nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2009‒12‒19
two papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Polytechnic Institute of Portalegre and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Substitution Between Managers and Subordinates: Evidence from British Football By Sue Bridgewater; Lawrence M. Kahn; Amanda H. Goodall
  2. Do clubs foster provision success ? By Mohamed Ali Bchir; Marc Willinger

  1. By: Sue Bridgewater (Warwick); Lawrence M. Kahn (Cornell); Amanda H. Goodall (Warwick)
    Abstract: We use data on British football managers and teams over the 1994-2007 period to study substitution and complementarity between leaders and subordinates. We find for the Premier League (the highest level of competition) that, other things being equal, managers who themselves played at a higher level raise the productivity of less-skilled teams by more than that of highly skilled teams. This is consistent with the hypothesis that one function of a top manager is to communicate to subordinates the skills needed to succeed, since less skilled players have more to learn. We also find that managers with more accumulated professional managing experience raise the productivity of talented players by more than that of less-talented players. This is consistent with the hypothesis that a further function of successful managers in high-performance workplaces is to manage the egos of elite workers. Such a function is likely more important the more accomplished the workers are -- as indicated, in our data, by teams with greater payrolls.
    Keywords: Productivity, leadership
    JEL: J24 M51
    Date: 2009–11–30
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qut:auncer:2009_64&r=spo
  2. By: Mohamed Ali Bchir; Marc Willinger
    Abstract: We report the results of an experiment on the provision of a step-level collective good. We compare subjects’ behavior in a public good game and in a club good game. In the club good game, players who contribute less than the amount required to become a member, do not benefit from the collective good. Compared to the benchmark step-level public good, we find that the introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects. It increases significantly the provision success of the collective good.
    Date: 2009–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lam:wpaper:09-19&r=spo

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