nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2005‒11‒19
one paper chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Hierarchy and opportunism in teams By Potters,Jan; Sefton,Martin; Heijden,Eline van der

  1. By: Potters,Jan; Sefton,Martin; Heijden,Eline van der (Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research)
    Abstract: We use experiments to compare two institutions for allocating the proceeds of team production. Under revenue-sharing, each team member receives an equal share of team output; under leader-determined shares, a team leader has the power to implement her own allocation. Both arrangements are vulnerable to opportunistic incentives: under revenuesharing team members have an incentive to free-ride, while under leader-determined shares leaders have an incentive to seize team output. We find that most leaders forego the temptation to appropriate team output and manage to curtail free-riding. As a result, compared to revenue-sharing, the presence of a team leader results in a significant improvement in team performance.
    Keywords: team production;leadership;opportunism;experiments
    JEL: C9 D2 H4 J3 L2
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2005109&r=spo

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