nep-exp New Economics Papers
on Experimental Economics
Issue of 2019‒12‒16
33 papers chosen by



  1. Assignment Markets: Theory and Experiments By Arthur Dolgopolov; Daniel Houser; Cesar Martinelli; Thomas Stratmann
  2. Bidding on price and quality: An experiment on the complexity of scoring auctions By Riccardo Camboni; Luca Corazzini; Stefano Galavotti; Paola Valbonesi
  3. The Effect of Leniency Rule on Cartel Formation and Stability: Experiments with Open Communication By Maximilian Andres; Lisa Bruttel; Jana Friedrichsen
  4. On the modeling and testing of groundwater resource models By Murielle Djiguemde; Dimitri Dubois; Alexandre Sauquet; Mabel Tidball
  5. Do Appeals to Donor Benefits Raise More Money than Appeals to Recipient Benefits? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment with Pick.Click.Give. By Alexander James; John List; James Murphy; Michael Price
  6. Does Job Search Assistance Reduce Unemployment? Experimental Evidence on Displacement Effects and Mechanisms By Cheung, Maria; Egebark, Johan; Forslund, Anders; Laun, Lisa; Rödin, Magnus; Vikström, Johan
  7. No clue about bioplastics By Erik Ansink; Louise Wijk; Frederiek Zuidmeer
  8. Does Money Illusion Matter? A Theoretical and Computational Model By Niccolò Zaccaria
  9. Do Appeals to Donor Benefits Raise More Money than Appeals to Recipient Benefits? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment with Pick.Click.Give. By John A. List; James J. Murphy; Michael K. Price; Alexander G. James
  10. Profit vs morality: how unfair is labor market discrimination? Results from a survey experiment By Élisabeth Tovar; Matthieu Bunel
  11. Delegated Decision-Making in Finance By Felix Holzmeister; Martin Holmén; Michael Kirchler; Matthias Stefan; Erik Wengström
  12. Harnessing the Power of Social Incentives to Curb Shirking in Teams By Brice Corgnet; Brian Gunia; Roberto Hernán González
  13. Clustering and External Validity in Randomized Controlled Trials with Stochastic Potential Outcomes By Antoine Deeb; Cl\'ement de Chaisemartin
  14. The Impact of ETFs on Asset Markets: Experimental Evidence By John Duffy; Jean Paul Rabanal; Olga A. Rud
  15. Voter Autrement 2017 for the French Presidential Election By Sylvain Bouveret; Renaud Blanch; Antoinette Baujard; François Durand; Herrade Igersheim; Jérôme Lang; Annick Laruelle; Jean-François Laslier; Isabelle Lebon; Vincent Merlin
  16. EFFECTS OF EMPLOYEES’ OPPORTUNITIES TO INFLUENCE IN-STORE MUSIC ON SALES: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT By Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov; Moradi, Jasmine; Rudholm, Niklas; Öberg, Christina
  17. How Lotteries in School Choice Help to Level the Playing Field By Christian Basteck; Bettina Klaus; Dorothea Kuebler
  18. The effect of experts’ and laypeople’s forecasts on others’ stock market forecasts By Huber, Christoph; Huber, Juergen; Hueber, Laura
  19. Self-employment and Migration By Samuele Giambra; David McKenzie
  20. Seeking for tipping point in the housing market : evidence from a field experiment By Sylvain Chareyron; Samuel Gorohouna; Yannick l'Horty; Pascale Petit; Catherine Ris
  21. Job Prestige and Mobile Dating Success:A Field Experiment By Brecht Neyt; Stijn Baert; Jana Vynckier
  22. Heuristic Strategies in Uncertain Approval Voting Environments By Jaelle Scheuerman; Jason L. Harman; Nicholas Mattei; K. Brent Venable
  23. Improved drying and storage practices that reduce aflatoxins in stored maize: Experimental evidence from smallholders in Senegal By Prieto, Stacy; Bauchet, Jonathan; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob
  24. An Experimental Test of the Under-Annuitization Puzzle with Smooth Ambiguity and Charitable Giving By Hippolyte d'Albis; Giuseppe Attanasi; Emmanuel Thibault
  25. Modelling consumers' preference and willingness to pay for organic amaranth and tomato in Ondo State, Nigeria: Evidence from a choice experiment By Akinwehinmi, Joseph Oluwagbenga; Amos, Taye Timothy; Ogundari, Kolawole
  26. Uptake of Insurance-Embedded Credit in Presence of Credit Rationing: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Kenya By Ndegwa, Michael K.; Shee, Apurba; Turvey, Calum G.; You, Liangzhi
  27. Identifying appropriate incentive mechanisms for smallholder farmers to exploit inter-temporal arbitrage opportunities for grain Legumes: Experimental evidence from Malawi By Nindi, Tabitha; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob; Bauchet, Jonathan
  28. Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions By Julien Grenet; Yinghua He; Dorothea Kübler
  29. Discrimination à l’embauche : Ce que nous apprennent deux décennies de testings en France By Loic Du Parquet; Pascale Petit
  30. Leaning In or Not Leaning Out? Opt-Out Choice Framing Attenuates Gender Differences in the Decision to Compete By Joyce He; Sonia Kang; Nicola Lacetera
  31. Lessons from Behavioral Economics to Improve Treatment Adherence in Parenting Programs: An Application to SMS By Ajzenman, Nicolas; López Bóo, Florencia
  32. Cognitive Skills and Economic Preferences in the Fund Industry By Farago, Adam; Holmén, Martin; Holzmeister, Felix; Kirchler, Michael; Razen, Michael
  33. Impact Evaluation of Large-Scale Extension Activities on Agricultural Technology Adoption: Experimental vs. Non-Experimental Estimates By Omotilewa, Oluwatoba; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob

  1. By: Arthur Dolgopolov (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Daniel Houser (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Cesar Martinelli (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University); Thomas Stratmann (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science and Department of Economics, George Mason University)
    Abstract: We study theoretically and experimentally assignment markets, i.e. two-sided markets where indivisible heterogeneous items with unit demand and unit supply are traded for money, as exemplified by housing markets. We define an associated strategic market game, and show that every Nash equilibrium outcome of this game is a competitive equilibrium allocation with respect to an economy consisting exclusively of the goods that were traded. That is, inefficiency may arise from miscoordination because some goods are not traded. Experimental results show players behaving close to Nash equilibrium predictions for auction-like market designs and close to generalized bargaining for the market design that incorporates decentralized communication. Communication improves efficiency, but introduces with some probability outcomes inconsistent with Nash equilibria.
    Date: 2019–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gms:wpaper:1075&r=all
  2. By: Riccardo Camboni (DSEA, University of Padova); Luca Corazzini (Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari"); Stefano Galavotti (DEMDI, University of Bari); Paola Valbonesi (DSEA, University of Padova and HSE-NRU, Moscow)
    Abstract: We run an experiment on procurement auctions in a setting where both quality and price matter. We compare two unidimensional treatments in which the buyer fixes one dimension (quality or price) and sellers compete on the other, with three bidimensional treatments (with different strategy spaces) in which sellers submit a price-quality bid and the winner is determined by a score that linearly combines the two offers. We find that, with respect to the theoretical predictions, the bidimensional treatments significantly underperform, both in terms of efficiency and buyer's utility. We attribute this result to the higher strategic complexity of these treatments and test this intuition by fitting a structural Quantal Response Equilibrium model with risk aversion to our experimental data. We find very similar estimates for the risk aversion parameter across all treatments; instead, the error parameter, which captures deviations between the observed bids and the payoff-maximizing ones, is larger in the bidimensional treatments than in the unidimensional ones. Our evidence suggests that increasing the dimensionality and the size of the suppliers' strategy space increases their tendency to make suboptimal offers, thus undermining the theoretical superiority of more complex mechanisms.
    Keywords: scoring auctions, multidimensional auctions, complexity, bidding behaviour, Quantal Response Equilibrium
    JEL: D44 H11 H57
    Date: 2019–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pad:wpaper:0243&r=all
  3. By: Maximilian Andres; Lisa Bruttel; Jana Friedrichsen
    Abstract: Cartels can severely harm social welfare. Competition authorities introduced leniency rules to destabilize existing cartels and hinder the formation of new ones. Empirically, it is difficult to judge the success of these measures because functioning cartels are unobservable. Existing experimental studies confirm that a leniency rule indeed reduces cartelization. We extend these studies by having a participant in the role of the competition authority actively participating in the experiment. Based on chat communication content and price setting behavior, this authority judges whether firms formed a cartel and decides on fines in real time. We find that a leniency rule does not affect cartelization in this setup.
    Keywords: Cartels, corporate leniency programs, Bertrand competition, experiments
    JEL: C92 D43 L41
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1835&r=all
  4. By: Murielle Djiguemde (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique); Dimitri Dubois (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique); Alexandre Sauquet (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique); Mabel Tidball (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - FRE2010 - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - Montpellier SupAgro - Institut national d’études supérieures agronomiques de Montpellier - UM - Université de Montpellier - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)
    Abstract: Economists have been attempting to take on the optimal management of groundwater for many decades, initially through static models, and since the 1970's through a dynamic framework. Since then, several attempts have been made to test dynamic models through laboratory experiments. Yet formulating and testing these models raises several challenges that we attempt to tackle in this study by testing a very simple dynamic groundwater extraction model in a laboratory experiment. We propose a full characterization of the theoretical solutions, taking into account economic constraints. In the experiment we mimic continuous time by allowing subjects to make their extraction decisions whenever they wish, with an actualization and updating the data (resource and payoffs) every second. The infinite horizon is simulated through the computation of payoffs, as if time were endless. To get around the weaknesses of the widely used Mean Squared Deviation (MSD) statistic and classify individual behavior as myopic, feedback or optimal, we combine the MSD with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions and time series treatments. Results show that a significant percentage of agents are able to adopt an optimal extraction path, that few agents should be considered truly myopic, and that using the MSD alone to classify agents would be misleading for about half of the study participants.
    Keywords: Experimental Economics,Renewable Resources,Continuous Time,Dynamic Optimization,Differential Games,Applied Econometrics.
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02316729&r=all
  5. By: Alexander James; John List; James Murphy; Michael Price
    Abstract: Recent research suggests that warm glow is a key driver of individual donation decisions. We make use of a unique opportunity to partner with Alaska's Pick.Click.Give. Charitable Contributions Program to explore whether appealing to one aspect of donor benefits, feeling good about self, impacts donations. We randomly allocated the nearly 300,000 households (540,000 individuals) who registered to receive their annual dividend online into one of three experimental groups. We observe more than 26,000 donors giving aggregate donations exceeding $3 million in our experiment. Consonant with the warm glow model, empirical results highlight the relative import of appeals to self: individuals who received such an appeal were approximately 4.5 percent more likely to give and gave 20 percent more than counterparts in the control group. Yet, average donations from the group that received a message appealing to recipient benefits were no different than the control group. Tracking these individuals through the next campaign year, we also find long-run effects: contributions to the Pick.Click.Give. program in the subsequent year continued to be higher in the appeal-to-self group. Our results have import for theoreticians and empiricists interested in modeling charitable giving as well as practitioners and policymakers.
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:natura:00682&r=all
  6. By: Cheung, Maria (Swedish Public Employment Service); Egebark, Johan (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)); Forslund, Anders (IFAU and UCLS, Uppsala University); Laun, Lisa (IFAU); Rödin, Magnus (Swedish Public Employment Service); Vikström, Johan (IFAU and UCLS, Uppsala University)
    Abstract: This paper uses a large-scale two-level randomized experiment to study direct and displacement effects of job search assistance. Our findings show that the assistance reduces unemployment among the treated, but also creates substantial displacement leading to higher unemployment for the non-treated. By using detailed information on caseworker and job seeker behavior we show that vacancy referrals passed on from caseworkers to job seekers is the driving mechanism behind the positive direct effect. We also examine explanations for the displacement effect and show that displacement is not due to constrained resources, but arises in the labor market. A comparison between different meeting formats suggests that face-to-face meetings and distance meetings are more effective than group meetings. Despite the existence of displacement effects, when we incorporate our results into an equilibrium search model we find that a complete roll-out of the program would lead to lower unemployment and reduced government spending.
    Keywords: Vacancy referrals; Counseling; Job search; Randomized experiment
    JEL: C93 J64 J68
    Date: 2019–11–26
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1307&r=all
  7. By: Erik Ansink (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam); Louise Wijk (Amsterdam University College); Frederiek Zuidmeer (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
    Abstract: We analyze recycling decisions for bioplastics using a natural field experiment. The potential environmental benefits of these new plastics may not materialize if they are recycled incorrectly. The field experiment that we set up to test this recycling behavior exploits the setting of a lemonade tasting. In our experimental treatments, subjects are exposed to different types of bioplastics logos on their cups as well as varying amounts of recycling information. We use two types of bioplastics and compare these to conventional plastics in terms of whether subjects recycle the cups correctly. Our results show that over 90% of subjects dispose of their cup with plastic waste and that none of our treatments can snap subjects out of this default behavior. We interpret this finding as subjects having no clue how to recycle bioplastics. More generelly, these results point to skepticism regarding new products or varieties whose environmental benefits depend on proper use or disposal.
    Keywords: Recycling, field experiment, bioplastics
    JEL: Q53 C93
    Date: 2019–12–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tin:wpaper:20190084&r=all
  8. By: Niccolò Zaccaria
    Abstract: We based our work mainly on ‘Does Money Illusion Matter?’, by E. Fehr and J. R. Tyran (AER2001) in which the authors show experimental evidence of the presence of money illusion withinsubject groups. We build up a model which provides a formal and mathematical framework of theexperiment design, and it is in principle able to explain subjects’ behaviour within the experiment.Once we had analysed the dynamic properties of our model, we have run numerical simulationsin order to see whether we were able to get the same pattern found by the authors. It turns outthat not only our model is able to give a theoretical justification of the results found in the lab, butmoreover it is able to replicate the experimental series found by the two couple of authors, up to acertain degree of fitness. Then we used a replication of the original experiment by L. Petersen andA. Winn, ‘Does Money Illusion Matter?: Comment’, (AER 2014), to test for robustness of ourmodel.
    Keywords: Money Illusion, Computational Model, Experiments
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:frz:wpaper:wp2019_25.rdf&r=all
  9. By: John A. List (Department of Economics, University of Chicago; NBER); James J. Murphy (Department of Economics, University of Alaska, Anchorage; Economic Science Institute, Chapman University); Michael K. Price (Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, Culverhouse College of Commerce, University of Alabama; NBER); Alexander G. James (Department of Economics, University of Alaska, Anchorage)
    Abstract: We partnered with Alaska’s Pick.Click.Give. Charitable Contributions Program to implement a statewide natural field experiment with 540,000 Alaskans designed to explore whether targeted appeals emphasizing donor benefits through warm glow impact donations. Results highlight the relative import of appeals to self. Individuals who received such an appeal were 4.5 percent more likely to give and gave 20 percent more than counterparts in the control group. Yet, a message that instead appealed to recipient benefits had no effect on average donations relative to the control group. We also find evidence of long-run effects of warm glow appeals in the subsequent year.
    Keywords: Fields Experiment; Experimental Economics; Charitable Giving; Philanthropy, Warm Glow; Nonprofits; Altruism; Alaska; Permanent Fund Dividend
    JEL: C93 D01 D64 D91 H41 L30 L38 M31 M37
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-31&r=all
  10. By: Élisabeth Tovar; Matthieu Bunel
    Abstract: Using an original survey-experimental protocol, we study the normative acceptability of the trade-off between immoral profit (discrimination) and costly morality (non-discrimination). We test the causal influence of three factors: i) the origin of discrimination, ii) the steepness of the morality/profit trade-off and iii) anti-discriminatory moral injunctions. Contrasting with past experimental and attitudinal studies, we find that a significant minority of respondents believe that labor market discrimination is acceptable when morality results in profit loss. We also find that the three tested factors have significant effects on normative opinions. Respondents are more likely to choose profit over morality when discrimination is taste-based than when it is caused by imperfect information. Discrimination’s acceptability rises with the cost of non discrimination. Anti-discriminatory moral injunctions sharply reduces the acceptability of profitable discrimination.
    Keywords: discrimination, moral suasion, profit/morality trade-off, vignette survey experiment
    JEL: J23 J7 J78 C9
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:drm:wpaper:2019-25&r=all
  11. By: Felix Holzmeister; Martin Holmén; Michael Kirchler; Matthias Stefan; Erik Wengström
    Abstract: We run an online experiment with 408 nance professionals (money managers) and 550 subjects from the general population in Sweden (clients). We examine drivers of clients' delegation decisions, differences in decision-making quality between both groups, and professionals' ability to implement investment portfolios that suit the clients' risk attitudes. We find that clients' trust in money managers increases the likelihood of delegating their investment decisions, whereas decision-making quality is associated with a decrease. We further show that decision-making quality of nance professionals is not significantly higher compared to their clients' when controlling for risk taking. Finally, we observe high variability among professionals' perception of delegated risk levels and overlaps in portfolio risk across self-reported risk-levels of clients. This finding indicates that communicating risk between clients and professionals constitutes a potential pitfall in delegated investment decisions.
    Keywords: Experimental nance, nance professionals, delegated decision-making
    JEL: C93 G11
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:inn:wpaper:2019-21&r=all
  12. By: Brice Corgnet (Emlyon Business School); Brian Gunia (Carey Business School, Johns Hopkins University); Roberto Hernán González (Burgundy School of Business, Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté)
    Abstract: We study several solutions to shirking in teams that trigger social incentives by reshaping the workplace social context. Using an experimental design, we manipulate social pressure at work by varying the type of workplace monitoring and the extent to which employees engage in social interaction. This design allows us to assess the effectiveness as well as the popularity of each solution. Despite similar effectiveness in boosting productivity across solutions, only organizational systems involving social interaction (via chat) were at least as popular as a baseline treatment. This suggests that any solution based on promoting social interaction is more likely to be embraced by workers than monitoring systems alone.
    Keywords: Social Incentives; Social Pressure; Moral Hazard in Teams; Laboratory Experiments
    JEL: C92 D23 D91 M54
    Date: 2019
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:19-30&r=all
  13. By: Antoine Deeb; Cl\'ement de Chaisemartin
    Abstract: In the literature studying randomized controlled trials (RCTs), it is often assumed that the potential outcomes of units participating in the experiment are deterministic. This assumption is unlikely to hold, as stochastic shocks may take place during the experiment. In this paper, we consider the case of an RCT with individual-level treatment assignment, and we allow for individual-level and cluster-level (e.g. village-level) shocks to affect the potential outcomes. We show that one can draw inference on two estimands: the ATE conditional on the realizations of the cluster-level shocks, using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors; the ATE netted out of those shocks, using cluster-robust standard errors. By clustering, researchers can test if the treatment would still have had an effect, had the stochastic shocks that occurred during the experiment been different.
    Date: 2019–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1912.01052&r=all
  14. By: John Duffy (University of California, Irvine); Jean Paul Rabanal (Monash University); Olga A. Rud (RMIT University)
    Abstract: We examine how exchange traded funds (ETFs) affect asset pricing, volatility and trade volume in a laboratory asset market. We consider markets with zero or negative correlations in asset returns and the presence or absence of composite ETF assets. We find that when the returns on assets are negatively correlated, the presence of an ETF asset reduces mispricing and price volatility without decreasing trading volume. In the case where returns have zero correlation, the ETF asset has no impact. Thus, our findings suggest that ETFs do not harm, and may in fact improve, price discovery and liquidity in asset markets.
    Keywords: ETF, asset pricing, volatility, volume, experimental finance
    JEL: G11 G12 G14 C92
    Date: 2019–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:154&r=all
  15. By: Sylvain Bouveret; Renaud Blanch; Antoinette Baujard; François Durand; Herrade Igersheim; Jérôme Lang; Annick Laruelle; Jean-François Laslier; Isabelle Lebon (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Vincent Merlin (CREM - Centre de recherche en économie et management - UNICAEN - Université de Caen Normandie - NU - Normandie Université - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UNIV-RENNES - Université de Rennes - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: In April 2017, during the first round of the French presidential election, we performed a set of experiments on the use of voting rules. Participants to these experiments were asked to test several alternative voting methods, like approval voting, and other variants of evaluative voting. The experiments were both carried out in situ in polling stations during the first round of the presidential election (using paper ballots), and on line during the month preceding the first round, and until the second round of the election (using a web application). A total of 6358 participants took part to the in situ experiment and 37739 participants took part to the on line experiment. This paper describes the protocol of the in situ experiments and the format of the collected dataset.
    Keywords: Online Voting,Elections,Experiments,Voting Theory
    Date: 2019–11–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02379941&r=all
  16. By: Daunfeldt, Sven-Olov (Institute of Retail Economics (Handelns Forskningsinstitut)); Moradi, Jasmine (Space Sonology); Rudholm, Niklas (Institute of Retail Economics (Handelns Forskningsinstitut)); Öberg, Christina (Örebro University)
    Abstract: The effects of in-store music on consumer behavior have attracted much attention in the marketing literature, but surprisingly few studies have investigated in-store music in relation to employees. Conducting a large-scale field experiment in eight Filippa K fashion stores in Stockholm, Sweden, we investigate whether it is beneficial for store owners to give employees more opportunities to influence the in-store music. The experiment lasted 56 weeks, and the stores were randomly assigned into a treatment group and a control group, with the employees in the treatment stores having the opportunity to influence the in-store music through an app developed by Soundtrack Your Brand (SYB). The results from the experiment show that sales decreased by, on average, 6% in treatment stores when employees had the opportunity to influence the music played in the store. Interviews revealed that employees frequently changed songs, preferred to play high-intensity songs, and had diverse music preferences that were not congruent with the brand values of the company. Our results thus imply that employees choose music that suits their preferences rather than based on what is optimal for the store, suggesting that store owners might want to limit their opportunities to influence the background music in stores.
    Keywords: Background music; Brand-fit music; Music tempo; Consumer behavior; Job satisfaction; Atmospheric cues; Work environment; Field experiment
    JEL: C93 D22 L81 M31 M54
    Date: 2019–12–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:hfiwps:0004&r=all
  17. By: Christian Basteck; Bettina Klaus; Dorothea Kuebler
    Abstract: School authorities in the UK and the US advocate the use of lotteries to help desegregate schools. Inspired by the current school choice mechanism in Berlin, we study lottery quotas embedded in the deferred acceptance (DA) and immediate acceptance (IA) mechanisms. Some seats are allocated based on academic achievement (e.g.,grades) and some based on a lottery. We focus on the e ect of the lottery quota on truth-telling, stability, the utility of students, and the student composition at schools, using theory and experiments. We find that in theory a lottery quota strengthens truth-telling in DA by eliminating non-truth-telling equilibria. The equilibrium outcome of DA with a lottery is stable while this is not the case for IA with a lottery. Both predictions are borne out in the experiment. Moreover,the lottery quota leads to more diverse school populations in the experiment, as predicted. Comparing the two mechanisms, students with the lowest grades profit more from the introduction of the lottery under IA than under DA.
    Keywords: School choice, immediate acceptance mechanism, deferred acceptance mechanism, lotteries, experiment, market design
    JEL: C78 C91 D82 I24
    Date: 2019–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lau:crdeep:19.09&r=all
  18. By: Huber, Christoph (University of Innsbruck); Huber, Juergen; Hueber, Laura
    Abstract: With a large-scale online experiment with 1593 participants from the U.S. and the U.K. we explore whether and how people working in the finance industry and laypeople from the general population are influenced by information on other people’s forecasts when making forecasts on the future development of two indices and two stocks. We find that (i) laypeople’s forecasts are strongly influenced by information they get on other subjects’ forecasts, while financial professionals are much less influenced by information signals; (ii) signals by financial professionals influence all subject groups more than forecasts by laypeople; (iii) we observe a home bias in all subject groups, which can be mitigated by information signals; (iv) all subject groups expect lower forecast errors for financial professionals than for laypeople, hence we find evidence for trust in experts.
    Date: 2019–08–18
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:57m6g&r=all
  19. By: Samuele Giambra (Brown University); David McKenzie (World Bank)
    Abstract: There is a widespread policy view that a lack of job opportunities at home is a key reason for migration, accompanied by suggestions of the need to spend more on creating these opportunities so as to reduce migration. Self-employment is widespread in poor countries, and faced with a lack of existing jobs, providing more opportunities for people to start businesses is a key policy option. But empirical evidence to support this idea is slight, and economic theory offers several reasons why the self-employed may in fact be more likely to migrate. We put together panel surveys from eight countries to descriptively examine the relationship between migration and self-employment, finding that the self-employed are indeed less likely to migrate than either wage workers or the unemployed. We then analyze seven randomized experiments that increased self-employment, and find their causal impacts on migration are negative on average, but often small in magnitude.
    Keywords: internal migration; international migration, self-employment, migrant selection,randomized experiment
    JEL: F22 J61 O15
    Date: 2019–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crm:wpaper:1912&r=all
  20. By: Sylvain Chareyron (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Samuel Gorohouna (LARJE - Laboratoire de Recherches Juridique et Economique - UNC - Université de la Nouvelle Calédonie); Yannick l'Horty (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Pascale Petit (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Catherine Ris (LARJE - Laboratoire de Recherches Juridique et Economique - UNC - Université de la Nouvelle Calédonie)
    Keywords: discrimination,rental market,tipping - point
    Date: 2019–10–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02334132&r=all
  21. By: Brecht Neyt; Stijn Baert; Jana Vynckier (-)
    Abstract: Research exploiting data on classic (offline) couple formation has confirmed predictions from evolutionary psychology in a sense that males attach more value to attractiveness and women attach more value to earnings potential. We examine whether these human partner preferences survive in a context of fewer search and social frictions. We do this by means of a field experiment on the mobile dating app Tinder, which takes a central place in contemporary couple formation. Thirty-two fictitious Tinder profiles that randomly differ in job status and job prestige are evaluated by 4,800 other, real users. We find that both males and females do not use job status or job prestige as a determinant of whom to show initial interest in on Tinder. However, we do see evidence that, after this initial phase, males less frequently begin a conversation with females when those females are unemployed but also then do not care about the particular job prestige of employed females.
    Keywords: job prestige, partner preferences, dating apps, online dating, Tinder
    JEL: J12 J16 J13 C93
    Date: 2019–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:19/981&r=all
  22. By: Jaelle Scheuerman; Jason L. Harman; Nicholas Mattei; K. Brent Venable
    Abstract: In many collective decision making situations, agents vote to choose an alternative that best represents the preferences of the group. Agents may manipulate the vote to achieve a better outcome by voting in a way that does not reflect their true preferences. In real world voting scenarios, people often do not have complete information about other voter preferences and it can be computationally complex to identify a strategy that will maximize their expected utility. In such situations, it is often assumed that voters will vote truthfully rather than expending the effort to strategize. However, being truthful is just one possible heuristic that may be used. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of heuristics in single winner and multi-winner approval voting scenarios with missing votes. In particular, we look at heuristics where a voter ignores information about other voting profiles and makes their decisions based solely on how much they like each candidate. In a behavioral experiment, we show that people vote truthfully in some situations and prioritize high utility candidates in others. We examine when these behaviors maximize expected utility and show how the structure of the voting environment affects both how well each heuristic performs and how humans employ these heuristics.
    Date: 2019–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1912.00011&r=all
  23. By: Prieto, Stacy; Bauchet, Jonathan; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob
    Keywords: Crop Production/Industries, Farm Management
    Date: 2019–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae19:295682&r=all
  24. By: Hippolyte d'Albis (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics); Giuseppe Attanasi (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis - UCA - Université Côte d'Azur - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Emmanuel Thibault (TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales)
    Keywords: Self-insurance,annuity,uncertain survival probabilities,smooth ambiguity aversion,charity,experiment
    Date: 2019–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02132858&r=all
  25. By: Akinwehinmi, Joseph Oluwagbenga; Amos, Taye Timothy; Ogundari, Kolawole
    Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis, Crop Production/Industries
    Date: 2019–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae19:295715&r=all
  26. By: Ndegwa, Michael K.; Shee, Apurba; Turvey, Calum G.; You, Liangzhi
    Keywords: Agricultural Finance
    Date: 2019–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae19:295782&r=all
  27. By: Nindi, Tabitha; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob; Bauchet, Jonathan
    Keywords: Crop Production/Industries, Farm Management
    Date: 2019–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae19:295698&r=all
  28. By: Julien Grenet (PSE - Paris School of Economics, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Yinghua He (Rice University [Houston], TSE - Toulouse School of Economics - UT1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales); Dorothea Kübler (WZB - Social Science Research Center Berlin - Social Science Research Center Berlin, Technical University Berlin)
    Abstract: The matching literature commonly assumes that every agent's preferences are time-invariant and known to herself at the outset. Consequently, market centralization is preferred. We find counterevidence from a quasi-experiment in Germany's university admissions---a clearinghouse that implements the early stages of the deferred-acceptance mechanism in real time, resembling a decentralized market with continuous offers, rejections, and acceptances. We show that early offers are accepted more often than later ones, despite not being more desirable. These results and survey evidence imply that it is costly for students to learn about universities. We propose a hybrid, welfare-improving mechanism that balances centralization and decentralization.
    Keywords: Centralized Matching Market,Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance,Mechanism,University Admissions,Early Offers,Information Acquisition
    Date: 2019–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-02146792&r=all
  29. By: Loic Du Parquet (GAINS - Groupe d'Analyse des Itinéraires et des Niveaux Salariaux - UM - Le Mans Université); Pascale Petit (ERUDITE - Equipe de Recherche sur l’Utilisation des Données Individuelles en lien avec la Théorie Economique - UPEM - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée - UPEC UP12 - Université Paris-Est Créteil Val-de-Marne - Paris 12)
    Abstract: This paper is a general presentation and discussion about field experiments on hiring discrimination focusing on implementation, results and limits of this experimental procedure. Most of field experiments applied to french labor market show that job applicants are at risk to face discriminations about gender, ethnic origin, location of housing and presumed religion.
    Abstract: Cet article présente et discute les différents aspects de la méthode du testing : sa mise en œuvre, sa portée et ses limites. Un survol des principales études réalisées sur le marché du travail français depuis deux décennies montre l'existence de discriminations à l'embauche en raison du sexe, de l'origine, de la réputation du lieu de résidence et de la religion supposée des candidats à l'emploi.
    Date: 2019–10–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-02333816&r=all
  30. By: Joyce He; Sonia Kang; Nicola Lacetera
    Abstract: In most organizations, promotions often require self-nomination and competition among applicants. However, research on gender differences in preferences for competition suggests that this process might result in fewer women choosing to participate. We study whether changing promotion schemes from a default where applicants must opt in (i.e., self-nominate) to a default where applicants must opt out (i.e., they are automatically considered for promotion, but can choose not to be considered) attenuates gender differences. In our first experiment, although women are less likely than men to choose competitive environments under the traditional opt-in framing, in the opt-out system both women and men have the same participation rate as men in the opt-in system. The increase in participation of women into competition is not associated with negative consequences on performance or well-being. In our second experiment, we show that opt-out framing does not entail penalties from evaluators making decisions about whom to hire. These results support the promise of choice architecture to reduce disparities in organizations. More generally, our findings suggest that gender differences in attitudes toward completion may be context-dependent.
    JEL: C91 D03 D91 J16 J24 J82 M5
    Date: 2019–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26484&r=all
  31. By: Ajzenman, Nicolas (São Paulo School of Economics-FGV); López Bóo, Florencia (Inter-American Development Bank)
    Abstract: A growing literature shows how insights from behavioral economics can be successfully adopted in simple interventions through SMS or other types of low-cost communications. In this short, note we provide concrete basic guidelines to design behaviorally informed messages, based on theory and our own experience. We provide examples applied to parenting interventions.
    Keywords: behavioral interventions, parenting, child development, poverty
    JEL: D9 D90 D91 I15 I38 J38
    Date: 2019–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12808&r=all
  32. By: Farago, Adam; Holmén, Martin; Holzmeister, Felix (University of Innsbruck); Kirchler, Michael; Razen, Michael
    Abstract: By running a battery of incentivized and non-incentivized experiments with fund managers from four countries in the European Union, we investigate the impact of fund managers' cognitive skills and economic preferences on the dynamics of the mutual funds they manage. First, we find that fund managers' risk tolerance positively correlates with fund risk when accounting for fund benchmark, fund category, and other controls. Second, we show that fund managers' ambiguity tolerance positively correlates with the funds' tracking error from the benchmark. Finally, we report that cognitive skills do not explain fund performance in terms of excess returns. However, we do find that fund managers with high cognitive reflection abilities generate these returns at lower risk.
    Date: 2019–07–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:964ba&r=all
  33. By: Omotilewa, Oluwatoba; Ricker-Gilbert, Jacob
    Keywords: Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession, Research and Development/Tech Change/Emerging Technologies
    Date: 2019–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:aaae19:295762&r=all

General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.