firms in 26 countries. Our results suggest that (a) lobbying and corruption are fundamentally different, (b) political institutions play a major role in explaining whether firms choose bribing or lobbying, (c) lobbying is more effective than corruption as an instrument for political influence, and (d) lobbying is more powerful than corruption as an explanatory factor for enterprise growth, even in poorer, often perceived as highly corrupt, less developed countries. |
| Keywords: | lobbying, corruption, political institutions |
| JEL: | E23 D72 H26 O17 P16 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3693&r=cdm |
| By: | Hans Gersbach (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland); Felix Mühe (CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Switzerland) |
| Abstract: | Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly. |
| Keywords: | vote-buying, political economy, poverty traps, economic development, voting rules, repeated voting |
| JEL: | D72 I20 I30 O10 P16 |
| Date: | 2008–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eth:wpswif:08-94&r=cdm |