|
on Sports and Economics |
|
Issue of 2012‒06‒05
one paper chosen by Joao Carlos Correia Leitao University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon |
| By: | Marc Rysman (Department of Economics, Boston University); Ginger Zhe Jin (University of Maryland and NBER) |
| Abstract: | We study a new data set of US sports card conventions in order to evaluate the pricing theory of two-sided markets. Conventions are two-sided because organizers must set fees to attract both consumers and dealers. We have detailed information on consumer price, dealer price and, since most conventions are local, the market structure for conventions. We present several ndings: rst, consumer pricing decreases with competition at any reasonable distance, but pricing to dealers is insensitive to competition and in longer distances even increases with competition. Second, when consumer price is zero (and thus constrained), dealer price decreases more strongly with competition. These results are compatible with existing models of two-sided markets, but are dicult to explain without such models. |
| Date: | 2012–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2012-015&r=spo |