New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2007‒08‒18
eight papers chosen by
  1. Projection Effects and Strategic Ambiguity in Electoral Competition By Thomas Jensen
  2. Elections, Private Information, and State-Dependent Candidate Quality By Thomas Jensen
  3. The pronouncements of paranoid politicians By Guido, Cataife
  4. Terrorism, Anti-Terrorism, and the Copycat Effect By Thomas Jensen
  5. Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans By Kai A. Konrad; Wolfgang Leininger
  6. Predicaments in the futures of aging democracies By Lindh, Thomas; Lundberg, Urban
  7. Assessing risky social situations By Marc Fleurbaey
  8. The Political Opinions of Swedish Social Scientists By Jordahl, Henrik; Berggren, Niclas; Stern, Charlotta
  1. By: Thomas Jensen (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: Theories from psychology suggest that voters' perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate's position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters' perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives a generally liked candidate an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we construct and analyze a formal model to investigate under which conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition, even if voters dislike ambiguity per se.
    Keywords: electoral competition; ambiguity; voter perception; cognitive consistency; projection
    JEL: D72 D83
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0712&r=cdm
  2. By: Thomas Jensen (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: In this paper we contribute to the study of how democracy works when politicians are better informed than the electorate about conditions relevant for policy choice. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic model of electoral competition. An important feature of the model is that candidate quality is state-dependent. Our main insight is that if the electorate is sufficiently well informed then there exists an equilibrium where the candidates' policy positions reveal their information and the policy outcome is the same as it would be if voters were fully informed (the median policy in the true state of the world).
    Keywords: electoral competition; uncertainty; private information; candidate quality; revealing equilibria
    JEL: D72 D82
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0713&r=cdm
  3. By: Guido, Cataife
    Abstract: This paper models the strategic encounter of two office-motivated candidates who may or may not announce policy. In the case of no announcement, the voters rank the candidates according to prior beliefs. In the case of announcement, the candidates cannot avoid a degree of noise in the voters' interpretation of their announcements. We show that this simple deviation from the standard Downsian setting suffices to overcome previous impossibility results which suggest that not announcing policy can never occur in equilibrium. Also, we extend the model to study the equilibrium when candidates are ambiguity averse. An ambiguity averse candidate is interpreted as being concerned about an ongoing negative campaign against him. This negative campaign would consist in inducing the voters to adopt some interpretation of the candidate's announcement unfavorable to his electoral performance. We show that under ambiguity aversion the candidates opt not to announce position under less stringent conditions than expected utility. Finally, we use data on U.S. Senate elections to test an empirical implication of the model. We find that the relevant coefficient has the sign predicted by the theory and is statistically significant.
    Keywords: Voting; Salience; Electoral Ambiguity; Ambiguity Aversion; Media Politics
    JEL: D72 C13 C72
    Date: 2007–08–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:4473&r=cdm
  4. By: Thomas Jensen (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: In this paper we contribute to the study of how democracy works when politicians are better informed than the electorate about conditions relevant for policy choice. We do so by setting up and analyzing a game theoretic model of electoral competition. An important feature of the model is that candidate quality is state-dependent. Our main insight is that if the electorate is sufficiently well informed then there exists an equilibrium where the candidates' policy positions reveal their information and the policy outcome is the same as it would be if voters were fully informed (the median policy in the true state of the world).
    Keywords: terrorist cells; optimal anti-terrorism; copycat effect; dynamic pattern of terrorism
    JEL: D74 H56
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0714&r=cdm
  5. By: Kai A. Konrad; Wolfgang Leininger
    Abstract: We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.
    Keywords: Free-riding, defence, collective action, distributional conflict, war, norms
    JEL: D72 D74 H41
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0016&r=cdm
  6. By: Lindh, Thomas (Institute for Futures Studies); Lundberg, Urban (Institute for Futures Studies)
    Abstract: Ageing societies need to supply support to an ever growing segment of elderly dependent population without compromising the future sustainability for the currently young or unborn population. Current tendencies to focus on policy solutions like automatic stabilisers and norm based pre-commitment strategies with decisions delegated to experts carry a high risk of political breakdown when future populations re-evaluates this with new information. Using the Swedish pension reform as a concrete example we show how the futurity problem associated with the current non-existence of the future population makes the political process prone to avoid bringing issues with very long horizons into the public debate. Alternative demographic scenarios for Sweden are used to illustrate how even very small variations in the assumptions of demographic projections lead to radically different future population structures. Hence, the majority preferences in a distant future cannot be foreseen. Adding to this the complex interactions with a changing environment of technology and nature time-consistent decision making at the far future horizon must be virtually impossible. Thus the sustainability of long-term social security systems require constitutional balances that provide for orderly and continual adaptation rather than once-for-all fixes that are likely to be rejected by future electorates.
    Keywords: ageing; democracy; pensions
    JEL: J10
    Date: 2007–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:ifswps:2007_004&r=cdm
  7. By: Marc Fleurbaey (CNRS-CERSES, University Paris 5, and IDEP)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes social situations in the context of risk. A new argument is proposed in order to defend the ex-post approach against Diamond’s (1967) famous critique of Harsanyi’s (1955) utilitarian theorem. It leads to a characterization of the criterion consisting in computing the expected value of the “equal-equivalent”. Characterizations of the ex-post maximin and leximin criteria, as well as a variant of Harsanyi’s theorem, are also obtained. It is examined how to take account of concerns for ex-ante fairness within this ex-post approach. Related issues are also addressed, such as the rescue problem or preference for catastrophe avoidance.
    Keywords: risk, social welfare, ex ante, ex post, fairness, Harsanyi theorem
    JEL: D63 D71 D81
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iep:wpidep:0703&r=cdm
  8. By: Jordahl, Henrik (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Berggren, Niclas (Ratio); Stern, Charlotta (Swedish Institute of Social Research (SOFI))
    Abstract: We study the political opinions of Swedish social scientists in seven disciplines. A survey was sent to 4,301 academics at 25 colleges and universities, which makes the coverage of the disciplines included more or less comprehensive. When it comes to party sympathies there are 1.3 academics on the right for each academic on the left – a sharp contrast to the situation in the United States, where Democrats greatly dominate the social sciences. The corresponding ratio for Swedish citizens in general is 1.1. The most left-leaning disciplines are sociology and gender studies, the most right-leaning ones are business administration, economics, and law, with political science and economic history somewhere in between. The differences between the disciplines are smaller in Sweden than in the more polarized U.S. We also asked 14 policy questions. The replies largely confirm the pattern of a left-right divide – but overall the desire to change the status quo is tepid.
    Keywords: Academics; Social Scientists; Policy Views; Political Opinions; Party Sympathies
    JEL: A11 A13 A14
    Date: 2007–08–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0711&r=cdm
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