nep-sog New Economics Papers
on Sociology of Economics
Issue of 2018‒09‒17
two papers chosen by
Jonas Holmström
Axventure AB

  1. Methods Matter: P-Hacking and Causal Inference in Economics By Abel Brodeur; Nikolai Cook; Anthony Heyes
  2. The Determinants of Faculty Pay in Russian Universities: Incentive Contracts By Ilya Prakhov; Victor Rudakov

  1. By: Abel Brodeur (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON); Nikolai Cook (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON); Anthony Heyes (Department of Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, ON, and University of Sussex)
    Abstract: The economics 'credibility revolution' has promoted the identification of causal relationships using difference-in-differences (DID), instrumental variables (IV), randomized control trials (RCT) and regression discontinuity design (RDD) methods. The extent to which a reader should trust claims about the statistical significance of results proves very sensitive to method. Applying multiple methods to 13,440 hypothesis tests reported in 25 top economics journals in 2015, we show that selective publication and p-hacking is a substantial problem in research employing DID and (in particular) IV. RCT and RDD are much less problematic. Almost 25% of claims of marginally significant results in IV papers are misleading.
    Keywords: Research methods, causal inference, p-curves, p-hacking, publication bias.
    JEL: A11 B41 C13 C44
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ott:wpaper:1809e&r=sog
  2. By: Ilya Prakhov (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Victor Rudakov (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper evaluates the design of current contractual incentive mechanisms in Russian universities depending on the type of higher education institution after recent significant contractual reforms in the national academic sector. We employ the theoretical framework of incentive contracts in order to identify and assess performance measures of university faculty determining the total income received from teaching, research and administrative duties. We estimate returns from academic productivity in Russia to be reflected in the academic salary by an evaluation of empirical models of the determinants of faculty pay depending on their productivity, current academic and administrative position, gender and seniority. We show that for the entire sample, faculty salary is positively associated with publication activity. Teaching is significant only for the entire sample, but not significant for subsamples. Administrative duties (expressed in the position held) are positively related to faculty pay: the largest effect is for rectors and vice-rectors, but for deans and heads of departments or laboratories the effect is also strong. Heads of universities and structural units receive a significant bonus for their administrative position. For research-oriented universities the largest effect in publication activity is for the number of papers in high ranking journals. In universities with no research status we discovered a significant gender gap: the male faculty earn more than their female colleagues. There is a positive linear relationship between salary and seniority for the entire sample and in universities with no special status, which corresponds to human capital theory. Salaries in universities requiring higher entrance exam scores are higher than in less selective higher education institutions. The salary in Moscow universities is higher than in the regional higher education institutions.
    Keywords: academic contracts, faculty pay, merit pay, incentive contract, international rankings, competitiveness of higher education.
    JEL: I21 I23 J31
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:47edu2018&r=sog

This nep-sog issue is ©2018 by Jonas Holmström. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.