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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2024‒01‒29
four papers chosen by |
| By: | Andrej Woerner (LMU Munich); Giorgia Romagnoli (University of Amsterdam – CREED); Birgit M. Probst (TU Munich); Nina Bartmann (Duke University); Jonathan N. Cloughesy (Duke University & University of Southern California); Jan Willem Lindemans (Duke University) |
| Abstract: | Traditionally, incentives to promote behavioral change are assigned rather than chosen. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically investigate the alternative approach of letting people choose their own incentives from a menu of increasingly challenging and rewarding options. When individuals are heterogeneous and have private information about their costs and benefits, we theoretically show that leaving them the choice of incentives can improve both adherence and welfare. We test the theoretical predictions in a field experiment based on daily meditation sessions. We randomly assign some participants to one of two incentive schemes and allow others to choose between the two schemes. As predicted, participants sort into schemes in (partial) agreement with the objectives of the policy maker. However, in contrast to our prediction, participants who could choose complete significantly fewer sessions than participants that were randomly assigned. Since the results are not driven by poor selection, we infer that letting people choose between incentive schemes may bring in psychological effects that discourage adherence. |
| Keywords: | monetary incentives; dynamic incentives; field experiment; mental health; |
| JEL: | D03 |
| Date: | 2023–12–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:475&r=cbe |
| By: | Ďuriník, Michal; Morita, Hodaka; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le |
| Abstract: | How does group identity influence promotion decisions and what impact does it have on the performance of organizations through promotions? We provide answers based on two experiments in which we identify the effect of group identity on the employers’ preferences regarding whom to promote, their expectations of the post-promotion effort of promoted and non-promoted workers, and the post-promotion effort itself. In both experiments, we find strong evidence of group identity biasing the employers’ preferences. The observed group identity bias in the promotion decision significantly reduces efficiency. Contributions to the literature on promotions in organizations and discrimination in promotions are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Group identity, in-group favoritism, post-promotion effort, post-promotion productivity, promotion decision |
| JEL: | C91 J7 M50 |
| Date: | 2023–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:119389&r=cbe |
| By: | Gary Charness (University of California, Santa Barbara,); Ismael Rodriguez-Lara (Universidad de Málaga and Chapman University) |
| Abstract: | Using the mind game, we provide experimental evidence that people are more likely to lie when they disclose non-personal information (e.g., reporting a number they thought of) compared with personal information (e.g., reporting the last digit of their birth year). Our findings suggest that the type of information is an important factor for lying behavior. |
| Keywords: | Lying behavior, personal information, impersonal information, selfconcept-maintenance, moral costs, motivated beliefs |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:24-01&r=cbe |
| By: | Ville Korpela (Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Finland); Michele Lombardi (University of Liverpool Management School, Liverpool, UK); Julius Zachariassen (Turku School of Economics, University of Turku, Finland) |
| Abstract: | Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agentsâ choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that if all agents would select the same outcome form the set of all feasible outcomes, then this outcome should be deemed socially optimal. While Unanimity is both sensible as a property of a goal and necessary for implementation under rational behavior, with nonrational behavior it is neither. In this paper we investigate behavioral implementation under complete information without assuming Unanimity. Moreover, we give a full characterization of behaviorally implementable SCRs when the designer can use individually based rights structure. |
| Keywords: | Behavioral economics, Implementation theory, Rights structure, Unanimity |
| JEL: | C72 D11 D71 D82 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp164&r=cbe |