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on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics |
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Issue of 2023‒05‒01
five papers chosen by Marco Novarese Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Chowdhury, Subhasish M.; Espín, Antonio M.; Nieboer, Jeroen |
| Abstract: | Fetal exposure to sex hormones can have long lasting effects on human behavior. The second-to-fourth digit ratio (DR) is considered a putative marker for prenatal exposure to testosterone (vs estrogens), with higher exposure resulting in lower DR. Even though testosterone is theoretically related to competition, the role of DR in human behavior is debated; and in situations such as bilateral conflict is unknown. We investigate this through a laboratory experiment using a repeated 2-person Tullock contest played in fixed same-gender pairs. Based on a previously obtained large sample of student subjects, we selectively invited participants to the laboratory if their right-hand DR was in the top (High-DR) or bottom (Low-DR) tercile for their gender. Unbeknownst to the subjects, we performed a controlled match of the DR types (Low-Low, Low-High, High-High). This novel methodology allows us to analyze the causal effect of DR on behavior for the first time in the literature. We find that Low-DR (vs High-DR) males compete more aggressively regardless of the counterpart's type. For females’ conflict behavior, the counterpart's type matters more than the decision-maker's type: Low-DRs are non-significantly more aggressive but every-one is more aggressive against High-DRs. Limitations due to sample size are discussed. |
| Keywords: | conflict; contest; digit ratio; gender lab experiments |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D74 D91 |
| Date: | 2023–06–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:118581&r=cbe |
| By: | Dohmen, Thomas (University of Bonn and IZA); Jagelka, Tomáš (University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Measures based on self-assessments, which are increasingly important in empirical economic research, are plagued by measurement error. This paper presents the first attempt at measuring both revealed and self-reported reliability of individuals' answers on self-reports of latent characteristics. We show that measurement error on self-reports relevant to economists is heterogeneous across individuals and can be reasonably approximated by a distribution with two unobserved types. We propose a straightforward survey question which allows to distinguish individuals who give highly reliable answers from those who do not, using cross-sectional data. We demonstrate that it predicts revealed individual reliability over and above all measured characterises, survey conditions, and experimental treatments. We show how our simple self-reported reliability measure can be used to cost-effectively reduce attenuation bias in estimates of cognitive and non-cognitive determinants of high school GPA, college graduation, unemployment, and life satisfaction. Without requiring panel data, the achieved correction is similar to some of the most effective reduced-form theory-based approaches in the existing literature. Finally, we clarify the role of effort and self-knowledge in generating measurement error and propose a simple model which rationalizes our findings. |
| Keywords: | measurement error, reliability, personality traits, economic preferences |
| JEL: | D90 C81 C83 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16027&r=cbe |
| By: | Mekvabishvili, Rati; Mekvabishvili, Elguja; Natsvaladze, Marine; Sirbiladze, Rusudan; Mzhavanadze, Giorgi; Deisadze, Salome |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we present an experimental study of prosocial behavior and individual normative standards of fairness under the novel context of a dynamic dictator game. In addition, we explore the role of informal institutions in shaping individuals’ cooperation within the domain of a public goods game under its direct exposure and in subsequent prosociality beyond its reach in the domain of the dictator game. We find that dictators’ average offers in our study are quite close to the typical results found in other dictator game experiments and they are quite stable over two periods. However, dictators become more selfish after they have had the experience of playing a public goods game with peer punishment. Interestingly, we found that dictators act significantly more selfishly relative to their own declared individual normative standard of fairness. Furthermore, our experiment reveals a large share of antisocial punishment in the public goods game and a peer-to-peer punishment mechanism to be an inefficient tool to promote cooperation, however in an environment that rules out a suitable normative consensus and collective choice. |
| Keywords: | dictator game; individual normative standard of fairness; dynamics of behavior; spillover; prosociality; public goods game; |
| JEL: | C73 C92 D02 H41 |
| Date: | 2023–02–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:116774&r=cbe |
| By: | Dohmen, Thomas (University of Bonn and IZA); Rohde, Ingrid M.T. (Istanbul Bilgi University); Stolp, Tom (SEO Amsterdam) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment among male participants to investigate whether rewarding schemes that depend on work performance – in particular, tournament incentives – induce more stress than schemes that are independent of performance - fixed payment scheme. Stress is measured over the entire course of the experiment at both the hormonal and psychological level. Hormonal stress responses are captured by measuring salivary cortisol levels. Psychological stress responses are measured by self-reported feelings of stress and primary appraisals. We find that tournament incentives induce a stress response whereas a fixed payment does not induce stress. This stress response does not differ significantly across situations in which winners and losers of the tournament are publically announced and situations in which this information remains private. Biological and psychological stress measures are positively correlated, i.e. increased levels of cortisol are associated with stronger feelings of stress. Nevertheless, neither perceived psychological stress nor elevated cortisol levels in a previous tournament predict a subsequent choice between tournaments and fixed payment schemes, indicating that stress induced by incentives schemes is not a relevant criterion for sorting decisions in our experiment. Finally, we find that cortisol levels are severely elevated at the beginning of the experiment, suggesting that participants experience stress in anticipation of the experiment per se, potentially due to uncertainties associated with the unknown lab situation. We call this the novelty effect. |
| Keywords: | incentives, stress, cortisol, sorting, laboratory experiment |
| JEL: | D23 D87 D91 M52 |
| Date: | 2023–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16025&r=cbe |
| By: | Zhou, Renee (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | To test whether education can change risk preference, I exploit the Indonesian school construction programme and the Mexican education reform in compulsory schooling as two separate natural experiments. Applying the instrumental variable approach, I do not find a causal effect of education on risk preference. The results are consistent in the two different settings, so my findings are externally valid. The results suggest that a change in risk preference may not be the channel via which the impact of education on risk-taking in real life. This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of social preferences and the outcomes of education. |
| Keywords: | Risk preference ; risk aversion ; education JEL classifications: I25 ; D90 |
| Date: | 2023 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:wrkesp:45&r=cbe |