|
on Accounting and Auditing |
| By: | Jenderny, Katharina |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effect of the introduction of a final withholding tax on capital income on the progression of the German income tax. As previous literature shows, even with synthetic income taxation, tax progression was strongest in the middle of the income distribution, and decreased for high incomes. At the top, notably for the richest top 0.001 % of potential taxpayers, tax progression was not further observable. In 2009, the tax schedule changed and capital income was excluded from the synthetic income tax tariff. Instead, it is taxed at a lower final withholding tax rate. This paper explores the effect of this change on the overall progression on total income. The analysis is based on a microlevel panel dataset of income tax returns between 2001 and 2006, which provides information on the distribution of total taxable income and is particularly representative for the top of the income distribution. -- |
| JEL: | H24 D31 D63 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:80039&r=acc |
| By: | Wrede, Matthias |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes to what extent tax planning impacts on the level of the inheritance tax rate perceived as fair. In a factorial survey conducted in Germany it finds out that tax planning increases the fair tax rate by roughly 4 percentage points. The fair tax rate is not only determined by the size of the bequest, the relationship of the heir to the bequeather, and the type of bequest, but also by the perceived intentions of the bequeather. The families with social motives should be taxed less than those without. The paper looks for support in optimum-tax theory. To this end, it develops a simple model that shows that taxation should not prevent individuals with warm-glow-of-giving motives to contribute substantially more to the social good than individuals without these motives. -- |
| JEL: | H24 H21 D64 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79731&r=acc |
| By: | Loretz, Simon; Mokkas, Socrates |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the literature providing indirect evidence for profit shifting within multinational companies. In contrast to the previous studies we account for the tax responsiveness of the capital stock and analyse the impact of corporate taxes on both pre- and post-tax profitability. Evidence from our large panel dataset of European subsidiaries supports the profit shifting hypothesis. We find that a 10 percentage point decrease in the tax rate increases post-tax profitability by up to 1.1 percentage points. Further, our results suggest that financial profits and losses are particularly responsive to taxes, which indicates that a large part of profit shifting takes places via debt shifting. -- |
| JEL: | H25 H87 C23 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79847&r=acc |
| By: | Yongzheng Liu (School of Finance, China Financial Policy Research Center Renmin University of China); Jorge Martinez-Vazquez (International Center for Public Policy. Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the extent and possible channels of tax competition among provincial governments in China. Using a panel of provincial- level data for 1993-2007, we nd strong evidence of strategic tax interaction among provincial governments. Tax policy is approximated by average eective tax rates on foreign investment, taking into account the tax incentives available to foreign in- vestors. In line with the predictions of the theoretical tax competition literature, we also highlight the impact of each province's characteristics (including its size and level of industrialization) on the strategic interaction with its neighbors. Finally, the paper explicitly identies the establishment of development zones as an important conduit for tax competition among provinces. Tax competition; development zone; China |
| Date: | 2014–01–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1403&r=acc |
| By: | Peichl, Andreas; Fuest, Clemens; Siegloch, Sebastian |
| Abstract: | In this paper we provide empirical evidence on the wage incidence of the German business tax, which is set at the municipal level. For our analysis, we use very rich administrative linked employer-employee panel data, covering 11 years, and link it to data on the business tax rates of about 11,100 German municipalities. On average 8\% of the municipalities adjust their business tax rate per year. We are thus able to exploit multiple quasi-natural experiments to identify the tax incidence on wages. While the unique German setting allows us to gauge general equilibrium wage effects, the detailed administrative data enables us to estimate heterogeneous incidence effects and to explore different channels of how the business tax burden is passed on. Consistent with our theoretical model, we find a negative direct effect of corporate taxation on wage, arising in a collective wage bargaining context. A one euro increase in the annual tax liabilities yields a 50 cent decrease of the annual wage bill. This burden is borne high- and medium-skilled labor. Furthermore, we show that the general equilibrium effect on wages is negligible in the context of our study due to the high regional labor mobility. -- |
| JEL: | H22 H25 J30 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79916&r=acc |
| By: | Scheuering, Uwe |
| Abstract: | I analyze the e ffects of profi t taxation on the fi nancing decision of corporate acquisitions. The deductibility of interest expenses from the corporate tax base creates an incentive for acquiring companies to fi nance a takeover with debt. Regarding the particular decision how to finance the considered deals results are not robust but looking at the whole capital structure development of acquirers I fi nd that an increase of the statutory tax rate by one %-point is associated with an increase of the debt ratio by 0.57 %-points during the acquisition period. -- |
| JEL: | G34 H25 H32 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc13:79817&r=acc |
| By: | Nicolas Werquin (Yale University); Aleh Tsyvinski (Yale University); Mikhail Golosov (Princeton University) |
| Abstract: | This paper derives novel formulas for the welfare gains of any tax reform around initial (optimal or suboptimal) dynamic tax systems. We use a perturbation-based method to express these formulas in terms of easily interpretable and empirically estimable parameters: elasticities of income and savings with respect to the tax rates, and the shape of the income and savings distributions. This generates new theoretical insights about dynamic optimal taxes, as well as policy implications regarding directions of tax reforms of the current US tax code. |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:red:sed013:879&r=acc |
| By: | Hasan, Iftekhar (Fordham University and Bank of Finland); Hoi, Chun-Keung (Stan) (E. Philip Saunders College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology); Wu, Qiang (Lally School of Management, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute); Zhang, Hao (E. Philip Saunders College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology) |
| Abstract: | We find that firms with greater tax avoidance incur higher spreads when obtaining bank loans. This finding is robust in a battery of sensitivity analyses and in two quasi-experimental settings including the implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 and the revelation of past tax sheltering activity. Firms with greater tax avoidance also incur more stringent non-price loan terms, incur higher at-issue bond spreads, and prefer bank loans over public bonds when obtaining debt financing. Overall, these findings indicate that banks perceive tax avoidance as engendering significant risks. |
| Keywords: | tax avoidance; cost of bank loans; information risk; agency risk; audit risk; FIN 48 |
| JEL: | G21 H26 |
| Date: | 2014–01–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:2014_003&r=acc |
| By: | Chiraz Ben Ali; Cédric Lesage |
| Abstract: | Family businesses are an important part of the world economy (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and show significant differences in their corporate governance compared to non-family firms. Although displaying evident unique features, family firms have received relatively little attention as distinct from their equivalents in publicly held firms. Our study contributes to this growing research and investigates empirically the relationship between family shareholding and audit pricing. Using a sample of 3291 firm-year observations of major U.S. listed companies, for the period 2006- 2008, our results demonstrate that audit fees is negatively associated to family shareholding after taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying, industry effects and traditional control variables. The empirical results are robust to alternative family shareholding measures and estimation model specifications. Our results are consistent with the convergence-of-interests hypothesis suggesting that family firms face lower manager/shareholders agency costs. Auditors charge lower fees for family firms because of lower information asymmetry and risk as the controlling family is well informed about the firm and is better able to monitor managerial decisions. |
| Keywords: | Family firms, Audit Fees, Agency Conflicts, Corporate Governance |
| Date: | 2014–01–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-02&r=acc |
| By: | Faustine Suco (IAE Grenoble - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Grenoble - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II) |
| Abstract: | Les centres techniques ont pour objet, depuis la loi n°48-1228 du 12 juillet 1948 qui fixe leurs statuts, "de promouvoir le progrès des techniques et participer à l'amélioration du rendement et à la garantie de la qualité dans l'industrie". L'objectif des centres techniques industriels est d'innover en anticipant les évolutions et les besoins de l'industrie, mais également de diffuser leurs recherches à l'aide de congrès et d'articles, et de transférer les résultats aux entreprises qui en ont besoin. Pour ce faire, ils disposent de ressources publiques (taxes affectées, dotations budgétaires...) et de ressources propres rémunérant leur activité commerciale. Ces différents types des ressources engendrent des difficultés de traitement fiscal, notamment quant à la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée et l'impôt sur les sociétés. L'obligation d'établir des comptes annuels entraîne parfois l'intervention d'un commissaire aux comptes. Celui-ci est alors confronté aux particularités des CTI lors de son audit. D'une manière générale, les risques que retrouveront les auditeurs dans le cadre d'une mission d'audit des comptes de centres techniques industriels sont le non-respect du principe de séparation des exercices et le non-respect des règles fiscales. Ce mémoire propose une approche pour le commissaire aux comptes en présentant les centres techniques industriels et en expliquant les difficultés majeures qui peuvent être rencontrées. |
| Keywords: | Centres techniques industriels ; taxe affectée ; fiscalité ; séparation des exercices ; audit légal |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00934327&r=acc |
| By: | Frédéric Loss; Gwenaël Piaser |
| Abstract: | Family businesses are an important part of the world economy (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) and show significant differences in their corporate governance compared to non-family firms. Although displaying evident unique features, family firms have received relatively little attention as distinct from their equivalents in publicly held firms. Our study contributes to this growing research and investigates empirically the relationship between family shareholding and audit pricing. Using a sample of 3291 firm-year observations of major U.S. listed companies, for the period 2006- 2008, our results demonstrate that audit fees is negatively associated to family shareholding after taking into account unobservable firm effects, time-varying, industry effects and traditional control variables. The empirical results are robust to alternative family shareholding measures and estimation model specifications. Our results are consistent with the convergence-of-interests hypothesis suggesting that family firms face lower manager/shareholders agency costs. Auditors charge lower fees for family firms because of lower information asymmetry and risk as the controlling family is well informed about the firm and is better able to monitor managerial decisions. |
| Keywords: | Family firms, Audit Fees, Agency Conflicts, Corporate Governance |
| Date: | 2014–01–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-01&r=acc |
| By: | Alexis Gadiollet (IAE Grenoble - Institut d'Administration des Entreprises - Grenoble - Université Pierre-Mendès-France - Grenoble II) |
| Abstract: | Les clubs sportifs possèdent un statut souvent délicat car la frontière entre l'amateur et le professionnel reste encore très floue. Nous avons dans ce mémoire délimité cette frontière en analysant l'environnement juridique et économique des clubs de rugby professionnels. Le contrôle de ces clubs est une condition sine qua none pour s'assurer de leur pérennité. De ce fait, afin de garantir une stabilité financière et une certaine équité, la DNACG analyse tout au long de la saison les comptes et budgets des différents clubs. Dans le cadre de ce contrôle, le commissaire aux comptes (CAC) est amené à intervenir dans les clubs professionnels dans le cadre de sa mission légale. La mission du CAC dans un club de rugby est réellement passionnante mais nécessite rigueur et professionnalisme. Les différentes particularités, les multiples problématiques liées aux traitements comptables et aux démarches d'audit les mieux adaptées ainsi que les enjeux très importants présente une réel intérêt. Dans ce mémoire, nous avons traité des contrats de sponsoring ainsi que des indemnités de mutation qui nécessitent une approche particulière du commissaire aux comptes. On a ainsi pu remarquer que les spécificités demandent d'adapter la démarche de l'auditeur aux différentes problématiques qu'il peut rencontrer. |
| Keywords: | Contrat de sponsoring, DNACG, société anonyme sportive professionnelle, association support, indemnités de mutation, indemnités de transferts, indemnités de formation, audit légal, démarche d'audit, contrôle interne |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00933932&r=acc |
| By: | Tristan Boyer; Nicolas Jonard |
| Abstract: | This paper is about the diffusion of cooperation in an infinite population of networked individuals repeatedly playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma. We formulate conditions on payoffs and network structure such that, starting from an initial seed group, imitative learning results in the overall adoption of cooperation — efficient contagion. Key to this result is the pattern of interaction among players who are at the same distance from the initial seed group. We find that the more these agents interact among themselves rather than with players who are closer to or further away from the initial seed group, the easier it is for efficient contagion to take place. We highlight the importance of cycles for efficient contagion, and show that the presence of critical edges prevents it. We also find that networks organized as dense clusters sparsely connected to one another tend to resist efficient contagion. Finally, we find that the likelihood of efficient contagion in a network increases when information neighborhoods extend beyond interaction neighborhoods. |
| Keywords: | networks, imitation, contagion |
| JEL: | C7 D8 |
| Date: | 2014–01–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-11&r=acc |