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on Africa |
By: | Markus Goldstein (none); Alain de Janvry (University of California, Berkeley); Elisabeth Sadoulet (University of California, Berkeley) |
Keywords: | household models, insurance, risk, social aspects, villages, |
Date: | 2003–06–01 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdl:agrebk:1067&r=afr |
By: | Thomas Barnebeck Andersen (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Henrik Hansen (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Thomas Markussen (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
Abstract: | This paper studies the role of US political factors in the allocation of World Bank concessional lending, where US political interests are proxied by voting similarity in the United Nations General Assembly on issues identified as important by the US Department of State. In contrast to previous studies we find that the US exerted a significant influence on IDA lending during the period 1993 - 2000. We demonstrate that the influence was both statistically as well as economically significant. Finally, we demonstrate that our result is robust with respect to the omission of the IDA Country Performance Rating index. |
Keywords: | aid; World Bank; US political influence |
JEL: | F34 F35 O19 |
Date: | 2004–08 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0506&r=afr |
By: | Rolf Maier |
Abstract: | This paper extends the ongoing discussion on optimal exchange rate regimes to the issue of pro-poor growth. To analyze empirically the poverty effects of exchange rate regimes, we estimate the distribution effects of different exchange rate arrangements on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent. In addition, we test the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, to capture potential trade-offs between poverty effects through overall economic growth and distribution. To analyze this question, we collect an irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-country data on the first and second quintile share from 76 countries and use two recently proposed de facto exchange rate regime classifications, Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart/Rogoff (2003). To cover econometric issues, cross-country variation and dynamic aspects of within-country changes of the income of the poor, we apply two econometric specifications, a growth equation and a system GMM estimation. We estimate the poverty effects of different exchange rate regimes for all countries and, separately, developing and industrial countries due to considerable differences in economic structure, access to international capital markets and soundness of domestic financial systems. Empirical findings vary considerably with respect to three aspects. First, findings for the Levy-Yeyati/Sturzenegger (2002) and Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification differ significantly with respect to similar exchange rate categories. Thus the classification process of exchange rate regimes affects critically the policy conclusions. Second, statistically significant exchange rate regimes in the Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification impact positively on the poor in developing countries, but negatively on the poor in industrial countries. Thus exchange rate regimes affect very differently the poor in developing and industrial countries in the Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification. Third, statistical significance of exchange rate regimes in the system GMM approach differs considerably for adjusted and unadjusted income inequality measures. Due to these varying and only weakly robust empirical findings, a concise policy recommendation with respect to poverty-reducing exchange rate regimes is difficult. Nevertheless, positive effects of intermediate regimes of the Reinhart/Rogoff (2003) classification in developing countries should be emphasized, showing at least a tendency to not negative and possible positive effects of intermediate regimes on the poorest 40 percent in developing countries. |
Keywords: | Pro-Poor Growth, Exchange Rate Regimes |
JEL: | F3 F4 |
Date: | 2005–04–21 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpif:0504008&r=afr |
By: | Rolf Maier |
Abstract: | To reveal effects and consequences of high indebtedness on income poverty, this paper explores empirically a linear and non-linear impact of external debt on pro-poor growth in developing and transitional countries. To examine this hypothesis, we test the distribution effect of external debt to GDP, external debt to exports, and debt services to exports on the poorest 20 and 20 to 40 percent in a cross-country approach. In addition, we estimate the total effect, i.e. the distribution and growth effect, to analyse potential trade-offs between the impact of unsustainable external debt levels on poverty through overall economic growth and via distribution. To test the poverty effects, we collect an irregular and unbalanced panel of time-series cross-country data on the first and second quintile of 58 developing and transitional countries for the period 1970 – 1999. We apply two econometric specifications, a growth equation and a system GMM estimation, to cover econometric issues, cross-country variation and dynamic aspects of within-country changes of the income of the poor. Empirical findings of the impact of the debt indicators on pro-poor growth have to be interpreted carefully due to inconsistent results of the sensitivity analyses. Thus results do not indicate an optimal external debt level with respect to pro–poor growth. On the contrary, higher external debt levels are associated with negative effects on the level of the income of the poorest 40 percent without exhibiting any significant effects on the growth rates. Thus concise policy recommendations with respect to debt sustainability levels and debt relief are difficult. A cautious conclusion would be that debt relief may affect the poor positively, but seems not to be a sufficient policy instrument for improved growth rates of the income of the poorest 40 percent. This policy proposal would be in line with calls for more poverty-targeted capital inflows, as even total debt relief would release only insufficient resources for poverty reducing activities. With this interpretation, however, we abstract from political economy and bad governance issues which may prevent poverty reducing debt relief initiatives. |
JEL: | E |
Date: | 2005–04–21 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpma:0504031&r=afr |