| By: |
Alex Bryson (University College London, National Institute of Social and Economic Research and Institute for the Study of Labor);
Babatunde Buraimo (University of Liverpool);
Rob Simmons (Lancaster University) |
| Abstract: |
That football Head Coaches will be dismissed for poor performance and will
quit when they have better outside options seems to be nothing more than a
statement of the obvious. But owners may find it hard to distinguish poor
performance from bad luck and may find it difficult to identify and attract
talented managers from other clubs. Indeed, most of the literature indicates
little improvement in team performance when one coach replaces another.
Equally, Head Coaches may have few options to move to better clubs even when
they are performing well. We identify significant differences between
determinants of quits and dismissals that are largely consistent with a
standard model which predicts departures occur when the value of the job match
specific surplus for one or both parties falls below the value of outside
options. However, dismissals and quits are more common in Italy and Spain than
in Germany and France, suggesting institutions may be important. We discuss
the implications of our findings in the context of principal-agent theory and
the wider literature on turnover among CEOs and other corporate leaders. |
| Keywords: |
Quits; Dismissals; Layoffs; Managerial performance; Team performance; Football; Survival analysis; Competing risks |
| JEL: |
J23 J24 J63 J64 |
| Date: |
2017–04–01 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qss:dqsswp:1707&r=spo |