By: |
Schaling,Eric (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research) |
Abstract: |
South Africa's 40 years of experience with capital controls on residents and
non-residents (1961-2001) reads like a collection of examples of perverse
unanticipated effects of legislation and regulation. We show that the presence
of capital controls on residents and non-residents, enabled the South African
Reserve Bank (SARB) to target domestic interest rates (and or the exchange
rate) via interventions in the (commercial) foreign exchange market. This
provides an early rationale for anchoring SA monetary policy via the exchange
rate, rather than via domestic interest rates. This suggests not only that the
capital controls themselves exhibited substantial institutional inertia, but
that this same institutional inertia also applied to the monetary policy
regime. A plausible reason for this is that for most of the 20th century in
South Africa (partial) capital controls and exchange rate based monetary
policies were like Siamese twins; almost impossible to separate. |
Keywords: |
capital controls;exchange rate mechanism |
JEL: |
E42 E61 E65 F32 F33 F41 |
Date: |
2005 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005110&r=afr |