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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2024‒11‒18
four papers chosen by Marco Novarese, Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Breitkopf, Laura (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Chowdhury, Shyamal (University of Sydney); Priyam, Shambhavi (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods); Sutter, Matthias (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods) |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between parenting style and a broad range of children's skills and outcomes. Based on survey and experimental data from 5, 580 children and their parents, we find that children exposed to positive parenting have higher IQs, are more altruistic, open to new experiences, conscientious, and agreeable, have a higher locus of control, self-control, and self-esteem, perform better in scholarly achievement tests, behave more prosocially in everyday life, and are more satisfied with their life. Positive parenting is negatively associated with children's neuroticism, patience, engagement in risky behaviors, and their emotional and behavioral problems. |
| Keywords: | parenting style, child outcomes, economic preferences, personality traits, IQ |
| JEL: | C91 D01 D10 |
| Date: | 2024–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17336 |
| By: | Mayuko Nakamaru (School of Environment and Society, Institute of Science Tokyo, JAPAN); Takaaki Ohkawauchi (College of Humanities and Sciences, Nihon University, JAPAN); Rei Okawa (School of Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, JAPAN); Koki Oikawa (School of Social Sciences, Waseda University, JAPAN); Yuto Otani (School of Engineering, Tokyo Institute of Technology, JAPAN); Hiroo Sasaki (Professor Emeritus, Waseda University, JAPAN); Junyi Shen (Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, JAPAN); Koichi Takase (Faculty of Commerce, Waseda University, JAPAN); Hirofumi Yamamura (Faculty of Business Administration, Komazawa University, Japan); Takehiko Yamato (School of Engineering, Institute of Science Tokyo, JAPAN) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies two types of facility maintenance games in the laboratory, in a cross-cultural experiment conducted in Tokyo and Guam. One is called the one-person maintenance game, in which only one player makes maintenance investment decisions for a privately owned facility, and the other is called the two-person maintenance game, in which two players make maintenance investment decisions for a shared public facility without communication. Both games are characterized by the fact that the durability of the facility depends on each player's decision of costly investment in its maintenance, and that the facility can be enjoyed as long as it is available, i.e., the probability that the game will end or continue depends on each player's decision of costly investment in its maintenance. Our main results are that first, most subjects chose to invest in each experimental round of both games. At the beginning of the two games, the percentage of subjects who are willing to invest is significantly higher among the Tokyo subjects than among the Guam subjects. However, as the game proceeds, the difference in this percentage between the two groups becomes statistically insignificant. Second, in either the one-person game, the two-person game or both, subjective factors (i.e., risk and time preferences) and/or objective factors (i.e., the durability of the facility) play important roles in influencing the investment behaviors of either the Guam subjects, the Tokyo subjects or both. Third, there is a significant difference in the investment ratio between the one-person and two-person games among the Tokyo subjects, but not among the Guam subjects. Finally, we also investigate the factors affecting different behaviors between the two games. The results indicate the possibility of conditional cooperative behavior among the Guam subjects and the possibility of free rider behavior among the Tokyo subjects in the two-person game. |
| Keywords: | Maintenance games; Public good; Free rider; Risk preference; Time preference; Inter-regional comparison |
| JEL: | C71 C72 C91 |
| Date: | 2024–11 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kob:dpaper:dp2024-35 |
| By: | Jonathan Chapman; Erik Snowberg; Stephanie W. Wang; Colin Camerer |
| Abstract: | We introduce DOSE⸻Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation⸻to elicit preference parameters. DOSE starts with a model of preferences and a prior over the parameters of that model, then dynamically chooses a customized question sequence for each participant according to an experimenter-selected information criterion. After each question, the prior is updated, and the posterior is used to select the next, informationally-optimal, question. Simulations show that DOSE produces parameter estimates that are approximately twice as accurate as those from established elicitation methods. DOSE estimates of individual-level risk and time preferences are also more accurate, more stable over time, and faster to administer in a large representative, incentivized survey of the U.S. population (N = 2; 000). By reducing measurement error, DOSE identifies a stronger relationship between risk aversion and cognitive ability than other elicitation techniques. DOSE thus provides a flexible procedure that facilitates the collection of incentivized preference measures in the field. |
| Keywords: | preference elicitation, risk preferences, time preferences, dynamic experiments, cognitive ability, preference stability |
| JEL: | C81 C90 D03 D81 D90 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11361 |
| By: | Niklas M. Witzig (Johannes-Gutenberg University, Germany) |
| Abstract: | I study altruistic choices through the lens of a cognitively noisy decision-maker. I introduce a theoretical framework that demonstrates how increased cognitive noise can directionally affect altruistic decisions and put its implications to the test: In a laboratory experiment, participants make a series of binary choices between taking and giving monetary payments. In the treatment, to-be-calculated sums replace plain monetary payments, increasing the cognitive difficulty of choosing. The Treatment group exhibits a lower sensitivity towards changes in payments and decides significantly more often in favor of the other person, i.e., is more altruistic. I explore the origins of this effect with Bayesian hierarchical models and a number-comparison task, mirroring the mechanics of the altruism choices absent any altruistic preference. The treatment effect is similar in this task, suggesting that a biased perception of numerical magnitudes drives treatment differences. The probabilistic models support this interpretation. A series of additional results show a negative correlation between cognitive reflection and individual measures of cognitive noise, as well as associations between altruistic choice and number comparison. Overall, these results suggest that altruistic preferences – and potentially social preferences more generally – are affected by the cognitive difficulty of their implementation. |
| Keywords: | Cognitive Noise, Altruism, Bayesian Hierarchical Models, Experiment. |
| JEL: | C91 D91 |
| Date: | 2024–09–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:2415 |