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on Accounting |
By: | Gérard Charreaux (Université de Bourgogne) |
Abstract: | The objective of this article is to conduct a survey of the different corporate governance theories. In the first part, we present the micro theories by opposing the disciplinary view to the knowledge-based view. The second part deals with the macro or national systems theories. We separate the theories based on appropriation of the organizational rent from those attributing a dominant role to production. This survey highlights that the financial view of corporate governance is a very particular case and presents many limits. |
Keywords: | national systems of governance;micro theories of corporate governance;macro theories of corporate governance;disciplinary view;knowledge-based view;law and finance view;political theory;varieties of capitalism. |
JEL: | G30 P50 |
Date: | 2004–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1041202&r=acc |
By: | Thiess Büttner |
Abstract: | A theoretical analysis considers the impact of a typical system of redistributive \"fiscal equalization\" transfers on the taxing effort of local jurisdictions. More specifically, it shows that the marginal contribution rate, i.e. the rate at which an increase in the tax base is reducing those transfers, might be positively associated with the local tax rate while the volume of grants received is likely to be inversely related to the tax base. These predictions are tested in an empirical analysis of the tax policy of German municipalities. In order to identify the incentive effect the analysis exploits discontinuities in the rules of the fiscal equalization system as well as policy changes. The empirical results support the existence of an incentive effect, suggesting that the high marginal contribution rates induce the municipalities to raise their business tax rates significantly. |
Keywords: | Fiscal Equalization, Tax Competition, Fiscal Federalism, Incentive Effect of Taxation, Regression Discontinuity |
JEL: | H71 H77 |
Date: | 2005–01–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:got:cegedp:37&r=acc |
By: | Christian Groth (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen); Poul Schou (Danish Rational Economic Agents Model (DREAM)) |
Abstract: | The conventional view within the endogenous growth literature is that interest income taxes impede economic growth and investment subsidies promote economic growth. The present paper lays out a simple framework to see whether this is still true when non-renewable resources enter the ”growth engine” in an essential way. It is not! The framework allows a rich set of determinants of longrun growth, including some fiscal policy measures, but interest income taxes and investment subsidies are not among these. The results not only contrast with the modern literature on taxes and endogenous growth, but also with observations in the literature from the 1970’s on non-renewable resources and taxation - observations which were not based on general equilibrium considerations. |
Keywords: | non-renewable resources; endogenous growth; greenhouse effect; taxes; subsidies |
JEL: | H2 O4 Q3 |
Date: | 2004–07 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:epruwp:04-16&r=acc |
By: | John Rand (Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen) |
Abstract: | This paper examines the extent to which borrowing constraints restrict firm access to credit and identifies individual, firm, and loan characteristics, which determine the cost of capital in Vietnamese manufacturing. Using direct information from a Vietnamese enterprise survey I show that 14 percent of the enterprises are credit constrained, and these enterprises would increase their debt holdings by 34 percent if borrowing constraints were relaxed. Moreover, it emerges that informal credit markets play an important role for fast growing firms. Enterprises do not appear to have the necessary time to go through the many administrative difficulties in the formal credit system if they want to "seize the day". Finally, collateralized loans face larger interest rates, explained by the significant influence of "policy lending" in Vietnamese credit markets. |
Keywords: | financial markets; credit constraints; Vietnam |
JEL: | O16 O53 |
Date: | 2004–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0501&r=acc |
By: | Spartak Keremidchiev |
Abstract: | The paper aims at outlining the existing gaps in Bulgarian corporate governance compared to the standards and the state of corporate governance in developed market economies. The current state of corporate governance, the degree of ownership concentration as well as the strengths and weaknesses of corporate governance are examined for the fulfillment of this goal. On the other hand the current trends in development of corporate governance model in leading market economies are discussed. A conceptual model for modernization of corporate governance in Bulgaria is created. |
Keywords: | corporate governance, ownership concentration, modernization of corporate governance |
JEL: | G G32 G34 G38 |
Date: | 2005–01–03 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0501004&r=acc |
By: | Jochen Michaelis (Author-Workplace-Name: Department of Economics, University of Kassel); Angela Birk (Author-Workplace-Name: HWWA, University of Hamburg, Havard University, Department of Economics) |
Abstract: | This paper explores how revenue-neutral tax reforms impact employment and economic growth in a model of endogenous growth and search frictions on the labor market. We analyze how savings and the incentive to create new jobs are affected by tax swaps between wage income taxes, payroll taxes, capital income taxes and taxes levied on capital costs. In our framework, the payroll tax is found to be neutral. If this tax is used to finance a cut in the capital income tax, we will observe an increase in both growth and, via the capitalization effect, employment. Most other tax reforms, however, imply a trade-off between employment and growth |
Keywords: | search unemployment, growth, tax reform |
JEL: | E6 H2 J6 O4 |
Date: | 2004–06 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kas:wpaper:58/04&r=acc |