nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2023‒02‒13
three papers chosen by
Humberto Barreto
DePauw University

  1. Differences in the voting patterns of experts, peers, and fans: Analyzing the NFL's all-star team selections By Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp; Gänßle, Sophia; Budzinski, Oliver
  2. Within-season dismissals of football managers: evidence from the French Ligue 1 By Luc Arrondel; Cédric Zimmer; Richard Duhautois
  3. Riding the Green Wave – How Countdown Timers at Bicycle Traffic Lights Impact on Cycling Behavior By Christina Brand; Thomas Hagedorn; Till Kösters; Marlena Meier; Gernot Sieg; Jan Wessel

  1. By: Kunz-Kaltenhäuser, Philipp; Gänßle, Sophia; Budzinski, Oliver
    Abstract: Experts' voting behavior is conjectured to be more objective than peer voting (own group/peers) and public voters (everyone interested), who are supposedly influenced by all sorts of subjective aspects. We examine differences in voting behavior between these groups by analyzing the voting outcomes for all-star teams in American Football. This paper analyzes the impact of performance as well as non-performance markers and team effects on the voting outcome. It contains a comparative analysis across the mentioned groups to elaborate on differences. The econometric analysis uses unbalanced panel data of All-Pro and Pro Bowl player selections over 78 seasons (1951-2019). It applies panel probit regression to assess the impact of the markers on the outcome probability of winning one of the All-Star awards. We find that expert, peer, and public voting show similarities and are partially driven by the same performance and non-performance markers. However, none of the three analyzed voting systems is free from the influence of non-performance markers. We find exposure effects as well as effects from team affiliation in all of them, including in fact expert voting. Positive effects of team success are found in expert and, to a lesser extent, in peer voting. Team-specific effects are found in public voting, providing evidence for partisanship voting by fans. Our results shed doubt on the suspected objectiveness of expert voting. Furthermore, they fortify the notion of public voting being inefficient at identifying objective quality and extend the literature on voting biases among experts, peers, and the general public.
    Keywords: Voting Behavior, Voting Bias, Expert Voting, Public Voting, Sports Economics, National Football League, American Football
    JEL: D72 Z20 L83
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:tuiedp:170&r=spo
  2. By: Luc Arrondel (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Cédric Zimmer (LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] - HESAM - HESAM Université - Communauté d'universités et d'établissements Hautes écoles Sorbonne Arts et métiers université, CEET - Centre d'études de l'emploi et du travail - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] - HESAM - HESAM Université - Communauté d'universités et d'établissements Hautes écoles Sorbonne Arts et métiers université - M.E.N.E.S.R. - Ministère de l'Education nationale, de l’Enseignement supérieur et de la Recherche - Ministère du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Santé); Richard Duhautois (LIRSA - Laboratoire interdisciplinaire de recherche en sciences de l'action - CNAM - Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers [CNAM] - HESAM - HESAM Université - Communauté d'universités et d'établissements Hautes écoles Sorbonne Arts et métiers université)
    Abstract: There have been many studies of the impact of manager turnover on club performance, especially in European leagues. Our paper examines the impact of within-season manager change on club performance using information from the French Ligue 1 over the period 1998-2018. The clubs that change their manager have different characteristics from clubs that do not. Some may be observed (as points before dismissal), and others remain unobservable in the data. We use an empirical method that takes observable differences between clubs into account (through exact matching) and corrects for unobserved characteristics (through difference-indifferences). Our results show that the overall effects of a change of manager on team performance are insignificant even if we take into account some characteristics of the coaches.
    Abstract: De nombreuses études ont analysé l'impact du changement d'entraîneurs sur les performances des clubs, notamment dans les championnats européens. Nous utilisons ici les informations provenant de la Ligue 1 sur la période 1998-2018. Les clubs français qui changent d'entraîneur ont des caractéristiques différentes des équipes qui ne le font pas. Certaines peuvent être observées (comme les points avant le licenciement), d'autres restent inobservables. Notre méthode empirique prend en compte les différences observables entre les clubs par appariement exact et corrige des caractéristiques non observées par doubles différences. Nos résultats montrent que les effets d'un changement d'entraîneur sur la performance de l'équipe ne sont pas significatifs, et ce même si l'on tient compte de certaines caractéristiques des coachs.
    Keywords: Football manager dismissals, Leadership, Team performance, Exact matching, French Ligue
    Date: 2022
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-03917462&r=spo
  3. By: Christina Brand (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster); Thomas Hagedorn (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster); Till Kösters (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster); Marlena Meier (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster); Gernot Sieg (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster); Jan Wessel (Institute of Transport Economics, Muenster)
    Abstract: The Leezenflow system is an open-source green wave assistant designed specifically for cyclists and is installed 110 meters in front of a traffic light in Münster, Germany. The system indicates the remaining time of the current traffic light phase through an expiring bar, colored either green or red. This is intended to help cyclists adjust their speed in order to cross the traffic lights when green, and consequently optimize cycling flow. We conduct a natural field experiment in real traffic to analyze the impact of the Leezenflow system on cycling flow and safety, and find that it impacts statistically significantly on cycling flow. Due to the Leezenflow system, the number of cyclists that have to stop at the red lights decreases by 6.6 %. Accordingly, the share of cyclists that pass the green lights increases. The data also indicate positive effects on traffic safety. The results of the natural field experiment confirm and put into perspective the feedback of an accompanying online survey. The majority of surveyed users reports that the Leezenflow system does improve the cycling flow. The influence on traffic safety is predominantly seen as positive or neutral by the survey participants. The Leezenflow system can thus help city planners to promote cycling, thereby enabling more sustainable mobility.
    Keywords: Bicycle traffic flow, traffic safety, open-source green wave assistant, countdown timer, natural field experiment, survey
    JEL: R49 C93
    Date: 2023–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mut:wpaper:37&r=spo

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