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on Sociology of Economics |
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Issue of 2008‒06‒13
three papers chosen by Jonas Holmström Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration |
| By: | Susanne Warning; Christian Wiermann; Günther G. Schulze (Department of International Economic Policy, University of Freiburg) |
| Abstract: | This paper constructs several meta-indexes of journal rankings from existing journal rankings which all have limited coverage. It is applicable both for researchers in the field of economics and business administration (including their respective subfields) and includes also journals which are published in German. We discuss the relative merits of meta-indexes based on peer assessment and on citations. |
| Keywords: | Zeitschriftenranking, Evaluation von Forschung, Meta-Index |
| JEL: | A11 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fre:wpaper:3&r=sog |
| By: | Marco Novarese (Universita del Piemonte Orientale); Christian Zimmermann (University of Connecticut) |
| Abstract: | We study how the democratization of the diffusion of research through the Internet could have helped non traditional fields of research. The specific case we approach is Heterodox Economics as its pre-prints are disseminated through NEP, the email alert service of RePEc. Comparing heterodox and mainstream papers, we find that heterodox ones are quite systematically more downloaded, and particularly so when considering downloads per subscriber. We conclude that the Internet definitely helps heterodox research, also because other researcher get exposed to it. But there is still room for more participation by heterodox researchers. |
| Keywords: | NEP, RePEc, heterodox economics, diffusion of research |
| JEL: | B50 A14 |
| Date: | 2008–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-17&r=sog |
| By: | Nicola Lacetera (Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western University, Cleveland, OH, USA); Lorenzo Zirulia (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; CESPRI, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy; and Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis) |
| Abstract: | Scientific fraud is a pervasive phenomenon with deleterious consequences, as it leads to false scientific knowledge being published, therefore a¤ecting major individual and public decisions. In this paper we build a game-theoretic model of the research and publication process that ana- lyzes why scientists commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model, authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects, and can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show four main results. First, the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be representative of the overall amount of malfeasance in science; also, star scientists are more likely to misbehave, but are less likely to be caught than average scientists. Second, a reduction in the costs of checking for frauds may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes, but rather to a change in the type of research that is performed. Third, an increase in competition between scientists may in fact reduce, and not increase, scientific misconduct. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct does not always provide additional deterrence. |
| Keywords: | Research and publication process, peer review, fraud. |
| JEL: | A14 D82 K42 O31 Z13 |
| Date: | 2008–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp215&r=sog |