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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2024‒03‒25
six papers chosen by |
| By: | Andre, Peter; Boneva, Teodora; Chopra, Felix; Falk, Armin |
| Abstract: | We document the individual willingness to act against climate change and study the role of social norms in a large sample of US adults. Individual beliefs about social norms positively predict pro-climate donations, comparable in strength to universal moral values and economic preferences such as patience and reciprocity. However, we document systematic misperceptions of social norms. Respondents vastly underestimate the prevalence of climate-friendly behaviors and norms. Correcting these misperceptions in an experiment causally raises individual willingness to act against climate change as well as individual support for climate policies. The effects are strongest for individuals who are skeptical about the existence and threat of global warming. |
| Keywords: | Climate change, climate behavior, climate policies, social norms, misperception, beliefs, economic preferences, moral values, survey experiments |
| JEL: | D64 D83 D91 Q51 Q54 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:284397&r=cbe |
| By: | Schütze, Tobias; Carlhoff, Henrik; Witschel, Helena |
| Abstract: | Individual paternalistic preferences are central to the question to what extent the state may intervene in the freedom of choice of its citizens. Albeit its practical and theoretical importance, there is yet no incentivised tool to elicit those preferences. In this paper, we present a simple and abstract experiment to elicit paternalistic preferences and also investigate its relationship with individual psychological constructs that are argued to correlate with paternalistic preferences. In line with previous empirical results, our experimental data suggest that paternalistic preferences are indeed heterogeneously distributed in our sample. Moreover, we identify outcome related and autonomy related motives as important factors of paternalistic preferences. More precisely, (especially young) individuals with a strong desire for autonomy are more likely to opt for an informed choice and individuals with a strong focus on the outcome are more likely to opt for an uninformed choice than giving up their autonomy. |
| Keywords: | paternalistic preferences, revealed preferences approach, psychology of decision making, autonomous decision making, paternalism, libertarianism |
| JEL: | C91 D91 H10 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:roswps:169&r=cbe |
| By: | Mohammad Mehdi Mousavi; Mahdi Kohan Sefidi; Shirin Allahyarkhani |
| Abstract: | Economists modeled self-control problems in decisions of people with the time-inconsistence preferences model. They argued that the source of self-control problems could be uncertainty and temptation. This paper uses an experimental test offered to individuals instantaneous reward and future rewards to measure awareness of self-control problems in a tempting condition and also measure the effect of commitment and flexibility cost on their welfare. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model with time discount factor and present bias at the same time was used for making a model for measuring awareness and choice reversal conditions. The test showed 66% awareness of self-control (partially naive behaviors) in individuals. The welfare implication for individuals increased with commitment and flexibility costs. The result can be useful in marketing and policy-making fields design precisely offers for customers and society. |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2402.11072&r=cbe |
| By: | Mathieu Chevrier (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France); Vincent Teixeira (Université de Lorraine, CNRS, BETA, France) |
| Abstract: | We conducted a laboratory experiment where participants could either choose between an equal or unequal allocation, either delegate the choice to an algorithm controlled by another participant. This participant either has a high control on the algorithm (the algorithm follow perfectly the participants' decision) either a low control (the algorithm sometimes follows the participants' decisions). Our results suggest that a high level of control by the participants over the algorithm implies that participants bear full responsibility in the event of an unequal decision. A low level of control by the participants over the algorithm implies that the participants are perceived as 56.17% less responsible than participants who have a high level of control over the algorithm. The delegator is perceived as 56.52% more responsible than the delegator who delegates to an algorithm that is fully controlled. Finally, we demonstrate that participants with low control over the algorithm are more likely to choose an unequal allocation when they can hide themselves behind the algorithm. These results imply that companies might prioritize an algorithm's profitability over ethical considerations, effectively shifting the burden of responsibility to the user. |
| Keywords: | Artificial Intelligence, Delegation, Responsibility, Punishment, Laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D63 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2024-04&r=cbe |
| By: | Krecik, Markus |
| Abstract: | Current time allocation and household production models face three major weaknesses: First, they only describe the average time allocation. Thus, information about the order of activities is lost. Therefore, it is impossible to describe the influence of activities on later ones. Such interactions are likely pervasive, and can significantly alter behavior. Second, they are unable to describe the effort allocation of individuals, although effort influences one's time allocation. Thereby, they are either unable or very limited in describing labor productivity or multitasking although individuals frequently multitask. Through the omission of interactions and effort allocation, current models yield biased descriptions of e.g. price and time elasticities. Third, they require strong assumptions, such as perfect foresight or periodic environments, and thus cannot describe behavior in unpredictable environments, like reactions to external shocks. In this paper, I provide a remedy for these shortcomings by developing a dynamical model of procedurally rational decision making. The basic idea of the model is a feedback loop between experienced utility, decision utility, and activities. In applications of the model, I show how introducing a work-leisure interaction and multitasking significantly changes elasticities and how nonmarginal external shocks cause short-term demand surges, none of which can be described by current time allocation models. |
| Keywords: | Preferences, Decision-Making, Behavioral Economics, Procedural Rationality, Household Economics |
| JEL: | C61 C63 D11 D90 J22 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:fubsbe:284389&r=cbe |
| By: | Holger Herz; Christian Zihlmann |
| Abstract: | Organizational structures are an important determinant of individual incentives and thus individual motivation in organizations. We study whether their effects on individual motivation go beyond incentives and how they relate to the perceived legitimacy of organizational structure. To this end, we design a laboratory experiment in which we exogenously manipulate the organizational structure in a way that leaves the incentives of all individuals unaffected, but changes the perceived legitimacy of the organizational structure. Our data show that organizational structure indeed affects behavior beyond monetary incentive effects and that the observed changes are significantly associated with changes in perceived legitimacy. |
| Keywords: | legitimacy, organization, motivation |
| JEL: | D01 D23 D91 M50 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10946&r=cbe |