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on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Congressional Budget Office |
| Abstract: | In 2016, low- and moderate-income workers will face an effective marginal tax rate of 31 percent, on average. Federal individual income and payroll taxes will be the main contributors. |
| JEL: | H20 H24 I38 |
| Date: | 2015–11–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbo:report:509231&r=acc |
| By: | Malinina, Tatiana (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy); Gromov, Vladimir (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)) |
| Abstract: | The paper concerns the current regulations and practice and presents proposals for improving it on the important issues of individual and corporate taxation of income from financial instruments in Russia. |
| Keywords: | regulations, Russia |
| Date: | 2016–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rnp:wpaper:544&r=acc |
| By: | Paolo Ferri (College of Business, RMIT University); Maria Lusiani (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice); Luca Pareschi (Dept. of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venice) |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the growing history of accounting history by analysing the contents of all papers published in Accounting History, one among the leading journals of the field, through a recent and promising analytical technique called Topic Modeling. Based on literature, we know what accounting history is about, but we know less how the accounting history field has evolved. By adopting Topic Modeling, an automated procedure for coding the content of corpus of text based on Bayesian statistic, the paper complements prior assessments of the accounting history literature by providing accurate measures about the relative prevalence of research areas and their evolution over time. The analysis highlights three sets of topics not uncovered by previous categorizations. In particular, the ÔRegulationÕ topic, that refers to international accounting standards and auditing regulation, appears to be overlooked by previous reviews. In terms of dynamics we find that the ÔTechnical core of accountingÕ decreased in importance overtime in favour of more variegated and fragmented foci of research: this finding may substantiate the claimed shift from a conception of accounting as a technical practice to the one of accounting as a social practice, that is the transition from the so called ÔtraditionalÕ to ÔnewÕ accounting history. Moreover, we see a pluralisation in the range of issues that are under the lenses of accounting historians. Finally, our analysis suggests that the way in which accounting history is presented or Ôtalked aboutÕ has not changed much in the last 20 years. |
| Keywords: | Accounting history, Topic Modeling, Literature review, Journal |
| JEL: | M40 M48 H83 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vnm:wpdman:116&r=acc |
| By: | Guillaume Plantin; Jean Tirole |
| Abstract: | While the debate on cost and market-value accounting has been raging for years, economists lack a framework allowing a comparison of their relative merits. This paper considers an agency model in which the measurement of an asset can be based on public market data (marking to market) and/or on the realization of its value through costly resale to an informed buyer (taking to market). At the optimal contract, noisier market data lead to cost accounting and gains trading (selling winners/keeping losers) whereas accurate data naturally favor market-value accounting. The quality of market data and the magnitude of resale costs both depend on the volume of transactions, and therefore on accounting rules. The paper studies the mutual feedback between individually optimal accounting rules and asset market liquidity. This equilibrium approach reveals a socially excessive use of market-value accounting that dries up market liquidity and reduces the informativeness of price signals. |
| Keywords: | cost and market value accounting; agency; gains trading; equilibrium; accounting rules |
| JEL: | D82 M41 M52 |
| Date: | 2015–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ehl:lserod:65104&r=acc |
| By: | Franziska Bremus; Jeremias Huber |
| Abstract: | A key challenge for economic policy today is to make the financial system more resilient. The literature finds that high indebtedness (or: leverage), both in the financial and in the real sectors, is a danger to macroeconomic stability and growth. Moreover, the design of the corporate tax system is an important determinant of leverage: in many countries interest paid on debt is tax-deductible while the return on equity is not, such that tax systems incentivize debt-type financing and, hence,leveraging. This article summarizes the debate about the implications of corporate taxation for leverage and economic stability. Proposals for addressing the debt bias of taxation are also presented. |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwrup:93en&r=acc |
| By: | Shatalov, Stanislav (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)); Zakharenkova, E. (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA)) |
| Abstract: | The report presents the analysis of the legal nature and practical implementation of cost sharing mechanism and conclusions on the possibility to introduce cost sharing rules in the Russian tax legislation. The results of the work are based on the thorough analysis of the theory and practice of cost sharing in Russia and worldwide. |
| Keywords: | cost sharing mechanism, cost sharing rules, tax legislation, Russia |
| Date: | 2016–04–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rnp:wpaper:545&r=acc |
| By: | Florence LACHET-TOUYA |
| Abstract: | When same authorities belonging to a same level of government derive their receipts from a mobile tax base, a competition mechanism takes place among them that triggers externalities. Likewise, when different layers of decision-makers exert their taxing power upon a common base, the choices made by one tier affect the receipts that the other governments can collect. Generally speaking, the decisions made by one government affect the tax revenue that can be collected by the decisionmakers belonging to the same tier of government or by stacked jurisdictions : externalities arise, the existence and the magnitude of which are closely related to the nature of the tax, to the mobility of the base and to the distribution of tax competence among decisionmakers. This paper proposes a model where both horizontal and vertical interactions take place. Uncertainty concerning the base, that is, the amount of capital likely to be invested, is introduced and a generalization of taxation schemes is provided in order to assess the robustness of traditional analyses results in a more general and realistic scheme. The analysis led envisages two possible schemes of European corporate taxation. On the one hand, we consider a setting consisting in having a corporate tax set at the European level only, the receipts of which are distributed among member states. On the other hand, we introduce the addition of a European tax upon national corporate taxes and we simultaneously take into account horizontal and vertical externalities. We distinguish according the nature of the objective function that each kind of government may display. We can show that the fi?rst scheme should be preferred, both from a taxation degree and a public investment point of view. |
| Keywords: | anticipations, inference, perfect foresight, rational expectations, financial markets, asymmetric information, arbitrage |
| JEL: | D72 D82 H23 H30 H32 H71 H77 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tac:wpaper:2015-2016_10&r=acc |
| By: | Erik Bugyi (Council for Budget Responsibility) |
| Abstract: | This paper describes the construction of the baseline scenario for next 50 years. The baseline scenario is based on the European System of National Accounts (ESA) methodology and compatible with all national budget classifications. To increase transparency, detailed calculation will be published regularly in order to assess the long-term sustainability (Report on the Long-Term Sustainability of Public Finances) or the general government budget (Evaluation of the General Government Budget). |
| Keywords: | long-term sustainability indicator (GAP), budgetary classification, revenues and expenditures, long-term projections |
| JEL: | E62 H68 |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cbe:dpaper:201502&r=acc |
| By: | Michael Kouparitsas (Treasury, Government of Australia); Dinar Prihardini (Treasury, Government of Australia); Alexander Beames (Treasury, Government of Australia) |
| Abstract: | For a small open economy, such as Australia, its living standards (per capita income) are determined by the level of its terms of trade, labour productivity, labour force participation and population. Australia’s terms of trade, labour force participation and population growth are expected to be flat or declining in the foreseeable future which implies any improvement in Australia’s living standards must be driven by a higher level of labour productivity. This paper shows that a company income tax cut can do that, even after allowing for increases in other taxes or cutting government spending to recover lost revenue, by lowering the before tax cost of capital. This encourages investment, which in turn increases the capital stock and labour productivity. Analysis presented here also suggests the long-term benefits accrue to workers and households via permanently higher after-tax real wages and consumption. |
| Keywords: | optimal taxation, company tax, tax reform, policy simulation |
| JEL: | H21 H25 H30 E27 |
| Date: | 2016–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tsy:wpaper:wpaper_tsy_wp_2016_2&r=acc |