nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2023‒02‒20
six papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto
DePauw University

  1. Decentralized revenue sharing from broadcasting sports By Gustavo Bergantiños; Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
  2. Ces petites différences de genre qui deviennent grandes : le rôle de la compétition By José De Sousa; Guillaume Hollard
  3. Large Sporting Events and Public Health and Safety By J. James Reade
  4. Guest Editorial. The business of now: the future starts here – best papers from the Managing Sport SIG at the EURAM Online Conference in 2020 By Anna Gerke
  5. Barcelona in the face of globalization, how to think of the city through the organization and evaluation of major events? By Patrice Ballester
  6. Show your strength in the hammer-nail game: a Nim game with incomplete information. By Gisèle Umbhauer

  1. By: Gustavo Bergantiños (ECOSOT, Universidade de Vigo); Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Department of Economics, Universidad Pablo de Olavide)
    Abstract: We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues among participating clubs. First, we characterize the set of rules satisfying two basic axioms: anonymity and additivity. Then, we decentralize the problem letting clubs vote for rules. No majority equilibrium exists when they are allowed to vote for any rule within the characterized set. Nevertheless, if the set is restricted in a meaningful and plausible way (just replacing anonymity by equal treatment of equals) majority equilibrium does exist.
    Keywords: Resource allocation, broadcasting problems, voting, majority, anonymity.
    JEL: D63 C71 Z20
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pab:wpaper:23.02&r=spo
  2. By: José De Sousa (Université Paris-Saclay, RITM - Réseaux Innovation Territoires et Mondialisation - Université Paris-Saclay, LIEPP - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire d'évaluation des politiques publiques (Sciences Po) - Sciences Po - Sciences Po); Guillaume Hollard (X - École polytechnique, CP - CNRS-périodiques - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: Gender studies are a very active area of research, particularly in highlighting competition-related differences. Using an original field setting, the game of chess, we benefit from a large and rich dataset to investigate the robustness and heterogeneity of our uncovered gender differences in competition. We find a macro gender gap in every country: there are fewer female than male players, especially at the top, and women have lower average rankings. Moreover, comparing millions of individual games, we find a small but robust micro gender gap: women's scores are about 2% lower than expected when playing a man rather than a woman with an identical rating, age and country. Using a simple theoretical model, we show how this small micro gap may affect women's long-run human-capital formation. By reducing effort and increasing the probability of quitting, both effects accumulate to explain a larger share of the macro gap.
    Abstract: Les études sur le genre représentent un domaine de recherche très actif en mettant notamment en évidence des différences liées à la compétition. Grâce à un environnement original, le jeu d'échecs, nous bénéficions d'un ensemble de données vaste et riche pour étudier la robustesse et l'hétérogénéité des différences de compétition entre les sexes. Nous trouvons un écart de genre au niveau macro dans environ 150 pays : il y a moins de femmes que d'hommes, surtout au sommet, et les femmes ont en moyenne des classements inférieurs. En comparant des millions de parties individuelles, nous constatons aussi un écart de genre micro, mais relativement modeste : à niveau, âge et pays égal, les scores des femmes sont inférieurs d'environ 2% à ceux attendus lorsqu'elles jouent contre un homme plutôt que contre une femme. À l'aide d'un modèle théorique simple, nous montrons comment ce petit écart micro peut affecter à long terme la formation du capital humain des femmes. En réduisant l'effort et en augmentant la probabilité d'abandon, les deux effets se cumulent pour expliquer une part plus importante de l'écart macro.
    Date: 2023–01–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:spmain:hal-03941242&r=spo
  3. By: J. James Reade (Department of Economics, University of Reading)
    Abstract: Large sporting events have non-trivial externalities, where net social benefits can differ from net private benefits. In this chapter we particularly explore the relationship between large sporting events and public health and safety considerations, surveying the relevant literature. The Covid-19 Pandemic has provided a particularly clear example of the manner in which sporting events interact with the wider health and safety infrastructure, where sporting events were postponed, cancelled, and their formats dramatically altered in light of the Pandemic. This in turn then influenced outcomes, and arguably reduced the commercial value of the sporting product being produced via its impact on the production process. We consider these two directions of interaction between sporting events and public health and safety before concluding with some policy-related considerations.
    Keywords: mega events, Olympic Games, public health and safety, sport, organisation
    JEL: Z18 Z23 Z28
    Date: 2023–02–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2023-04&r=spo
  4. By: Anna Gerke (Audencia Recherche - Audencia Business School)
    Date: 2022–12–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03898087&r=spo
  5. By: Patrice Ballester (GEODE, UPPA, MSHS-T, UNS-IAE Nice)
    Abstract: The event questions men whether it is political, cultural or touristic. It has its own meaning as it starts something while showing a will, a new possibility to create, to meet and to surprise. The event is in fact an "advent that reaches everything" generally integrating itself into a long process or phase of the evolution of societies in terms of its societal structure. However, if the event exists, it is significant and therefore assessable. How to evaluate an Olympic Games or an international exhibition? Can we evaluate the before (from the statement of position, application file), the during (the course of the tourist, cultural or sporting event) and the after (the closing of the festival and its direct and indirect effects on society)? How then to evaluate all the dimensions of the event generally based on major tourist and urban planning operations? We will take as a field of study a city -- capital -- commercial port which has become a sort of archetype in the context of the organization of mega-events with a tourist vocation, such as the Universal or International Exhibitions and the Olympic Games, namely Barcelona and three very important dates for the Catalan capital: 1888, universal exhibition, 1929 universal and international exhibition, 1992 the modern Olympic Games and 2004 the Universal Forum of Cultures of Unesco, international exhibition. The economic interest of organizing an ephemeral giant event is still relevant and will be confirmed in the future with the role of Asian countries within the IOC and the BIE (Bureau international des expositions). The important thing is to develop a rational argument to communicate on the economic merits of the event. Sustainable development and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) are predominant elements for ephemeral events that are intended to be sustainable over time for future generations.
    Date: 2022–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2212.13901&r=spo
  6. By: Gisèle Umbhauer
    Abstract: We study the hammer-nail game, a game played in the French TV show “Fort Boyard”, by transforming this game into a Nim game with incomplete information. In this game, two players are in front of a nail slightly driven into a wooden support. Both have a hammer and in turn hit the nail. The winner is the first player able to fully drive the nail into the support. A player is of strength f if he is able, with one swing of the hammer, to drive the nail at most f millimeters into the support. We study the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria of this game with incomplete information on the players’strength, and we also look at the equilibrium behavior when strength is combined with dexterity.
    Keywords: Nim game, incomplete information, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, Fort Boyard.
    JEL: C72
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2023-05&r=spo

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