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on Africa |
| By: | Ozili, Peterson K |
| Abstract: | Using six widely accepted indicators, this study compares the progress made in financial inclusion in Nigeria, Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the World, with a view to deducing lessons that each entity can improve upon. We find that Nigeria outperformed sub-Saharan Africa in three indicators of financial inclusion while sub-Saharan Africa did better than Nigeria in one metric. Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa exceeded the World average in informal borrowings. We also constructed an index of financial inclusion and found that financial institution account ownership, formal borrowing, informal borrowing and debit or card ownership are significant positive determinants of the financial inclusion index. These findings indicate that policymakers in Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa have significant room for improving their financial inclusion standings towards the global average. We make recommendations on the aspects where policymakers can place their focus in pursuit of this goal. |
| Keywords: | financial inclusion, Nigeria, Sub-Saharan Africa, digital financial inclusion |
| JEL: | G00 G20 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121527 |
| By: | Ekpeyong, Paul |
| Abstract: | In retrospect, the poverty problem has deepened in many Sub-Saharan African countries in the last several decades, underpinning the region’s inability to sustain peace and stability, and in the process threatening years of development post-independence. This worsening situation is reflected in the HDI of the sub-continent which is on the lowest bracket in the global league. Subsequently, most of the countries have formulated and embarked on poverty reduction strategies in order to eradicate the status of “extremely poor” and also to receive debt forgiveness from the multi-lateral as well as bilateral organizations. Nevertheless, the effects of these endeavors have been mixed. This paper aims at identifying the status of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa and qualitatively look at the modern policies that keep the problem alive today. What it enshrines is an elaborate strategy for poverty eradication, which puts emphasis on a consultative process for addressing the plight of extreme poverty in the region. |
| Keywords: | poverty, sub-Saharan, Africa, Policies |
| JEL: | H30 H5 H54 O21 O23 |
| Date: | 2024–08–14 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:121728 |
| By: | Kohnert, Dirk |
| Abstract: | Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) accounts for a third of the countries on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list. In the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (ML/TF) Ranking and Risk Assessment Tool, the region performed poorly in terms of resilience to ML/TF, with more than 60% of countries falling into the high-risk category. Although countries on the grey list are not subject to sanctions, inclusion on the list has a significant impact on their economies. This includes a significant reduction in capital inflows and foreign direct investment. The four main sources of illicit financial flows from SSA, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia and Nigeria, accounted for more than 50% of total illicit financial flows. While SSA received nearly $2 trillion in foreign direct investment (FDI) and official development assistance (ODA) between 1980 and 2018, it issued over $1 trillion in illicit financial flows. These illicitly acquired funds and diverted from the region continue to pose a development challenge. Illicit financial flows increased overall, but not concerning trade. In the 38 years from 1980 to 2018, they increased significantly in the 2000s, in parallel with the growth of African trade. Emerging and developing countries in Asia and the Middle East have become key targets. Previous initiatives to curb money laundering and improve the exchange of tax information between countries have largely failed, including the three most important: the Financial Action Task Force (founded in 1998), the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (founded in 2009) and the Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (founded in 2016). First, African countries lack the resources and capacity to address illicit financial flows. Second, many advanced economies are not sufficiently engaged in these initiatives. However, the repatriation of illegal funds is an important tool for strengthening the resource base of African countries. In 2020, for example, the United States and the self-governing British Crown Dependency of Jersey, one of the world's most notorious tax and money laundering havens, reached an agreement with Nigeria to repatriate more than $300 million stolen by Nigeria's former military dictator General Sani Abacha. |
| Abstract: | Subsahara-Afrika (SSA) macht ein Drittel der Länder auf der grauen Liste der Financial Action Task Force (FATF) aus. Im Ranking und Risikobewertungstool für Geldwäsche und Terrorismusfinanzierung (ML/TF) schnitt die Region in Bezug auf die Widerstandsfähigkeit gegenüber ML/TF schlecht ab, wobei mehr als 60 % der Länder in die Hochrisikokategorie fielen. Obwohl Länder auf der grauen Liste keinen Sanktionen unterliegen, hat die Aufnahme in die Liste erhebliche Auswirkungen auf ihre Wirtschaft. Dazu gehört eine deutliche Reduzierung der Kapitalzuflüsse und ausländischen Direktinvestitionen. Auf die vier Hauptquellen illegaler Finanzströme aus SSA, Südafrika, die Demokratische Republik Kongo, Äthiopien und Nigeria, entfielen mehr als 50 % der gesamten illegalen Finanzströme. Während SSA zwischen 1980 und 2018 fast 2 Billionen US-Dollar an ausländischen Direktinvestitionen (FDI) und offizieller Entwicklungshilfe (ODA) erhielt, emittierte es über 1 Billion US-Dollar an illegalen Finanzströmen. Diese unrechtmäßig erworbenen und aus der Region abgeleiteten Gelder stellen weiterhin eine Entwicklungsherausforderung dar. Die illegalen Finanzströme nahmen insgesamt zwar zu, nicht jedoch im Verhältnis zum Handel. In den 38 Jahren von 1980 bis 2018 stiegen sie in den 2000er Jahren deutlich an, parallel zum Wachstum des afrikanischen Handels. Schwellen- und Entwicklungsländer in Asien und im Nahen Osten sind zu Hauptzielen geworden. Die bisherigen Initiativen zur Eindämmung der Geldwäsche und zur Verbesserung des Austauschs von Steuerinformationen zwischen Ländern sind weitgehend gescheitert, darunter die drei wichtigsten: die Financial Action Task Force (gegründet 1998), das Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (gegründet 2009) und das Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (gegründet 2016). Erstens mangelt es den afrikanischen Ländern an Ressourcen und Kapazitäten, um gegen illegale Finanzströme vorzugehen. Zweitens engagieren sich viele fortgeschrittene Volkswirtschaften nicht ausreichend in diesen Initiativen. Allerdings ist die Rückführung illegaler Gelder ein wichtiges Instrument zur Stärkung der Ressourcenbasis afrikanischer Länder. Im Jahr 2020 einigten sich beispielsweise die Vereinigten Staaten und das selbstverwaltete britische Krongebiet Jersey, eines der berüchtigtsten Steuer- und Geldwäscheparadiese der Welt, mit Nigeria auf die Rückführung von mehr als 300 Millionen US-Dollar, die vom ehemaligen nigerianischen Militärdiktator General Sani Abacha gestohlen worden waren. |
| Keywords: | Money laundering, Embezzlement, Corruption, tax evasion, Terrorism financing, Informal economy, Sub-Saharan Africa |
| JEL: | D23 D25 D53 D63 D74 E21 F35 G28 O17 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:300868 |
| By: | Aminou Yaya |
| Abstract: | Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, like most developing countries, face major challenges to achieve strong, sustainable, and inclusive growth with the view to reduce significantly persistent poverty and inequality. Many of these challenges results from a high level of economic vulnerability due to simultaneous shocks, notably the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change and the multiplicity of armed conflicts. Hence the need to study policies and means of strengthening economic resilience to shocks. This paper analyzes the effects of productive capacities on the volatility of economic growth in SSA countries when faced with significant vulnerability. The study covers the period 2000-2018 for 43 SSA countries. Using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), the results show that economic vulnerability contributes to growth volatility in SSA. However, this effect varies according to the performance of productive capacities. Countries with high productive capacities have greater opportunities to mitigate the effect of economic vulnerability on growth volatility. Some specific dimensions of productive capacities (Institutions, ICT) seem to matter more than others. The results of this study provide important recommendations to policy makers. |
| Keywords: | Productive capacities; economic vulnerability; growth volatility |
| Date: | 2024–08–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2024/169 |
| By: | Christopher Blattman; Horacio Larreguy; Benjamin Marx; Otis Reid |
| Abstract: | We study a large-scale intervention designed by civil society organizations to reduce vote buying in Uganda’s 2016 elections. We study this intervention in light of a model where incumbents benefit from a first-mover and valence advantage, vote buying and campaigning are complementary, and voter reciprocity increases the effectiveness of vote buying. The intervention undermined reciprocity as well as the valence advantage of incumbents. As a result, challengers not only campaigned more intensively but also bought more votes in treated locations. Consistent with incumbents being first movers in markets for votes and facing more frictions to adjust their strategies than challengers, their response to the intervention was limited. The intervention ultimately failed to reduce vote buying, but led to short-run electoral gains for challengers and increased service delivery in treated locations. |
| Keywords: | elections, voting behaviour, field experiment, Africa |
| JEL: | C93 D72 O55 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11247 |
| By: | Doux Baraka Kusinza (University of Namur); Catherine Guirkinger (University of Namur) |
| Abstract: | In the literature, polygamy is frequently associated with intra-household inefficiencies, commonly attributed to a lack of cooperation between co-wives. In this paper, we challenge this claim by investigating the extent to which co-wives are inclined to cooperate when mutual gains are at stake. Additionally, we examine whether the lack of voice in intra-household decision- making contributes to explaining commonly observed inefficiencies. Using public good games in northern Benin, we find that co-wives are not more prone to cooperate with their husband than with each other. Moreover, when they share mutual interests, they tend to coalesce and play against their husband’s interests. These findings are particularly strong in the case of women with low levels of agency. We argue that co-wives with low agency have more incentive to unite to collectively improve their access to household resources since, individually, they are marginalized. Finally, the comparison of monogamous and polygamous households reveals that efficiency levels and the determinants of cooperative behavior are similar in both types of households (at least when household members themselves set the rules regarding the allocation of the public good). |
| Date: | 2024–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nam:defipp:2403 |