New Economics Papers
on Collective Decision-Making
Issue of 2007‒08‒14
ten papers chosen by
  1. Platform Stickiness in a Spatial Voting Model By L. Lambertini
  2. Voting Power in the Australian Senate: 1901-2004 By Alex Robson
  3. Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals By Otto H. Swank; Bauke Visser
  4. Incentive Reversal By Eyal Winter
  5. The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “Guessing” game By Chou, Eileen; McConnell, Margaret; Nagel, Rosemarie; Plott, Charles R.
  6. Rebag-Ware: Reputation-based Governance of Public Works By R. Confalonieri; C. Leoni; L. Picci
  7. On Policy Relevance of Ramsey Tax Rules By Selim, Sheikh
  8. Migration, effort, and voter sentiment towards temporary migration By Alessandra Venturini; Gil S. Epstein
  9. Social Identity and Preferences By Daniel J. Benjamin; James J. Choi; A. Joshua Strickland
  10. Strategic Redistricting By Wolfgang Pesendorfer; Faruk Gul
  1. By: L. Lambertini
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:597&r=cdm
  2. By: Alex Robson
    Abstract: Indices of voting power are intended to measure the a priori degree of in.uence that a voter or party can expect to have in framing legislation or passing motions. Commonly used measures include those proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), Banzhaf (1965) and Deegan and Packel (1978). This paper computes these power indices for the Australian Senate for the period 1901-2004. The introduction of the Single Transferable Vote in the Senate in 1949 appears to have had a profound effect on the voting power of both major parties, as well as on the degree of concentration of voting power.
    Date: 2007–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2007-480&r=cdm
  3. By: Otto H. Swank (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam); Bauke Visser (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
    Abstract: Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision-making that explains the public’s demand for transparency, and committee members’ aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Outcomes of pre-meetings are less determined, more anarchic, than those of formal meetings, but within bounds. We characterize feasible deals that are credible and will be endorsed in the formal meeting.
    Keywords: Committee decision-making; reputational concerns; transparency; pre-meetings; deliberation
    JEL: D71 D72 D82
    Date: 2007–07–17
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20070055&r=cdm
  4. By: Eyal Winter
    Date: 2007–07–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:843644000000000241&r=cdm
  5. By: Chou, Eileen; McConnell, Margaret; Nagel, Rosemarie; Plott, Charles R.
    Date: 2007–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1274&r=cdm
  6. By: R. Confalonieri; C. Leoni; L. Picci
    Date: 2007–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:586&r=cdm
  7. By: Selim, Sheikh
    Abstract: The Ramsey approach to optimal taxation and Ramsey tax rules have amassed substance in economic theory. However, they are often criticized on grounds of practicality, fairness, feasibility and some other aspects of designing actual tax policy. This paper presents a collection of these views; it discusses how closely or remotely Ramsey rules are followed in designing tax policy. It presents some recent tax reforms in the US and in the UK that have closely, if not completely, followed the principle of distortion minimization. Despite the widely speculated difficulty associated with mapping normative tax rules into positive policy design, it is possible to implement taxes that have strong correspondence to Ramsey tax formulas. This paper also discusses why some implemented tax rules lack consistency with Ramsey principles, or why it is often difficult to establish correspondence between some implemented taxes and Ramsey tax rules.
    Keywords: Optimal Taxation, Policy Relevance, Ramsey Tax Rules
    JEL: E61 E62 H21 H30
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5736&r=cdm
  8. By: Alessandra Venturini; Gil S. Epstein
    Abstract: The sentiments felt by capital owners and local workers and consumers towards migrants may improve when temporary migration policies are adopted. The observed level of exertion of effort by migrants, which decreases during their duration in the host country, positively affects production, real wages and capital owners' profits. We show that the acceptance of job offers by migrants results in the displacement in employment of national workers by immigrants, but it increases the exertion of effort by workers, reduces prices, and acts as a counterweight to anti-immigrant voter attitudes.
    Keywords: migration, effort, voter, migration
    JEL: J1 J10 R23
    Date: 2006–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpc:wplist:wp18_06&r=cdm
  9. By: Daniel J. Benjamin; James J. Choi; A. Joshua Strickland
    Abstract: In two laboratory experiments, we examine whether norms associated with one's social identity affect time and risk preferences. When we make ethnic identity salient to Asian-American subjects, they make more patient choices. When we make race salient to black subjects, non-immigrant blacks (but not immigrant blacks) make more risk-averse choices. Making gender identity salient causes choices to conform to gender norms the subject believes are relatively more common. Our results provide evidence that identity effects play a role in shaping U.S. demographic patterns in economic behaviors and outcomes.
    JEL: C91 Z10
    Date: 2007–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13309&r=cdm
  10. By: Wolfgang Pesendorfer; Faruk Gul
    Date: 2007–08–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000351&r=cdm
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