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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Kelly Sarmiento; Dana Waltzman; Kelley Borradaile; Andrew Hurwitz; Kara Conroy; Jaimie Grazi |
| Abstract: | This paper explores youth football coaches’ perception of football safety and their experiences implementing these interventions aimed at athlete safety. |
| Keywords: | athletics, injury, player, sporting, tackle |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mpr:mprres:20e307f06cde415897a86a0dd33147c2&r=all |
| By: | Reio Tanji (Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University) |
| Abstract: | This paper discusses what determines the reference point in decision making,using an empirical dataset of performance stats in professional baseball.Previous literature has argued that some round-numbers may work as such points,and as a result,bunching occurs around these numbers in the distribution of the target outcomes.On the other hand,in the setting of workplace, the outcomes are observable both for the worker(players) and the evaluator(managers). This paper shows that this bunching do NOT occur from the structure of the contracts,or how the managers evaluate the players.Bunching seems to stem from the reference-point dependence of the workers themselves,and so to avoid this economically inefficient behavior,we have to design contracts that incentivize players to do so. |
| Keywords: | referencedependence,round-numbereffect,bunching,monetaryincentive,sports |
| JEL: | D91 J01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osk:wpaper:2023&r=all |
| By: | Booth, Alison L. (Australian National University); Nolen, Patrick J. (University of Essex) |
| Abstract: | Gender differences in paid performance under competition have been found in many laboratory-based experiments, and it has been suggested that these may arise because men and women respond differently to psychological pressure in competitive environments. To explore this further, we conducted a laboratory experiment comprising 444 subjects, and measured gender differences in performance in four distinct competitive situations. These were as follows: (i) the standard tournament game where the subject competes with three other individuals and the winner takes all; (ii) an anonymized competition in which an individual competes against an imposed production target and is paid only if s/he exceeds it; (iii) a 'personified' competition where an individual competes against a target based on the previous performance of one anonymised person of unknown gender; and (iv) a 'gendered' competition where an individual competes against a target based on the previous performance of one anonymised person whose gender is known. We found that only men respond to pressure differently in each situation; women responded the same to pressure no matter the situation. Moreover, the personified target caused men to increase performance more than under an anonymized target and, when the gender of the person associated with the target was revealed, men worked even harder to outperform a woman but strived only to equal the target set by a male. |
| Keywords: | psychological pressure, tournament, piece rate, gender, competitive behaviour, experiment |
| JEL: | C91 C92 J16 J33 M52 |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp14174&r=all |
| By: | Julien Benistant (Univ Lyon, CNRS, ISC Marc Jeannerod, UMR 5229, Bron, France); Fabio Galeotti (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France); Marie Claire Villeval (Univ Lyon, CNRS, GATE, UMR 5824, F-69130 Ecully, France; IZA, Bonn, Germany) |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic variant of the die-under-the-cup task where players can repeatedly misreport the outcomes of consecutive die rolls to earn more money, either under a noncompetitive piece rate scheme or in a two-player competitive tournament. In this dynamic setting we test (i) whether giving continuous feedback (vs. final ex post feedback) on the opponent’s reported outcome to both players encourages cheating behavior, and (ii) to what extent this influence depends on the incentive scheme in use (piece rate vs. tournament). We also vary whether the opponent is able to cheat or not. We find that people lie more when placed in a competitive rather than a non-competitive setting, but only if both players can cheat in the tournament. Continuous feedback on the counterpart’s reports increases cheating under the piece-rate scheme but not in a competitive setting. Our results provide new insights on the role that feedback plays on cheating behavior in dynamic settings under different payment schemes, and shed liht on the origins of the effect of competition on dishonesty. |
| Keywords: | Dishonesty, feedback, peer effects, competitive incentives, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 M52 D83 |
| Date: | 2021 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:2101&r=all |
| By: | Christian Krekel |
| Abstract: | The Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games have been rescheduled to take place in July and August this year. Christian Krekel uses tools from the new science of wellbeing to assess whether the event should still go ahead and how likely it is to have been a worthwhile investment. |
| Keywords: | wellbeing, Covid-19, growth |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepcnp:596&r=all |