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on Collective Decision-Making |
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Issue of 2006‒11‒04
four papers chosen by |
| By: | D'Haultfoeuille, Xavier; Davezies, Laurent; Fougère, Denis |
| Abstract: | This paper considers the semiparametric identification of endogenous and exogenous peer effects based on group size variation. We show that Lee (2006)’s linear-in-means model is generically identified, even when all members of the group are not observed. While unnecessary in general, homoskedasticity may be required in special cases to recover all parameters. Extensions to asymmetric responses to peers and binary outcomes are also considered. Once more, most parameters are semiparametrically identified under weak conditions. However, recovering all of them requires more stringent assumptions. Eventually, we bring theoretical evidence that the model is more adapted to small groups. |
| Keywords: | linear-in-means model; semiparametric identification; social interactions |
| JEL: | C14 C21 C25 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5865&r=cdm |
| By: | Gautier, P.; Soubeyran, R. |
| Abstract: | We propose a two dimensional infinite horizon model of public consumption in which investments are decided by a winner-take-all election. Investments in the two public goods create a linkage across periods. We follow the idea of issue ownership introduced by Petrocik (1996) in considering parties with different specialties. We show that the incumbent party vote share decreases the longer it stays in power. The median voter is generally not indifferent between the two parties and, when she is moderate enough, no party can maintain itself in power for ever. This result holds when the parties' main objective is to win the election and is compatible with a large range of candidates sub-objectives, that may change from one election to the next. Finally, the more parties are specialized and the more public policies have long-term effects, the more political cycles are likely to occur. ...French Abstract : Nous proposons un modèle de consommation publique à horizon infini. Les investissements engagés dans la fourniture de deux biens publics sont déterminés par les élections. Ces investissements créent un lien entre les élections successives. Nous suivons l'idée introduite par Petrocik (1996) selon laquelle les partis "possèdent" certains thèmes, en considérant qu'ils ont des spécialités différentes. Nous montrons que la part des voix du parti au pouvoir décroît entre deux élections. L'électeur médian n'est généralement pas indifférent entre les deux partis et, lorsqu'il est suffisamment modéré, aucun parti ne peut se maintenir indéfiniment au pouvoir. Ce résultat est valide lorsque l'objectif principal des partis est de gagner l'élection et est compatible avec un grand ensemble de sous objectifs, qui peuvent changer d'une élection à l'autre. Finalement, plus les partis sont spécialisés et plus les politiques ont des effets de long terme, plus les cycles politiques sont susceptibles d'apparaître. |
| Keywords: | CYCLES; ALTERNATION; ISSUE OWNERSHIP; PUBLIC GOODS; OPPOSITION |
| JEL: | D72 H41 C72 |
| Date: | 2006 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:umr:wpaper:200613&r=cdm |
| By: | Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco |
| Abstract: | Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying, corruption and influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25 transition countries. Our results show that (a) lobbying and corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for political influence than corruption, even in poorer, less developed countries. |
| Keywords: | corruption; institutions; lobbying; transition |
| JEL: | D72 E23 H26 O17 P16 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5886&r=cdm |
| By: | Lagerlöf, Johan N.M. |
| Abstract: | I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock's (1980) classic model where the influence activities are "black-boxed." Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend more resources on rent seeking than is in society's interest, which is consistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature. |
| Keywords: | competition; disclosure; information acquisition; rent seeking; welfare |
| JEL: | D42 D43 D72 D83 L13 |
| Date: | 2006–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5893&r=cdm |