|
on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Florian Lindner |
| Abstract: | Psychological pressure affects performance. This is especially true for individuals completing precision tasks in decisive situations, such as assessment tests, job talks, or sports competitions. In this paper, I shed light on detrimental effects of pressure on performance, a phenomenon known as "choking under pressure". I analyze a unique setting in which the effect of pressure on performance is naturally observable: Biathlon World Cup competitions. As the last shot in the final bout of shootings is regularly decisive for the victory, pressure is highest on the leader of the competition not to miss this last shot. Using event data from 11 seasons of Biathlon World Cup, I find strong evidence for "choking under pressure", implying that especially leaders are more likely to fail decisive shots. Furthermore, taking more time for the last shootings bout leads to a decrease in performance. Finally, I show suggestive evidence for a momentum effect – after missing a shot during the last shooting bout, the probability of missing the last shot decreases. |
| Keywords: | Choking under pressure, psychological pressure, biathlon |
| JEL: | L83 M51 M54 L83 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2017-24&r=spo |
| By: | Csató, László |
| Abstract: | We discuss the strategy-proofness of multistage tournaments. In a tournament with subsequent group stages, players are divided into groups in the preliminary and main rounds, where they play pairwise matches against each other. The higher ranked players qualify to the next stage such that matches are not repeated in the main round if two qualified players have already faced in the preliminary round. Players prefer to carry over better results to the main round, provided that they qualify. It is shown that these tournament systems, widely used in handball, are incentive incompatible. We also present some historical examples where a team was ex ante not interested in winning by a high margin. |
| Keywords: | OR in sport; tournament ranking; handball; strategy-proofness; manipulation |
| JEL: | C44 D71 L83 |
| Date: | 2017–12–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:83269&r=spo |
| By: | Mario Lackner; Hendrik Sonnabend (Universtity of Hagen) |
| Abstract: | This contribution examines the effect of advantageous inequity on performance using data from top-level penalty kicking in soccer. Results indicate that, on average, professionals do not perform worse when they experience unfair advantages. However, we find a negative effect of advantageous inequity in situations where success is less important. |
| Keywords: | advantageous inequity; guilt; self-serving bias; fairness; performance |
| JEL: | C93 D91 |
| Date: | 2017–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jku:econwp:2017_21&r=spo |
| By: | Jeremy Rosen (Department of Economics, Georgetown University); Alexandre Olbrecht (Anisfield School of Business, Ramapo College) |
| Abstract: | We estimate econometric models to predict the future performance of National Football League (NFL) quarterbacks selected in the first three rounds of the NFL draft. Using previously agreed-upon measurement criteria, we find that our approach outperforms other specifications currently in use. Since our methods are replicable, stakeholders can use them to improve the draft’s efficiency and help it accomplish its mission to promote competitive balance. In addition, we find that functional mobility best predicts NFL success, and playing in a pro-style offense does not predict NFL success. |
| Keywords: | Efficiency, Prediction Methods, NFL, Quarterback |
| JEL: | L83 |
| Date: | 2017–12–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~17-17-08&r=spo |