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on Africa |
| By: | Sakurai, Takeshi |
| Abstract: | The enhancement of agricultural productivity is the key to economic development of Sub-Saharan Africa. Particularly, the intensification of lowland agriculture is critically important in West Africa since demand for rice and vegetables is increasing rapidly due to urbanization. As has been debated much, informal land tenure system in Sub-Saharan Africa can be a constraint to the intensification. This paper, applying an endogenous switching probit model where lowland ownership is endogenously selected, analyzes data collected in the area around two large inland cities, Bouaké in Côte d’Ivoire and Kumasi in Ghana. Regression results reveal that village ownership has a positive impact on the intensification of lowland cropping in the Bouaké area, while it discourages the intensification of lowland cropping as well as investment in tree plantation in lowlands in the Kumasi area. The findings support the hypotheses since land is relatively scarcer in the Kumasi area than in the Bouaké area. |
| Keywords: | informal land ownership, lowland agriculture, intensification, land use, crop choice, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana |
| Date: | 2013–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hit:hituec:586&r=afr |
| By: | Hamazakaza, Petan; Smale, Melinda; Kasalu, Helen |
| Abstract: | following the 1991 economic liberalisation and Structural Adjustment Programme witnessed an influx of foreign based seed companies whose primary investment in the Zambian seed industry was in maize seed improvement and marketing. The crop has received considerable government attention over the years in terms of financial investment to support smallholder farmer access to seed and fertilizer. In this regard, government introduced the subsidized Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP) in 2002/03 and by 2010, about 1,210,520 resource constrained farmers had benefited from the programme. |
| Keywords: | Zambia, Maize, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Development, |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:midcwp:148808&r=afr |
| By: | Estian Calitz (University of Stellenbosch, South Africa); Sally Wallace (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University); Le Roux Burrows (University of Stellenbosch, South Africa) |
| Abstract: | The purpose of this paper is, very generally, to provide a framework and potential methodology of analysis of tax incentives in one country — South Africa. As incentives are often specific and targeted, the precise methods needed to analyze the effectiveness of incentives may well differ among types of incentives. However, by positing a framework for evaluation based on basic economic principles, we believe that transparency, accountability and rigorous evaluation of individual incentives or regarding the choice of incentives may be enhanced. |
| Date: | 2013–04–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1306&r=afr |
| By: | Marc Sangnier (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - Aix-Marseille Univ. - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales [EHESS] - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM)); Yanos Zylberberg (CREI - Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional - Universitat Pompeu Fabra) |
| Abstract: | Leaders' misbehaviors may durably undermine the credibility of the state. Using individual level survey in the aftermath of geo-localized social protests in Africa, we find that trust in monitoring institutions and beliefs in social coordination strongly evolve after riots, together with trust in leaders. As no signs of social unrest can be recorded before, the social conflict can be interpreted as a sudden signal sent on a leader's action from which citizens extract information on the country's institutions. Our interpretation is the following. Agents lend their taxes to a leader with imperfect information on the leader's type and the underlying capacity of institutions to monitor her. A misbehavior is then interpreted as a failure of institutions to secure taxes given by citizens and makes agents (i) reluctant to contribute to the state effort, (ii) skeptical about the contributions of others. |
| Keywords: | social conflicts; norms of cooperation; trust; institutions |
| Date: | 2013–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00822377&r=afr |
| By: | Ahmad, Ahmad H.; Pentecost, Eric J. |
| Abstract: | Persistent international current account imbalances and real exchange rate movements have become a permanent feature of the world economy. This paper, therefore, sets out to investigate the relationship between the real exchange rate and current account dynamics of eleven African countries, using data from 1980 to 2008, based on a stochastic Mundell-Fleming model in which shocks to real exchange rates and current account have been identified as permanent and temporary. Using a bi-variate structural VAR approach, the results are in consonant with the theoretical model, with permanent shocks having permanent and positive effects on both the current account and the real exchange rates. On the other hand, while temporary shocks have insignificant effects on the real exchange rates, they have very different effects on the current accounts of different countries. |
| Keywords: | real exchange rates; current accounts; structural var |
| Date: | 2012 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eid:wpaper:32981&r=afr |
| By: | Pierre André; Sandrine Mesplé-Somps (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise; Institut de Recherche pour le Développement (IRD)) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies political competition in the case of a democratization process. We present an illustrative model describing political competition when the opposition threatens the stability of the country. In some cases, our model predicts the government should invest in opposition districts to avoid political agitation. This contrasts with existing literature on established democracies, where public funds usually target ruling party supporters or electorally tight districts. We empirically observe the first democratic changeover in Ghana in 2000. Implementing a diff-in-diff strategy, we find that districts with a leading political party member appear to receive slightly more public funds when their party is not in charge. This phenomenon is found in urban areas and in areas that vote the most for this leading member’s party. Hence it occurs in places with the potential for political agitation. |
| Keywords: | Public goods, Elections, Politics, Ghana. |
| JEL: | D72 O55 R53 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-24&r=afr |
| By: | Amadou Samaké (IER - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali); Jean-François Bélières (CIRAD - Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement - Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement [CIRAD]); Koné Bouréma (IER - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali); Assitan Traoré (IER - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali); Abdoulaye Nyentao (IER - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali - Institut d'Economie Rurale du Mali) |
| Abstract: | Ce rapport présente les résultats d'une étude réalisée en 2011 et 2012 par l'Institut d'Economie Rurale (IER) du Mali avec l'appui du Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le développement (CIRAD - France). Elle a été engagée dans le cadre du Programme d'Appui au Secteur Agricole du Mali (PASAM), sur financement de la Coopération Danoise, dans la perspective de l'élaboration d'un nouveau programme de développement rural. L'objectif était de fournir aux décideurs et acteurs du développement rural, des éléments pour une meilleure connaissance et une meilleure compréhension de la situation et du fonctionnement des exploitations agricoles familiales. Des enquêtes ont été réalisées, auprès de 312 exploitations agricoles familiales tirées au hasard dans 12 villages choisis pour représenter la diversité agro-économique des deux cercles. Les informations collectées portent sur l'année 2010. Le rapport présente les résultats obtenus à partir de traitements statistiques simples. Les exploitations agricoles familiales sont caractérisées à partir de leurs dotations en facteurs de production et leur système d'activités. Les performances agricoles sont analysées. Le revenu global intégrant à la fois les revenus collectifs et individuels, et les revenus agricoles et non agricoles, permet d'apprécier la performance globale des exploitations familiales. Les systèmes d'activités sont très diversifiés mais les revenus dépendent largement de la composante agricole. La pauvreté est généralisée et la capacité d'investissement est inexistante pour la plupart des exploitations. De part son importance, l'agriculture reste le principal levier de développement. L'amélioration de la productivité agricole passe par l'amélioration durable des capacités productives en permettant aux exploitations de réaliser des investissements mais aussi en permettant une diminution des risques auxquels sont soumises ces exploitations aussi bien au niveau de la production que de la commercialisation. |
| Keywords: | Afrique de l'Ouest, Mali, systèmes de poduction agricole, exploitations agricoles familiales, productivité, pauvreté, sécurité alimentaire |
| Date: | 2013–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00822017&r=afr |