nep-cbe New Economics Papers
on Cognitive and Behavioural Economics
Issue of 2009‒05‒30
six papers chosen by
Marco Novarese
University Amedeo Avogadro

  1. Cognitive and behavioral challenges in responding to climate change By Norgaard, Kari Marie
  2. Group Versus Individual Decision-Making: Is there a shift? By Attila Ambrus; Ben Greiner; Parag Pathak
  3. Not It: Opting out of Voluntary Coalitions that Provide a Public Good By David M. McEvoy
  4. Naked Exclusion: Towards a Behavioral Approach to Exclusive Dealing By Boone, J.; Müller, W.; Suetens, S.
  5. What is an award worth? An econometric assessment of the impact of awards on employee performance By Susanne Neckermann; Reto Cueni; Bruno S. Frey
  6. Where Angels Fear to Trade: The Role of Religion in Household Finance By Renneboog, L.D.R.; Spaenjers, C.

  1. By: Norgaard, Kari Marie
    Abstract: Climate scientists have identified global warming as the most important environmental issue of our time, but it has taken over 20 years for the problem to penetrate the public discourse in even the most superficial manner. While some nations have done better than others, no nation has adequately reduced emissions and no nation has a base of public citizens that are sufficiently socially and politically engaged in response to climate change. This paper summarizes international and national differences in levels of knowledge and concern regarding climate change, and the existing explanations for the worldwide failure of public response to climate change, drawing from psychology, social psychology and sociology. On the whole, the widely presumed links between public access to information on climate change and levels of concern and action are not supported. The paper's key findings emphasize the presence of negative emotions in conjunction with global warming (fear, guilt, and helplessness), and the process of emotion management and cultural norms in the construction of a social reality in which climate change is held at arms length. Barriers in responding to climate change are placed into three broad categories: 1) psychological/conceptual, 2) social and cultural, and 3) structural (political economy). The author provides policy considerations and summarizes the policy implications of both psychological and conceptual barriers, and social and cultural barriers. An annotated bibliography is included.
    Keywords: Environmental Economics&Policies,Climate Change,Transport and Environment,Global Environment Facility,Environmental Governance
    Date: 2009–05–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4940&r=cbe
  2. By: Attila Ambrus (Department of Economics, Harvard University); Ben Greiner (School of Economics, University of New South Wales); Parag Pathak (Department of Economics, MIT)
    Abstract: We revisit the phenomenon that group decisions differ systematically from decisions of individuals. Our experiment solicits individual and group decisions from the same subjects in two settings, gift-exchange games and lottery choices. With no deliberation and voting, the group decision is determined by the median individual decision, without a shift. With deliberation but no imposed decision rule, the individual one po- sition towards the selfish direction also becomes influential. In lottery choices we find no group shift relative to the median. We demonstrate that the standard practice of comparing means of group and individual decisions would incorrectly identify a level shift.
    Keywords: Decision making, lottery, risky choices
    Date: 2009–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ads:wpaper:0091&r=cbe
  3. By: David M. McEvoy
    Abstract: Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods experiments. We find that subjects’ behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding non-members is relatively large. Key Words: voluntary coalitions, voluntary agreements, public goods experiments, free riding
    JEL: H41 C92 C72 Q50
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apl:wpaper:09-14&r=cbe
  4. By: Boone, J.; Müller, W.; Suetens, S. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion". Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates compared to the non-discriminatory case only when payments to buyers can be offered sequentially and secretly. Third, allowing discrimination does not lead to significant decreases in costs of exclusion. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive deal the higher is the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.
    Keywords: exclusive dealing;entry deterrence;foreclosure;contracts;externalities;coordination;experiments.
    JEL: C91 L12 L42
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200930&r=cbe
  5. By: Susanne Neckermann; Reto Cueni; Bruno S. Frey
    Abstract: Behavioral economics documents the importance of status and self-image concerns in the workplace, but is largely silent about how to instrumentalize them to induce effort. Awards - widespread in the corporate sector and elsewhere - are motivators that derive their value from such social concerns. Panel data from the call center of a large international bank allow us to estimate the impact of receiving an award on effort. The performance of winners proves to be significantly higher than that of comparable nonrecipients after the award has been presented. This increase in work effort is sizeable, robust, and not driven by reverse causation.
    Keywords: Awards, motivation, non-monetary compensation, event-study, incentives
    JEL: C23 J33 M52
    Date: 2009–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:iewwpx:411&r=cbe
  6. By: Renneboog, L.D.R.; Spaenjers, C. (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: Although the relationship between religion and economic development on the macro-level has been investigated, it is less clear how religious background influences economic attitudes and financial decision-making on the level of the individual or household, the micro-level. We use panel data from the extensive DNB Household Survey, covering the period from 1995 to 2008, to investigate whether – and through which channel – religious denomination affects household finance in the Netherlands. We find evidence that, in general, religious households care more about saving, are more risk-averse, consider themselves more trusting, have a more external locus of control, and have a stronger bequest motive. Furthermore, Catholics and Protestants have longer planning horizons, and Protestants and Evangelicals seem to have a greater sense of individual financial responsibility. Most of these factors matter for household financial decision-making, albeit to differing degrees. Using our religion variables as instruments for economic attitudes (and controlling for demographic and background risk characteristics), we demonstrate that the above-mentioned differences in economic beliefs and preferences explain the higher propensity to save by religious households in general and the lower investments in risky assets by Catholic households.
    Keywords: Economic Attitudes; Culture; Religion; Household finance; Portfolio choice; Trust.
    JEL: A1 D1 Z1
    Date: 2009
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200934&r=cbe

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