nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2020‒10‒26
twenty-two papers chosen by



  1. Experiments on the Fly By Aleksandr Alekseev; James Alm; Vjollca Sadiraj; David L. Sjoquist
  2. Gender Norms and Labor-Supply Expectations: Experimental Evidence from Adolescents By Elisabeth Grewenig; Philipp Lergetporer; Katharina Werner
  3. Earnings Autocorrelation and the Post-Earnings-AnnouncementDrift – Experimental Evidence By Josef Fink; Stefan Palan; Erik Theissen
  4. Greening the common agricultural policy: a behavioural perspective and lab-in-the-field experiment in Germany By Fabian Thomas; Estelle Midler; Marianne Lefebvre; Stefanie Engel
  5. Reference point adaptation and air quality – Experimental evidence with anti-PM 2.5 facemasks from China By Zhang, nan; Qin, Botao
  6. SOME CONDITIONS (NOT) AFFECTING SELECTION NEGLECT: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAB By Raúl López-Pérez; Ágnes Pintér; Rocío Sánchez-Mangas
  7. The effects of parental involvement in homework. Two randomised controlled trials in financial education By Joana Elisa Maldonado; Kristof De Witte; Koen Declercq
  8. How People Know Their Risk Preference By Ruben C. Arslan; Martin Brümmer; Thomas Dohmen; Johanna Drewelies; Ralph Hertwig; Gert G. Wagner
  9. Productivity Versus Motivation in Adolescent Human Capital Production: Evidence from a Structurally-Motivated Field Experiment By Christopher Cotton; Brent Hickman; John List; Joseph Price; Sutanuka Roy
  10. Mental Accounting, Loss Aversion, and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence By Sanjit Dhami; Hajimoladarvish
  11. USING EYE-TRACKING TECHNIQUES TO UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF ATTENTION ON CHOICE AND REVERSALS By Raúl López-Pérez; Eli Spiegelman
  12. Team Formation in Coordination Games with Fixed Neighborhoods By Alejandro Caparrós; Esther Blanco; Philipp Buchenauer; Michael Finus
  13. Agenda control and reciprocity in sequential voting decisions By Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon
  14. Nudging and Subsidizing Farmers to Foster Smart Water Meter Adoption By Benjamin Ouvrard; Raphaële Préget; Arnaud Reynaud; Laetitia Tuffery
  15. Individual preferences regarding pesticide-free management of green-spaces: a discret choice experiment with French citizens. By Pauline Laille; Marianne Lefebvre; Masha Maslianskaia-Pautrel
  16. Substitution of social concerns under the Covid-19 pandemic By Esther Blanco; Alexandra Baier; Felix Holzmeister; Tarek Jaber-Lopez; Natalie Struwe
  17. Bidding strategies and winner’s curse in auctions of non-distressed residential real estate By Hungria Gunnelin, Rosane
  18. Does pre-play social interaction improve negotiation outcomes? By Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Cabrales, Antonio; Mateu, Guillermo; Angel, Sanchez; Sutan, Angela
  19. Consumer Groups and their Risk Perception in a Data Sharing Cooperation between Two Firms By Steudner, Tobias
  20. The Genius is a Male: Stereotypes and Same-Sex Bias in Exam Grading in Economics at Stockholm University By Jansson, Joakim; Tyrefors, Björn
  21. Improving the accuracy of project schedules By Lorko, Matej; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le
  22. Cultural Identity and Social Capital in Italy By Daniel Sgroi,; Michela Redoano,; Federica Liberini,; Ben Lockwood,; Emanuele Bracco,; Francesco Porcell,

  1. By: Aleksandr Alekseev; James Alm; Vjollca Sadiraj; David L. Sjoquist
    Abstract: How do exogenous increases in resources to a government affect its expenditure decisions? Economic theory typically predicts that a lump-sum grant will have the same impact on government expenditures as an increase in income. However, empirical studies consistently find that government spending is stimulated far more by grants than by income; that is, grants have a \"flypaper effect\" because the money \"sticks where it hits\". We conduct a laboratory experiment that controls for the most important factors that have been suggested in explaining the existence of the flypaper effect. Our experimental design crosses four transfer delivery methods with three voting frameworks. We examine three payoff-equivalent transfer delivery methods, all relative to a fourth baseline treatment with no transfer: an increase in income, a subsidy (repayment) for expenditures on the public good, and a lump-sum grant. Our two alternative voting frameworks are voting over levels of expenditures and voting over changes with information on public good externalities, each relative to a third baseline treatment where voting is over changes from a default (reference) level of expenditures. We find robust evidence of a flypaper effect: both the subsidy and the lump-sum grant increase expenditures more than does an equivalent increase in income. Our results are largely consistent with, and explained by, theoretical models that rely upon behavioral economics.
    Keywords: Laboratory experiment; intergovernmental grants; flypaper effect; reference dependence; public goods; incremental budgeting
    JEL: C9 H4 H8
    Date: 2020–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:exc:wpaper:2020-04&r=all
  2. By: Elisabeth Grewenig; Philipp Lergetporer; Katharina Werner
    Abstract: Gender gaps in labor-market outcomes often emerge with arrival of the first child. We investigate a causal link between gender norms and labor-supply expectations within a survey experiment among 2,000 German adolescents. Using a hypothetical scenario, we document that most girls expect to work 20 hours or less per week when having a young child, and expect from their partners to work 30 hours or more. Randomized treatments that highlight the existing traditional norm towards mothers, significantly reduce girls’ self-expected labor supply and thereby increase the expected gender difference in labor supply between their partners and themselves (i.e., the expected within-family gender gap). Treatment effects persist in a follow-up survey two weeks later, and extend to incentivized outcomes. In a second experiment conducted in the follow-up survey, we highlight another, more gender-egalitarian, norm towards shared household responsibilities and show that this attenuates the expected within-family gender gap. Together our results suggest that social norms play an important role in shaping gender gaps in labor-market outcomes around child birth.
    Keywords: gender norms, female labor supply, survey experiment
    JEL: J16 J22 C93 D83
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8611&r=all
  3. By: Josef Fink (Institute of Banking and Finance, University of Graz); Stefan Palan (Institute of Banking and Finance, University of Graz); Erik Theissen (Finance Area, University of Mannheim)
    Abstract: Post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD) is one of the most solidly documented asset pricing anomalies. We use the controlled conditions of an experimental lab to investigate whether earnings autocorrelation is the driving cause of this anomaly. We observe PEAD in settings with uncorrelated and correlated earnings surprises, implying that earnings autocorrelation is not a necessary condition for PEAD. It rather is a moderator, as the PEAD is stronger when earnings surprises are serially correlated. We further show that market prices underadjust to fundamental value changes, and that trading strategies can profitably exploit the PEAD. Besides offering new results regarding the PEAD-phenomenon, we thus provide a proof-of-concept for the ability of experiments to generate valuable insights into this asset pricing anomaly.
    Date: 2020–10–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:grz:wpsses:2020-03&r=all
  4. By: Fabian Thomas (University of Osnabrueck); Estelle Midler (Ministère de l'Agriculture, du Développement Rural et de la Pêche); Marianne Lefebvre (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage); Stefanie Engel (University of Osnabrueck)
    Abstract: This study investigates the behavioral economic underpinnings of current policy approaches to integrate environmental objectives into the Common Agricultural Policy. We conduct an economic lab-in-the-field experiment with farmers in Germany. We analyze the impact of the following policy design features on farmers' decisions to adopt sustainable agricultural practices: (i) framing of the policy: whether farmers perceive themselves as being part of the problem or the solution, (ii) degree of control: mandatory vs. voluntary policy (iii) framing of incentives as either losses or gains. All policy designs tested result in a significant increase in hectares conserved compared to a baseline scenario without policy. Also behavioral factors do significantly affect farmers' behavior at the individual level. Only framing is found to significantly affect policy effectiveness.
    Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy,Agri-Environment Measures,Greening,Lab-in-the-Field Ex- periment JEL Classifications: C93,D91,H20,Q00,Q18,Q58
    Date: 2019–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02519104&r=all
  5. By: Zhang, nan; Qin, Botao
    Abstract: The formation of reference points has drawn increasing interest ever since the introduction of prospect theory. Given that most studies focus on tradable goods such as stocks, for which the prices are observable, while few have focused on environmental goods. This paper attempts to fill this gap in the literature in this regard. In our experiment, we divided the subjects into buyers and sellers and asked them to trade four PM 2.5 filters using the Becker–DeGroot–Marschak mechanism. We have two treatments in this experiment: a) the experience of seven weeks of heavy air pollution; and b) the receiving of information on the relationship between death rates and air pollution. The different bidding prices for the four PM 2.5 filters in these treatment groups make it possible to trace the adjustment of the reference points as a result of these treatments without having to know their precise values. Our results show that, for buyers, the heavy air pollution drives them to fully downwardly adjust their reference points on air quality. For sellers, however, the reference points adaptation caused by heavy pollution is not a full adaptation. Moreover, the new information on the damage to health from air pollution causes buyers to upwardly adjust their reference points on air quality but does not significantly change the sellers’ reference points. We show that, for both treatments, sellers are more reluctant to adjust their reference points on air quality than are buyers. Our results confirm the asymmetric reference point adaptation in that adaptation after a loss is harder than adaptation after a gain.
    Keywords: prospect theory; reference point; asymmetric adaptation; air pollution; BDM auction
    JEL: C90 D44 Q53
    Date: 2020–06–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:102935&r=all
  6. By: Raúl López-Pérez; Ágnes Pintér; Rocío Sánchez-Mangas
    Abstract: People often extrapolate from data samples, inferring properties of the population like the rate of some event, class, or group - e.g. the percent of female scientists, the crime rate, the chances to suffer some illness. In many circumstances, though, the sample observed is non-random, i.e., affected by sampling bias. For instance, news media rarely display (intentionally or not) a balanced view of the state of the world, focusing particularly on dramatic and rare events. In this line, recent literature in Economics hints that people often fail to account for sample selection in their inferences. We here offer evidence of this phenomenon at an individual level in a tightly controlled lab setting and explore conditions for its occurrence. If the inference problem is simple enough, we conjecture that the key condition is the existence of ambiguity, i.e., non-quantifiable uncertainty, about the selection rule. In this vein, we find no evidence for selection neglect in an experimental treatment, in which subjects must infer the frequency of some event given a non-random sample knowing the exact selection rule. We also consider two treatments of similar complexity where the selection rule is ambiguous. Here, in contrast, people extrapolate as if sampling were random. Further, they become more and more confident in the accuracy of their guesses as the experiment proceeds, even when the evidence accumulated patently signals a selection issue and hence warrants some caution in the inferences made. This is also true when the instructions give explicit clues about selection problems. The evidence suggests that the mere accumulation of evidence, i.e., a larger sample, will not make people more circumspect about the quality of the sample and hence about the inferences derived from it in a selection problem, even if the sample becomes obviously biased as it grows and people are reminded of the existence of potential sampling issues.
    Keywords: Ambiguity; Beliefs; Experiments; Extrapolation; Sampling Bias; Selection Problem
    JEL: D01 D83 D91
    Date: 2020–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipp:wpaper:2002&r=all
  7. By: Joana Elisa Maldonado; Kristof De Witte; Koen Declercq
    Abstract: Based on two randomised controlled trials with a total of 2,779 students from grade 8 and 9 in Flanders, we provide causal evidence on the effects of parental involvement on students’ learning in a financial education course. Using an experimental design with three treatment groups, the impact of parental involvement in homework is distinguished from the standalone impact of the classroom intervention and homework itself. Intention-to-treat analysis reveals that the intervention effectively improves students’ knowledge and behaviour. The classroom intervention used in conjugation with a homework assignment that the students complete with the help of their parents increases financial literacy scores by 0.37 standard deviations. On average, the added value of involving parents in homework is not significant, but involving parents has significant positive effects on behaviour for disadvantaged students. As a potential underlying mechanism it is observed that the parental involvement intervention significantly increases family communication between students and parents about the course topics.
    Keywords: Financial Literacy; Parental Involvement; Randomised Controlled Trial; Education
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ete:ceswps:645427&r=all
  8. By: Ruben C. Arslan; Martin Brümmer; Thomas Dohmen; Johanna Drewelies; Ralph Hertwig; Gert G. Wagner
    Abstract: People differ in their willingness to take risks. Recent work found that revealed preference tasks (e.g., laboratory lotteries)—a dominant class of measures—are outperformed by survey-based stated preferences, which are more stable and predict real-world risk taking across different domains. How can stated preferences, often criticised as inconsequential “cheap talk,” be more valid and predictive than controlled, incentivized lotteries? In our multimethod study, over 3,000 respondents from population samples answered a single widely used and predictive risk-preference question. Respondents then explained the reasoning behind their answer. They tended to recount diagnostic behaviours and experiences, focusing on voluntary, consequential acts and experiences from which they seemed to infer their risk preference. We found that third-party readers of respondents’ brief memories and explanations reached similar inferences about respondents’ preferences, indicating the intersubjective validity of this information. Our results help unpack the self perception behind stated risk preferences that permits people to draw upon their own understanding of what constitutes diagnostic behaviours and experiences, as revealed in high-stakes situations in the real world.
    Keywords: risk preferences, self-report, self-perception
    JEL: A12 C81 J10
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8586&r=all
  9. By: Christopher Cotton; Brent Hickman; John List; Joseph Price; Sutanuka Roy
    Abstract: We leverage a field experiment across three distinct school districts to identify key pieces of a structural model of adolescent human capital production. Out focus is inspired by the contemporary psychology of education literature, which expresses learning as a function of the ratio of the time spent on learning to the time needed to learn. By capturing two crucial student-level unobservables- which we denote as academic efficiency (turning inputs into outputs) and time preference (motivation)- our field experiment lends insights into the underpinnings of adolescent skill formation and provides a novel view of how to lessen racial and gender achievement gaps. One general insight is that students who are falling behind their peers, whether correlated to race, gender, or school district, are doing so because of academic efficiency rather than time preference. We view this result, and others found in our data, as fundamental to practitioners, academics, and policymakers interested in designing strategies to provide equal opportunities to students.
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:framed:00719&r=all
  10. By: Sanjit Dhami; Hajimoladarvish
    Abstract: The evidence shows source-dependent entitlement to income sources and individuals are reluctant to part with income they feel more entitled to, e.g., earned labor income. Taxpayers may also be more reluctant to part with tax payments (evade more) from income sources they feel more entitled to- a form of mental accounting. We embed two main hypotheses within a rigorous theoretical model based on prospect theory. From incomes sources they feel more entitled to, taxpayers experience (i) greater loss aversion from paying taxes, and (ii) lower moral costs of evasion. We confirm the predictions of our model through MTurk experiments. Evasion is increasing in the tax rate and decreasing in the audit penalty. Moral costs influence taxpayers decisions. Loss aversion, measured “directly” for the first time for each individual in an evasion experiment, reduces evasion, as predicted by our theory. Loss aversion, risk aversion, and their interaction, are critical determinants of evasion.
    Keywords: mental accounting, tax evasion, loss aversion, morality, prospect theory, risk-aversion
    JEL: C91 C92 D82 D91 G21
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_8606&r=all
  11. By: Raúl López-Pérez; Eli Spiegelman
    Abstract: A preference reversal (PR) refers to behavior that violates revealed preference or is simply incoherent – i.e., not explainable by a rational ordering. In a classical PR experiment, for instance, participants often exhibit greater risk aversion in a Choice-based revelation procedure than in an Evaluation-based one, i.e., choose the safer of two gambles but express a higher monetary valuation for the riskier. We conjecture that PRs are partly due to the interaction between attention and task mode, and explore three compatible explanations using eye-tracking techniques. Explanation 1 says that difficult tasks require more time to be performed without ‘mistakes’. Those who pay scarcely more attention to Evaluation than Choice, therefore, are more likely to act incoherently. Our data corroborate such a prediction. Explanation 2 assumes that the subjective value of (i) a bet or (ii) any of its attributes (prize and winning probability) depends on the attention paid to it. PRs occur when people allocate attention to different elements across tasks. In line with recent models of drift-diffusion, we find evidence consistent with point (i): a higher focus on the safer bet during Choice predicts PRs. In contrast, little evidence supports the idea (ii) that the share of fixations on probabilities versus prizes influences behavior or PRs. Explanation 3, finally, states that the nature of the tasks may affect the comparisons people make between the options, which are relevant for behavior. For instance, the cognitive difficulty of pricing a bet in Evaluation could distract attention from the relative risk across bets, thus reducing risk aversion. In our design, both bets are visible on the computer screen in both tasks, and subjects make substantially more transitions between bets in Choice. Yet this is observed among all participants, not only the reversers.
    Keywords: Eye-tracking; Limited Attention; Mental Effort; Rationality; Reversals
    JEL: D01 D81 D83 D91
    Date: 2020–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipp:wpaper:2001&r=all
  12. By: Alejandro Caparrós; Esther Blanco; Philipp Buchenauer; Michael Finus
    Abstract: This study contributes to the recent experimental literature addressing the role of team formation in overcoming coordination failure in weakest-link games. We investigate the endogenous formation of teams in fixed neighborhoods in which it is not possible to exclude players from influencing the weakest-link. Our experimental results show that team formation helps in overcoming the coordination problem, raises equilibrium provision levels, but falls short of providing the Pareto-optimal contribution. As the problem of multiplicity of Nash equilibria in weakest-link games is exacerbated when team formation is introduced, we provide Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) and Agent QRE analyses. The analysis demonstrates that team formation would solve the problem with (almost) perfectly rational agents, but also that our experimental results are consistent with (A)QRE models under bounded rationality.
    Keywords: Weakest-link; Coalition Formation; Experimental Economics; Quantal Response Equilibrium; Agent Quantal Response Equilibrium
    JEL: C72 C91 C92 H41
    Date: 2020–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ipp:wpaper:2004&r=all
  13. By: Fischbacher, Urs; Schudy, Simeon
    Abstract: We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given, but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals. Vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor. Punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs. (JEL C92, D71, D72)
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenar:73754&r=all
  14. By: Benjamin Ouvrard (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Raphaële Préget (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Arnaud Reynaud (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement); Laetitia Tuffery (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - UM - Université de Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
    Abstract: In a global context of increasing water scarcity, reducing water use in the agricultural sector is one of the spearheads of sustainable agricultural and environmental policies. New technologies such as smart water meters are promising tools for addressing this issue, but their voluntary adoption by farmers has been limited. Conducting a discrete choice experiment with randomized treatments, we test two policy instruments designed to foster the voluntary adoption of smart water meters: a conditional subsidy and green nudges. The conditional subsidy is offered to farmers who adopt a smart meter only if the rate of adoption in their geographic area is sufficiently high (25%, 50% or 75%). In addition, we implement informational nudges by providing farmers specific messages regarding water scarcity and water management. With the responses of 1,272 French farmers, we show that both policy instruments are effective tools for fostering smart water meter adoption. Surprisingly, our results show that the willingness to pay for the conditional subsidy does not depend on the collective adoption threshold. We also demonstrate that farmers who receive an informational nudge are more likely to opt for a smart water meter. This result calls for a careful joint design of these two policy instruments..
    Keywords: Behavioural economics,Choice experiment,Nudges,French farmers,Smart water meters,Social norms.
    Date: 2020–10–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpceem:hal-02958784&r=all
  15. By: Pauline Laille (Plante et Cité - Association Plante et Cité); Marianne Lefebvre (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage); Masha Maslianskaia-Pautrel (GRANEM - Groupe de Recherche Angevin en Economie et Management - UA - Université d'Angers - AGROCAMPUS OUEST - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - Institut National de l'Horticulture et du Paysage)
    Keywords: Discrete choice experiment,Pesticides,Urban green spaces,Individual preferences,France
    Date: 2020–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02867639&r=all
  16. By: Esther Blanco; Alexandra Baier; Felix Holzmeister; Tarek Jaber-Lopez; Natalie Struwe
    Abstract: Think tanks and political leaders have raised concerns about the implications that the Covid-19 response and reconstruction might have on other social objectives that were setting the international agenda before the Covid-19 pandemic. We present experimental evidence for eight consecutive weeks during April-May 2020 for Austria, testing the extent to which Covid-19 concerns might substitute other social concerns such as the climate crisis or the protection of vulnerable sectors of the society. We measure behavior in a simple donation task where participants receive Euro 3 that they can distribute between themselves and different charities. While participants in one treatment have the opportunity to donate, if any, to eight different charities including a rich set of social concerns (Baseline), participants in a second treatment can choose to donate, if any, to the same charities and, in addition, to the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund for the World Health Organization (Covid-19). In a third treatment, participants can only decide on distributing the Euro 3 between themselves and the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund (Covid-19 Only). Our results show that introducing the Covid-19 Solidarity Response Fund does not significantly change aggregate donations (donations represent 76.3% of endowment in Baseline and 70.2% in Covid-19, t(584) = 1.938, p = 0.053, n = 585). But, given positive donations to the Covid19 Solidarity Response Fund, this entails significantly lower donations to the other eight charities (76.3% in Baseline and 60.8% in Covid-19, t(584) = 5.868, p
    Keywords: Charitable donation, Covid-19 pandemic, climate crisis, poverty, substitution of social concerns
    JEL: D64 Q54 I3 D9
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2020-30&r=all
  17. By: Hungria Gunnelin, Rosane (Department of Real Estate and Construction Management, Royal Institute of Technology)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes how listing price and bidding strategies impact sales prices in non-distressed residential real estate auctions. Furthermore, the paper is the first that tries to explicitly quantify how these strategies affect the probability of a winner’s curse in such auctions. The findings support the results in the general auction literature that the winning bid and the probability of a winner’s curse is increasing in the number of bidders. The results further supports the notion of “auction fever” since high paced auctions (where unexperienced bidders may resort to emotional bidding) increases selling price and the probability of a winner’s curse. The results with respect to jump bidding and list price setting are mixed. Jump bidding has the intended effect of scaring off bidders, but not sufficiently to reduce the winning bid and the probability of a winner’s curse. Lowering the list price to market value ratio (the degree of underpricing) increases the number of bidders, but not sufficiently to counteract the anchoring effect of the list price leading to a reduction of the winning bid and the probability of a winner’s curse. In summary, the findings in this paper show that the unfolding of auctions of non-distressed residential real estate has a significant impact on selling price and the probability of a winner’s curse.
    Keywords: Housing; Auctions; List price; Bidding strategies; Winners curse
    JEL: D44 R31
    Date: 2020–10–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:kthrec:2020_013&r=all
  18. By: Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Cabrales, Antonio; Mateu, Guillermo; Angel, Sanchez; Sutan, Angela
    Abstract: We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. We isolate the impact of several common components of interactions: conversations, food, and alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages. Participants perform a standardized negotiation (complex and simple) under six conditions: without interaction, interaction only, and interactions with water, wine, water and food and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improves the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity, where we find the same lack of superiority of interaction.
    Keywords: negotiation, trust, business meals, social interactions, alcohol.
    JEL: C91 I18 M11
    Date: 2020–07–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:102842&r=all
  19. By: Steudner, Tobias
    Abstract: Privacy research has paid little attention to consequences and peculiarities when firms share consumer data with a third party. Thus, we explore consumers' distinct standpoints regarding an impact on their perceived privacy risks due to a data sharing cooperation between two firms. We identified three consumer groups, whereby two of them see their privacy risks affected (either increased or decreased) and the third consumer group sees their privacy risks not affected due to a data sharing cooperation between two firms. We show that this special third group does not intensively deal with privacy related issues in this situation, which results in lower perceived privacy risks and a higher willingness to disclose personal data compared to the two other consumer groups. We show that this group effect on willingness to disclose even holds when controlling for effects of consumers' privacy concerns and their perceived benefits. Furthermore, this effect is fully mediated by consumers' perceived privacy risks. Our study provides first insights into different consumer groups and its characteristics in a data disclosure setting in which firms have a data sharing cooperation. Therefore, this work allows future research to apply a refined view on consumers, especially in such complex data disclosure settings.
    Keywords: Privacy Risk Perception,Data Sharing Cooperation,Privacy Concerns,Privacy Calculus
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:itso20:224876&r=all
  20. By: Jansson, Joakim (Linnaeus University); Tyrefors, Björn (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))
    Abstract: We use the random allocation of graders to different exam questions at Stockholm University to evaluate the existence of same-sex bias in exam correction. We find evidence of same-sex bias before anonymous exams were introduced. Notably, once anonymous grading was in place, the effect disappears. When separating the effects by grader´s sex, both groups of graders favor male students, although male graders favor male students to a larger extent than female graders. Again, after anonymous grading was introduced, the effect disappears. There is no evidence of compositional changes across the pre-and post-anonymous grading regimes. In sum, our finding is consistent with theories of stereotyping, e.g., the genius being male.
    Keywords: Grading bias; University; Discrimination; Education; Anonymous grading; Same-sex bias
    JEL: I23 J16
    Date: 2020–10–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1362&r=all
  21. By: Lorko, Matej; Servátka, Maroš; Zhang, Le
    Abstract: How to avoid project failures driven by overoptimistic schedules? Managers often attempt to mitigate the duration underestimation and improve the accuracy of project schedules by providing their planners with excessively detailed project specifications. While this traditional approach may be intuitive, solely providing more detailed information has proven to have a limited effect on eliminating behavioral biases. We experimentally test the effectiveness of providing detailed specification and compare it to an alternative intervention of providing historical information about the average duration of similar projects in the past. We find that both interventions mitigate the underestimation bias. However, since providing detailed project specification results in high variance of estimation errors due to sizable over- and underestimates, only the provision of historical information leads to more accurate project duration estimates. We also test whether it is more effective to anchor planners by providing historical information simultaneously with the project specification or to provide the historical information only after beliefs regarding the project duration are formed, in which case planners can regress their initial estimates towards the historical average. We find that the timing of disclosing information does not play a role as the estimation bias is mitigated and the accuracy is improved in both conditions. Finally, we observe that the subjective confidence in the accuracy of duration estimates does not vary across the interventions, suggesting that the confidence is neither a function of the amount nor the detail of available information.
    Keywords: project management, project planning, duration estimation, historical information, project specification, experiment
    JEL: C91 D83 O21 O22
    Date: 2020–10–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:103367&r=all
  22. By: Daniel Sgroi, (University of Warwick, IZA, ESRC CAGE Centre); Michela Redoano, (University of Warwick); Federica Liberini, (University of Bath); Ben Lockwood, (University of Warwick); Emanuele Bracco, (Universita di Verona); Francesco Porcell, (Universita di Bari)
    Abstract: Italy became one nation only relatively recently and as such there remains significant regional variation in trust in government and society (so-called “social capital”) as well as in language and diet. In an experiment conducted across three Italian cities we exploit variation in family background generated through internal migration and make use of novel measures of social capital, language and diet to develop a new index of cultural heritage. Our new index predicts social capital, while self-reported identity does not. The missing link between the past and current identity seems to come through grandparents (especially maternal grandmothers) who have a strong role in developing the cultural identity of their grandchildren.
    Keywords: JEL Classification:
    Date: 2020
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:498&r=all

General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.