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on Africa |
| By: | Awash Teklehaimanot; Gordon C. McCord; Jeffrey D. Sachs |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates the number of people at risk of contracting malaria in Africa using GIS methods and the disease's epidemiologic characteristics. It then estimates yearly costs of covering the population at risk with the package of interventions (differing by level of malaria endemicity and differing for rural and urban populations) for malaria as recommended by the UN Millennium Project. These projected costs are calculated assuming a ramp-up of coverage to full coverage by 2008, and then projected out through 2015 to give a year-by-year cost of meeting the Millennium Development Goal for reducing the burden of malaria by 75% We conclude that the cost of comprehensive malaria control for Africa is US$3.0 billion per year on average, or around US$4.02 per African at risk. |
| JEL: | I18 |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13664&r=afr |
| By: | Alemu, Tekie; Ali, Daniel Ayalew; Deininger, Klaus |
| Abstract: | Although a large theoretical literature discusses the possible inefficiency of sharecropping contracts, the empirical evidence on this phenomenon has been ambiguous at best. Household-level fixed-effect estimates from about 8,500 plots operated by households that own and sharecrop land in the Ethiopian highlands provide support for the hypothesis of Marshallian inefficiency. At the same time, a factor adjustment model suggests that the extent to which rental markets allow households to attain their desired operational holding size is extremely limited. Our analysis points towards factor market imperfections (no rental for oxen), lack of alternative employment opportunities, and tenure insecurity as possible reasons underlying such behavior, suggesting that, rather than worrying almost exclusively about Marshallian inefficiency, it is equally warranted to give due attention to the policy framework within which land rental markets operate. |
| Keywords: | Rural Land Policies for Poverty Reduction,Land Use and Policies,Labor Policies,Municipal Housing and Land,Economic Theory & Research |
| Date: | 2007–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4442&r=afr |
| By: | Pontara, Nicola; Francisco, Manuela |
| Abstract: | This paper seeks to understand whether Mauritanian firms deem corruption as an obstacle to operate and grow, to identify the profile of firms that are more likely to make informal payments, and to quantify the size of these payments. The results of the analysis show that perceptions of corruption can be potentially misleading. Corruption is not considered to be one of the most taxing factors impeding the growth of firms in Mauritania. Yet, its cost to firms is significant and greater than in the comparator group countries. This means that corruption is internalized by firms and considered an accepted practice. Alternatively, firms may fear reporting corruption practices for fear of retaliation. Econometric evidence on the propensity and intensity of bribes suggests that medium-size firms suffer the most from corruption in Mauritania. Larger firms are more established and connected, do not fear exiting the market, and are less likely to be harassed. Smaller firms are less visible and may be able to escape the control of public officials by operating largely in the informal sector. Medium-size firms are the most likely to pay bribes and to pay the highest amounts as a percentage of their total annual sales, which places a heavy burden on their ability to grow. |
| Keywords: | Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures,Access to Finance,Governance Indicators,Microfinance,National Governance |
| Date: | 2007–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4439&r=afr |